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“WAR IN SPACE: WHY NOT?”
A NEOREALIST ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE POLITICS  
(1957-2018)
EIRIK BILLINGSØ ELVEVOLD
ABSTRACT
Why has there never been a space war? The most powerful states on Earth – the US,
China, Russia –  have all developed anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), but they have never
used them to destroy each others satellites. This master thesis in International relations (IR)
finds that the distribution of space power in the international system has so far been prone to
peace in space, but the distribution is gradually becoming more dangerous. A history of
international politics between 1957 and 2018 is analysed using a theoretical framework built
on four  different  neorealist  theories.  If  defined widely,  neorealism can include at  least
defensive neorealism (DN), offensive neorealism (ON), power transition theory (PTT) and
hegemonic stability theory (HST). The four theories have much in common, but are divided
on the question of war. DN and ON argues that a bipolar balance of power is the safest
system and multipolarity the most dangerous. PTT and HST argues that a preponderance
of power is the safest and power parity the main threat. Two hypotheses, one for each
“camp”,  are  formulated  from  the  theories  and  tested  against  historical  evidence  on
international space politics in the period between 1957 and 2018. The conclusion is that the
distribution of space power has been bipolar in the First Space Age and unipolar in the
Second Space, but in the underlying components of space power neither the USSR/Russia
or China ever reached up to the US. However, China is rapidly catching up with the US both
in space power and the underlying components – and so are other powerful states. The
distribution of space power In the international system is becoming more multipolar, and a
rising challenger is approaching parity with the dominant one. Thus, according to both
camps of neorealism, the world is entering a period with higher risk for space war. The
thesis  aims  to  be  a  stepping  stone.  Even  neorealism,  a  prominent  school  within  the
dominant realist paradigm, has rarely been used to analyse international space politics. The
goal of the thesis is to fill a gap in the growing IR literature on space and experiment with
neorealism to inspire further research on the topic. 
KEYWORDS: international  relations,  international  space politics,  neorealism,  outer  space,  space,  space
security, space war, war. 
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“GUERRA NO ESPAÇO: PORQUE NÃO?”
UM ANÁLISE NEOREALISTA DA POLÍTICA ESPACIAL INTERNATIONAL 
 (1957-2018) 
EIRIK BILLINGSØ ELVEVOLD
RESUMO
Por que nunca houve uma guerra espacial? As Grandes Potências - EUA, China e Rússia -
desenvolveram armas anti-satélite  (ASATs),  mas nunca as utilizaram para  destruir  os
satélites uns dos outros. Esta dissertação de mestrado em Relações Internacionais (RI) visa
evidenciar que a distribuição do poder espacial no sistema internacional tem sido até agora
propensa à paz no espaço, mas a mesma distribuição tende a tornar-se gradualmente mais
perigosa. Uma história da política internacional entre 1957 e 2018 é analisada recorrendo a
um quadro teórico construído sobre quatro diferentes teorias neo-realistas. Se amplamente
definido,  o  neo-realismo  pode  incluir,  o  neo-realismo  defensivo  (DN),  o  neo-realismo
ofensivo (ON), a teoria da transição de poder (PTT) e a teoria da estabilidade hegemónica
(HST). As quatro abordagens têm muito em comum, mas dividem-se sobre a questão da
guerra.  DN  e  ON  argumentam  que  a  bipolaridade  é  a  estrutura  mais  segura  e  a
multipolaridade a mais perigosa. PTT e HST argumentam que uma preponderância de
poder permite maior segurança, enquanto que a sua paridade é a principal ameaça. Duas
hipóteses, uma para cada “campo”, são formuladas a partir das teorias e testadas contra
evidências históricas da política espacial internacional no período compreendido entre 1957
e 2018. A conclusão é que a distribuição do poder espacial foi bipolar na Primeira Era
Espacial  e  unipolar  na Segunda,  mas a nível  de componentes  subjacentes  ao poder
espacial, nem a URSS / Rússia nem a China alcançam os EUA. No entanto, a China – e
outras potências - está a alcançar rapidamente os EUA tanto no poder espacial quanto nos
componentes subjacentes. A distribuição do poder espacial no sistema internacional tende
a tornar-se multipolar, e uma potência desafiante aproxima-se da paridade com o poder
dominante. Assim, de acordo com os dois campos do neo-realismo, entramos num período
com maior risco de guerra espacial. Esta dissertação pretende funcionar como ponto de
partida  e  “trampolim”.  Mesmo  o  neorrealismo,  uma  escola  proeminente  dentro  do
paradigma  realista  dominante,  raramente  é  utilizado  para  analisar  a  política  espacial
internacional. O objetivo da dissertação é preencher uma lacuna na crescente literatura de
RI sobre o espaço, utilizando o neorrealismo para inspirar mais pesquisas sobre o tema.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE:  espaço,  guerra,  guerra  no  espaço,  neorealismo,  política  espacial  internacional,
relações internacionais, segurança no espaço.
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“War in Space – Why Not?”
A Neorealist Analysis of International Space Politics (1957-2018)
INTRODUCTION  
“You spend even a little time contemplating the Earth from orbit
and the most deeply engrained nationalisms begin to erode. 
They seem the squabbles of mites on a plum.” 
– Carl Sagan, Pale Blue Dot.1
The words of Carl Sagan, an American astronomer, express some of the existing optimism about
international politics in outer space. Many view space as a second chance for mankind. They dream
of space becoming a sanctuary of peace, safe from the forces that have lead us to kill each other in
wars on Earth. According to Sheehan, the idea of a space sanctuary is “as old as the space age
itself”2, but has space ever actually been a sanctuary? Space cooperation could perhaps mitigate the
risks of conflict spreading beyond the atmosphere. The perspective gained from seeing our own
planet from the outside could unite our nations, expose our common vulnerability and motivate us
to work together for all humanity. This thesis, however, will go on to make the assumption, as a
worst case scenario, that we have brought our nationalisms – our “squabbles of mite” as Sagan
would say – with us to space. 
The main question is: why have states never fought a war in space? To answer the question,
a neorealist framework is applied to a history of the international space politics. By analysing the
distribution of space power among the most powerful states in space over time, some conclusions
can be drawn on the causes and likelihood of space war. The thesis is based on three chapters.
Chapter I establishes a neorealist theoretical framework for analysing international space politics.
Chapter II presents a descriptive international political history of the US, the USSR/Russia and
China in space between 1957 and 2018. Chapter III is an analysis of the historical evidence
presented in Chapter II using the theoretical framework established in Chapter I. The conclusion is a
synthesis of three partial conclusions made at the end of each of the three chapters. 
In short, the thesis concludes that the distribution of space power in the international system
1 Carl Sagan, Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the Human Future in Space (New York: Ballantine Books,1997), 104.
2 Michael Sheehan, The International Politics of Space (London: Routledge, 2007), 6.
1
has been prone to peace so far in the Space Age. In the First Space Age, there was a bipolar space
power balance between the US and the USSR. In the Second Space Age, there was a US
preponderance of space power. Now, however, the world is facing multipolarity in space. At the
same time, China is catching up with the US at the top of the hierarchy. As this thesis will show,
four different neorealist theories conclude that the risk of space war is increasing. The causes of
space war seem to be largely the same as the causes of major war on Earth. Space power is deeply
interlinked with power – especially nuclear power and missile technology. A future war in space is
therefore unlikely to occur without a large-scale conflict on Earth – and vice versa. 
Space War is a Real-World Scenario
Space has become crucial to our modern way of life. Satellites allow us to link vast distances,
gather information, improve education, expand medical resources and create jobs. There would be
no internet, no international money transfers, no cheap mobile phone calls, satellite TV or GPS
without the thousands of manmade machines circling the planet in space.3 Satellites monitor crop
yields to avoid famine, organize large refugee camps, monitor ship traffic, uncover ethnic cleansing
and research climate change.4 The list of possible applications seems endless. 
Space war, however, is still a prospect of science fiction for most people, but a space war
could break out tomorrow. A real-world space war scenario would not look like Star Wars. There
would not be any colossal spacecraft, fighting each other in far-off galaxies. Nonetheless, the most
powerful states on Earth, the United States (US), Russia (formerly the USSR) and China (The
People's Republic of China), have already developed and tested counterspace capabilities.5 The
most important sub-group of counterspace capabilities are anti-satellite weapons, often referred to
as ASATs, that can destroy satellites in orbit. A surprising Chinese ASAT test in 2007 –  the first
test globally since 1985 – created record-breaking amounts of space debris and was quickly
countered by another US ASAT test.6 The new superpower exchange in space made one thing clear:
a space war could ruin the space environment forever. 
Weapons have not yet been permanently placed in space, but satellites are actively used in
warfare on Earth. Space has been militarised, but not yet weaponised. Modern armies, navies and
air forces use satellites like augmented eyes, ears and voices in the sky. Missiles hit the right target
3 Ibid, 6.
4 Ibid, 7.
5 Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, eds, Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment 
(Washington, D.C.: Secure World Foundation, 2018).
6 Laura Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs (Cambridge: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2012). 
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in all types of weather, classified communications are kept secure and intelligence is gathered from
enemy territory – all using satellites.7 Information – delivered through material space capabilities –
is the primary military benefit from space.8 It provides “critical war-fighting capabilities”9 –
military advantages that once seemed unimaginable. Satellite navigation systems like GPS, for
example, can be used to track and identify friendly and unfriendly forces, conduct minesweeping
operations and convert unguided free-fall bombs into accurate smart bombs.10 In short, states use
space to keep their citizens safe and to project power on the battlefield of the 21st century. 
Are We Headed for Space War?
The launch of Sputnik – the first manmade satellite in history – in 1957 triggered a superpower
space race between the US and the USSR. According to McDougall, the space race “climaxed with
the Moon race, declined with detente, and died when the USSR died”11. After the collapse of the
USSR in 1991, the US emerged as the preeminent global space power. Today, the US has the best
military space technology, fields the most operational satellites in orbit and leads the global
aerospace industry.12 The Trump administration has launched a plan to establish a US Space Force –
after a long-running debate in the US congress and senate – to closer match the military
organisation in Russia and China.13 Russia still has a place among the top players in space due to
unique space capabilities and experience, but still lags behind the US due to “a lost decade in space”
in the 1990s.14 
Sixty years after Sputnik, the total number of space actors has grown significantly. China
has “moved more quickly in developing a wider range of military space capabilities than any
previous spacefaring state”15, independently achieved human spaceflight, tested ASATs, launched a
space station and soon made a global satellite navigation system. Ten states, including France,
Japan, India, Israel, Iran, North Korea and South Korea, have now independently developed space
7 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), preface. 
8 James C. Moltz, Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 
13.
9 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, 6. 
10 Ibid, 44. 
11 Walter A. McDougall, Walter, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic 
Books, 1985), xvi. 
12 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, preface, 6. 
13 Helene Cooper, “Pence Advances Plan to Create A Space Force,” New York Times, August 9, 2018.  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/us/politics/trump-pence-space-force.html  . 
14 Igor I. Kuznetsov, “Russian Space Launch Programs,” in Handbook of Space Security, ed. Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Peter 
L. Hays, Jana Robinson, Denis Moura and Christina Giannopapa (New York: Springer, 2015), 777.
15 Peter L. Hays, Space and Security (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 93. 
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launch capabilities.16 More than fifty states have operated satellites in space17, and the total number
of operational satellites in orbit is, according to the latest UN estimate, 1.957.18 The largest satellite
in orbit, the International Space Station (ISS), is a joint venture between the US, Russia, the
European Space Agency (ESA), Canada and Japan.19 The number of non-state actors, like
companies, universities and international organizations, has also skyrocketed.20 
The “unprecedented increase in space faring nations”21 is much due to a revolution in
information technology.22 The third industrial revolution is based on rapid technological advances in
computers, communications, and software that have cut the cost of processing and transmitting
information.23 As a consequence, the technology, skills and knowledge necessary for spaceflight is
spreading internationally through companies, trade, migration, education, and the flow of ideas.24 In
2017, a record-breaking space launch painted a clear picture of the new reality in space, when India
launched 104 nano-satellites, weighing less than 10 kilograms each, on behalf of private companies
from the US, Israel, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates.25
Shortly after, SpaceX became the first private space launch company to successfully launch and
land a reusable space launch vehicle (SLV) twice, raising optimism for cheaper spaceflight in the
future.2627
An international regime from the Cold War is supposed to prevent a space war from
happening, but its limits are becoming painstakingly clear. In the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of
1967, states commit to the peaceful uses of space and ban weapons of mass destruction in orbit.28
After the Sputnik launch, the UN established the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
16 Moltz, Crowded Orbits, 32. 
17 Brian Weeden, “U.S.-China Cooperation in Space: Constraints, Possibilities, and Options,” in Anti-satellite 
Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, ed. Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (Washington D.C.:
Stimson Center, 2013), 119. 
18 “UCS Satellite Database,” Union of Concerned Scientists, accessed April 27, 2019, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-
weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database#.WLAqnRKLR-U.  
19 Ibid.
20 Alessandra Vernile, The Rise of Private Actors in the Space Sector (Basel: Springer International Publishing, 2018). 
21 Anna, Burzykowska, “Smaller states and the new balance of power in space,” Space Policy 25, no. 3 (2009): 187,  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2009.05.006. 
22 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, 29. 
23 Joseph S. Nye Jr. and David A Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory 
and History  (Boston: Pearson, 2011), 268-269. 
24 Ibid, 305. 
25 Michael Safi, “India launches record-breaking 104 satellites from single rocket,” The Guardian, February 2, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/feb/15/india-launches-record-breaking-104-satellites-from-single-rocket 
26 Chelsea Leu, “Watch SpaceX launch its first truly reusable rocket,” Wired, March 30, 2017, 
https://www.wired.com/2017/03/watch-spacex-launch-first-truly-reusable-rocket/ 
27 William Harwood, “SpaceX Falcon Heavy launch puts on spectacular show in maiden flight,” CBS News, February 
6, 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/spacex-falcon-heavy-launch-spectacular-maiden-flight/ 
28 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, accessed April 27, 2019, 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html 
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(COPUOS), which remains the main arena for international space cooperation.29 However,
COPUOS can be a slow bureaucracy , and the OST has no clear rules for conventional weapons.30
The “loophole” came to light when China and US tested ASATs in 2007 and 2008, and in 2019
when India followed suit.31 These facts point to the potential usefulness of realism, which explains
the failure of international cooperation with fear for relative gains favouring competitors under the
insecurity of anarchy.32
Two analogies – sea power and air power – support the idea that space war is inevitable. As
humans took control of those elements, they eventually became battlespaces. Mahan writes of this
trend when he concludes that “[t]he history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a
narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in
war”33. The inevitability thesis has a prominent place in US, Russian and Chinese perspectives on
space weaponization.34 To counter US space dominance, Russia and China have tried to ban space-
based weapons while developing military space capabilities. However, the US, described as
“extraordinarily dependent on space”35, has protected its rights to defend its own space assets.
Simply put, the US has less to gain and more to lose from banning space weapons than Russia and
China. 
The security dilemma, a term first coined by John Herz, describes “the condition in which
states, unsure of one another’s intentions, arm for the sake of security and in doing so set a vicious
circle in motion”36. The inherent dual-use nature of space technology seems to suggest just this
condition apply to space as well as Earth. Most space assets are considered to be valuable to both
the military and the civilian sector.37 Pictures taken by imagery satellites can be used to target
weapons and monitor crop yields, and a missile defence system on Earth could attack satellites in
orbit more easily than incoming missiles.38 The lacking distinction between offensive and defensive
29 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 128.
30 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.”
31 Jeffrey Gettleman and Hari Kumar, “India Shot Down Satellite, Modi Says, Shifting Balance of Power in Asia,” 
New York Times, March 27, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/world/asia/india-weather-satellite-missle.html.
32 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories & Approaches (Oxford: 
Oxford: University Press, 2010), 116-117. 
33 Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (New York: Dover Publications, 1987), 1.
34 Columba Peoples, “Assuming the Inevitable? Overcoming the Inevitability of Outer Space Weaponization and 
Conflict,” Contemporary Security Policy 29, no. 3 (2008): 503. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260802514811 
35 Michael Krepon, Theresa Hitchens and Michael Katz-Hyman, “Preserving Freedom of Action in Space: Realizing 
the Potential And Limits of U.S. Spacepower,” in Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, ed. by Charles D. 
Lutes and Peter L. Hays with Vincent A. Manzo. Lisa M. Yambrik, and M. Elaine Bunn (Washington, D.C.: Institute 
for National Strategic Studies - National Defense University, 2011).  
36 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: Addison-Wesley, Longman Higher Education, 1979), 
185. 
37 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, 6-7.
38 Moltz, Crowded Orbits, 31. 
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weapons, together with the inherent vulnerability of satellites, feed zero-sum approaches and first-
strike mentalities to space security.39 In sum, IR theory in general and realism in particular could
provide crucial insights that can help us explain space security. 
Can IR Theory Explain The Lack of Space War? 
A theoretical framework is needed in order to analyse the history of international space politics. IR
deals with the likelihood of war between states. However, Walt argues that no single IR approach
can “capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics”, so “we are better off with a diverse
array of competing idea rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy”.40 Walt goes on to describe the
boundaries between different IR traditions as “somewhat fuzzy”, but concludes that the study of
state interaction is “best understood as a protracted competition between the realist, liberal and
radical traditions”.41 More specifically, constructivism has appeared as the most potent radical
challenger to the overlapping mainstream, materialistic theories of realism and liberalism after
marxism rendered itself rather marginal in the 1980s.42 Constructivism does not, however, “offer a
unified a unified set of predictions” on the most important issues of IR.43 
As the dominant paradigm of IR, realism has been the natural starting point for building the
framework needed for this thesis. Building on a scholarly body dating back several millennia to the
writings of Thucydides, prominent realists like Machiavelli, Hobbes, Morgenthau, Kennan, Wight,
Bull, Waltz and Mearsheimer have remained pessimistic about the future of international politics.44
Realists claim that the security dilemma can be mitigated, but never solved.45 They are divided in
their answers as to why wars occur, but a few fundamental conclusions about international politics
unite them. States are the central actors, and the use of force is the central problem.46 Anarchy – the
lack of world government – brings insecurity that influences state behaviour, forcing states to seek
survival through power politics.47 In their opinion, there seems to be an enduring logic to anarchy,
meaning, in short, that future wars are inevitable. Anarchy is not equal to a state of constant war,
but the risk of war will remain high until an unlikely global government upends anarchy. States will
39 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, 22. 
40 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 110, Special Edition: 
Frontiers of Knowledge (1998): 30. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid, 32. 
43 Ibid, 41. 
44 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, 22.  
45 Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 93. 
46 Nye and Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, 4. 
47 Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 93. 
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always be wary of relative gains because cooperation easily can end up helping the most powerful.48
When is there peace? The traditional realist answer is that a balance of power – an
equilibrium in the distribution of military capabilities between states or blocks of states –  make war
too costly.49 A disequilibrium in the balance of power, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of
war. Classical realists explain international conflict by states´ innate desire to dominate others and
focus on the moral dilemmas of statesmanship and explicit foreign policy.50 Similarly, neoclassical
realists seek to explain the foreign policy strategies of individual states.51 The goal of this thesis,
however, is not to explain why an individual state did not go to space war in a specific scenario, but
to explain why space war has not been an outcome of international space politics during the entire
Space Age. 
Structural realism or neorealism explains war as an outcome from the interaction of rational
actors trying to position themselves in “an exogenously given obstacle course”52.. The likelihood of
war is explained by the distribution of capabilities that affect state interaction.53 Neorealism, as well
as structural strains of liberalism, was born from the attempt to create formal, deductive IR theories
modelled on microeconomics in the 1980s.54 Waltz´s defensive neorealism (DN)55 and
Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism (ON)56 – two structural, realist balance of power theories –
hold that international system with a balance of power between only two major powers, bipolar
systems, are more safe than multipolar systems with many major powers. Unipolar systems are not
considered to be peaceful or stable because they quickly turn into multipolar systems due to
balancing behaviour against the most powerful state. However, Wohlforth argues that US
unipolarity is stable, peaceful and durable.57 Two other strains of structural realism, Organski´s
power transition theory (PTT)58 and Gilpin´s hegemonic stability theory (HST)59, hold that an
international system with one preponderant state is the least war prone and the most stable because
the risk of war increased during moments of power parity between great powers with different
growth rates. These theories have been included in the analysis on the basis of Taliaferro´s
48 Ibid, 116-117. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 44, 75. 
51 Jeffery W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 25, 
no. 3 (2001): 131, https://doi.org/10.1162/016228800560543.   
52 Craig Parsons, How to Map Arguments in Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 65. 
53 Scott Pace, “How far – if at all – should the USA cooperate with China in space?,” Space Policy 27, no. 3 (2011): 
127-130. 
54 Nye and Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, 7. 
55 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
56 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014). 
57 William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994-1995): 91-
129, doi: 10.2307/2539080. 
58 Abramo F. K. Organski, World Politics, (New York: Knopf, 1958). 
59 Robert Gilpin, War and change in world politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
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argument that “debates within particular research traditions, not debates between them, are more
likely to general theoretical progress”60. For that purpose, PTT and HST, which are located on the
fringe of neorealism, but share core assumptions with DN and ON, could provide useful,
contrasting conclusions and predictions. 
Liberal scholars, like Keohane and Nye, and constructivist scholars, like Wendt and
Finnemore, are the strongest challengers to realists.61 Both concede that anarchy brings some level
of insecurity to international politics, but keep a more positive outlook on the future than realists.
Liberalism can be summarized in the following three assumptions: «(1) a positive view of human
nature; (2) a conviction that international relations can be cooperative rather than conflictual; and,
(3) a belief in progress.»62 For constructivists, ideas – not material faces – are the most important
structures in IR.63 Snyder argues that “[w]hereas realists dwell on the balance of power and liberals
on the power of international trade and democracy, constructivists believe that debates about ideas
are the fundamental building blocks of international life”64. In sum, liberals and constructivists view
international insecurity as a real problem, but one which can be fixed by rational individuals,
collective security and international cooperation.
Liberalism and constructivism suggest that space war has been avoided because of a
growing interdependence among states, well-crafted institutions, new actors, soft power, spreading
norms and changing identities.65 In their view, sates are happy to cooperate if they can achieve
absolute gains.66 Liberalism could therefore be fruitful in explaining how international institutions
foster space cooperation or the changing role of private space actors. Regime theory could explain
how rules and institutions govern complex space activities and the private space economy. Soft
power theory could explain how states use space activities to make others want to achieve the same
goals as themselves. Similarly, a constructivist approach could open the blackbox in which
identities and interests are created and reshaped through international space politics. To paraphrase
Wendt, space might be whatever states make of it. 
There are several reasons for why neorealist theory still is the most fruitful choice of theory.
First of all, there is a wide gap in the existing IR literature on space. The dominant, but largely
unused theories of structural realism or neorealism thus seem well suited for a thesis on
60 Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” 130. 
61 Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” 32. 
62 Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 95. 
63 Ibid, 127. 
64 Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy, October 26, 2009,  
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/26/one-world-rival-theories/.  
65 Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 125, 179. 
66 Ibid, 116-117. 
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international space politics or space security. Neorealism can explain how international space
politics is shaped by anarchy, insecurity and dual-use space technology.67 Space activities seem to
be organised around what Dahrendorf has labelled “conflict groups”68, in this case nation states, and
not the individuals and ideas emphasized in liberalism and constructivism.69 The most powerful
states on Earth have the most influence in space because weaker states are hindered by the cost of
developing and maintaining an advanced military space programs.70 The US and China – the two
most powerful states on Earth – have little to no cooperation in space.71 COPUOS has been
criticised for being highly ineffective.72 The ISS, in spite of being an international joint venture,
remains dominated by the US in its decision-making processes.73 Ultimately, military space
programs continue to be a priority among the most powerful states.74 
Problems and Hypotheses 
The research question is only a starting point. New problems must be formulated and answered in
order to limit and clarify the analysis. Central concepts must be defined. What is a space war? What
is space security? Which actors should be studied? In which time period? Furthermore, the
relationship between Earth and space must be addressed. Can IR theory, made to study and explain
international politics on Earth, be used to study international space politics? Is international space
politics exogenous to international politics? Is space part of the international system? What
separates space power from power? 
The thesis will analyse the most powerful units operating in space and the distribution of
space power among them throughout history. Space will be functionally defined as “beginning at
the  lowest  perigee  required  for  orbit  and  extending  out  to  infinity”  because  this  is  the  most
commonly  used  definition  internationally.75 International  space  politics  is  defined  simply  as
“international  politics  related  to  activities  above  the  lowest  perigee  for  orbit”  in  order  to  best
explore a still unfamiliar object of study in IR. The dependent variable – space war – is defined per
67 McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth. 
68 Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. 
Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 305.
69 Max M. Mutschler, “Security Cooperation in Space and International Relations Theory,” in Handbook of Space 
Security, ed. Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Peter L. Hays, Jana Robinson, Denis Moura and Christina Giannopapa (New York: 
Springer, 2015), 42. 
70 Brian E. Fredriksson, Globalness: Toward a Space Power Theory (Maxwell: US Air Force Air University Press, 
2006), 36. 
71 Pace, “How far – if at all – should the USA cooperate with China in space?,” 127-130. 
72 Dolman, Astropolitik, 137-138.
73 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, 12-13. 
74 Ibid, 23. 
75 John J. Klein, Space Warfare (London: Routledge, 2014), 6. 
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Klein as when two or more states overtly destroy each others space assets through offensive
action.76 Space security is defined according the OST and the Space Security Index as “the secure
and sustainable access to, and use of, space and freedom from space-based threats”77. 
The independent variable will be the distribution of space power between states in the
international system. Space power is defined as an actor´s material resources as opposed to its
behaviour. The international system is a set of politically interrelated units, and structure describes
the configuration of the units. Any person or body whose decisions and actions have repercussions
for international politics can be treated as an actor, but realism is mostly concerned with the
strongest states.78 The state units will be limited to the US, the USSR/Russia and China. The EU,
Japan and India are also important states in space, but they have all historically lacked the military
space capabilities necessary to wage space war.798081 
International space regimes will be defined per Krasner as “sets of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations
converge in a given area of international relations”.82 In this case, the given area would be
international space politics, ultimately defining international space regimes as sets of implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations
converge in international space politics. 
The time scope of the thesis is limited to the period in which humans have been materially
present in space, most commonly known as the Space Age. Thus, the historical analysis will be
limited to the years between 1957 and 2018. The starting point – 1957 – is chosen because the
Space Age began when the USSR launched the first satellite, Sputnik I, in 1957. The end point,
2018, is chosen as the last full calender year before the delivery of the thesis. The Space Age will be
further divided in two separate periods per Hays and Lutes83, Harding84 and Cremins85. The First
Space Age (1957-1991), from the Sputnik launch the fall of the USSR and the Gulf War, and the
Second Space Age (1991-) both have distinct features and “offers signposts that point to potential
76 Ibid, 35. 
77 Jessica West, ed., Space Security Index 2016 (Kitchener: Pandora Print Shop, 2016). 
78 Nye and Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, 37. 
79 Robert Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 66. 
80 Christina Giannopapa, “Space Security Programs Worldwide: An Introduction,” in Handbook of Space Security, ed. 
Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Peter L. Hays, Jana Robinson, Denis Moura and Christina Giannopapa (New York: Springer, 2015), 
720-721. 
81 Sheehan, The International Politics of Space, 11, 88. 
82  Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 
186, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300018920. 
83 Peter L. Hays and Charles D. Lutes,“Towards a Theory of Space Power,” Space Policy 23, no. 4 (2007): 206-207, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2007.09.003. 
84 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 17. 
85 Thomas E. Cremins, “A New Space Age: Maximizing Global Benefits,” World Economic Forum, 2014,  
http://reports.weforum.org/global-strategic-foresight/thomas-e-cremins-nasa-a-new-space-age/.   
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space ages of the future”86. 
The research problem can now be reframed more precisely: Why has space war not been an
outcome of international space politics between 1957 and 2018? Why have the US, the
USSR/Russia and China not overtly destroyed each others space assets through offensive action
between 1957 and 2018? Realist, structural theories of IR will help answer these questions. Four
neorealist theories – DN, ON, PTT and HST – present two opposing conclusions on the likelihood
of war Earth. They disagree on whether a bipolar balance of power or a preponderance of power
makes for the safest system, and these conclusions will serves as hypothesis going forward. Thus.
the first neorealist hypothesis is that a bipolar balance of space power in the international system
has decreased the risk of space war. The second neorealist hypothesis is that a preponderance of
space power in the international system has decreased the risk of space war.
Approach, Methodology and Limitations 
To test the two neorealist hypotheses, theoretical concepts from a widely defined neorealism will be
used in a pluralist historical analysis of empirical evidence in the form of primary and secondary
sources. Four theories associated with neorealism, divided in two camps on the question of war,
have been included to show various sides of the problems confronted, provide alternative paths for
further research and hopefully give the reader a chance to make independent reflections and
conclusions. 
A theory of analytical eclecticism will inform the general approach to the social sciences in
order to combine the four neorealist theories. Analytical eclecticism as defined by Sil and
Katzenstein has three important features.87 First, it is consistent with an ethos of pragmatism in
seeking engagement with the world of policy and practice. Second, it formulates problems that are
wide in scope to more closely approximate the messiness and complexity of concrete dilemmas
facing actors in the real world. Third, in exploring these problems, eclectic approaches offer
complex causal stories that extricate, translate, and selectively recombine analytic components—
most notably, causal mechanisms – from explanatory theories, models, and narratives embedded in
competing research traditions like DN, ON, PTT and HST. 
86 Hays and Lutes, “Towards a theory of space power,” 206-207. 
87  Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems 
and Mechanisms across Research Traditions,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2 (2010): 411, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592710001179. 
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The methodology of the thesis will be historical and both qualitative and quantitative in
nature. The causal explanation will rest on the verbal presentation of the argument, but figures on
for example ASAT tests, satellites launches and space budgets will serve to illustrate the verbal
presentation. According to Berkhofer, history can be inferred from such things as manuscripts,
monuments, and other material objects that exist in the present, but have been accepted as survivals
from previous times.88 Sources, distinguished between primary and secondary sources, provide the
evidence for the historians own representations of the past.89 Primary sources are those documents
and other things both from and about the times being investigated. Secondary sources are those
referring to matters and times earlier than their own time of production.90 Due to the general
unavailability of unclassified primary sources on military space activities and the limited scope of
this project, secondary sources –  like history books, reports and scientific journals – will be the
foundation of the main findings. However, primary sources like policy documents, white papers and
treaties have been included when possible and fitting. 
Thies' guidelines for qualitative historical analysis in IR will help minimise investigator bias
and unwarranted selectivity in the research.91 Thies recommends to get to know your cases well to
avoid the inaccuracies in interpretation and evidence that often come with a failure to fully examine
the literature. Historians should triangulate by using a variety of types of sources to produce a more
accurate representation of history, but avoid actively searching confirmation for their theory.
Furthermore, historians should be aware of implicit or explicit presentism in another historian´s
monograph, of those claiming to simply be reporting the facts, and potential influences of political,
organizational, and disciplinary culture on a historian´s work. Suspicious documents should be
avoided. Documents should be evaluated to reveal the actors, their intentions, interactions and
context. The limits on historical evidence from the context provided by the historian must be
recognized. Ultimately, the goal is to produce a “history based on a selective, critical reading of
sources that synthesizes particular bits of information into a narrative description or analysis of a
subject”92. 
Limitations in the form of access to sources, language skills and precise budget comparisons
have restrain the findings of the thesis. As mentioned, classified information, especially on military
space capabilities, is a significant and well-known hurdle. In addition, lacking knowledge of the
Russian and Chinese language will lead to relatively better access to US sources, but this bias has
88 Robert Berkhofer, Fashioning History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 3. 
89 Ibid, 11. 
90 Ibid, 19. 
91 Cameron G. Thies, “A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of International Relations,” 
International Studies Perspectives 3, no. 4 (2002): 351-372, https://doi.org/10.1111/1528-3577.t01-1-00099. 
92 Ibid, 351.
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been consciously mitigated by including a varied set of sources. Ultimately, comparing space
capabilities and space budgets is a daunting task, but some key quantitative comparisons have been
included (See Figure 1) . Especially in China's case, budget comparison “ is problematic because of
currency conversion issues with the Chinese renminbi, labor wage differentials, and the fact that the
Chinese space program is highly integrated with the military and thus subject to the secrecy that
accompanies such an association”93. Luckily, China's five-year space white papers have “become an
important window for outside world to understand China’s space policy and progress in space
activities”94. The goal has been to analyse the research problem from relevant perspectives using the
best possible sources, but the end result could still face legitimate criticism for being western-
centric. 
The methodological pluralism and pragmatic, eclectic approach will underpin a theoretical
framework mixing and comparing concepts from various neorealist IR theories. The framework will
be used in a qualitative and quantitative historical analysis of international politics in the First and
Second Space Age. The goal of the thesis is, to the extent possible, to address and focus on the real-
world issue of space security. By using a neorealist framework supporting explanation as
causation95, historical patterns in the distribution of space power in the international system could
help explain, at least partially, the causes of space war and space security in international space
politics. 
Outline of the Thesis
The thesis is divided in an introduction, three main chapters, and a conclusion. The first chapter
establishes a neorealist analytical framework for international space politics. The second chapter
presents a history of international space politics. The third chapter contains the actual neorealist
analysis of why there has been no space war in the history of international space politics. 
Chapter I establishes a theoretical framework for international space politics. The chapter is
divided in four subchapters. First, a crash course on international space politics gives an overview
of space geography, space power, space actors, and space regimes. Second, a literature review
divided between studies discussing several IR paradigms and those using realism, liberalism, and
constructivism. Third, concepts and conclusions from Waltz´s defensive neorealism (DN) and
93 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 99. 
94 Rongping Mu and Yonggang Fan, “An Overview of Chinese Space Policy,” in Handbook of Space Security, ed. Kai-
Uwe Schrogl, Peter L. Hays, Jana Robinson, Denis Moura and Christina Giannopapa (New York: Springer, 2015), 422. 
95 Berkhofer, Fashioning History, 55. 
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Mearsheimer´s offensive neorealism (ON) are extrapolated to formulate the first neorealist
hypothesis, that a bipolar balance of space power in the international system has decreased the risk
of space war. Fourth, concepts and conclusions from Organski´s power transition theory (PTT) and
Gilpin´s hegemonic stability theory (HST) are similarly extrapolated to formulate the second
neorealist hypothesis, that a preponderance of space power in the international system has decreased
the risk of space war. The fifth subchapter is the first partial conclusion. It makes the final case for
using a theoretical framework built on four different neorealist theories. 
Chapter II presents a history of international space politics in the First Space Age and the
Second Space Age. The chapter is divided in four subchapters. The histories of the US, the
USSR/Russia and China are presented in separate subchapters. Each state has been given one
section for historical context, one for the First Space Age, and one for the Second Space Age. The
US has went from being second in space to becoming the only space superpower. The USSR was
initially the most powerful state in space before it collapsed in the early 1990s. Now, China is
rapidly gaining ground on the US, while Russia is gradually recovering in the field of military
space. The fourth subchapter is the second partial conclusion. It argues that IR theory can be used
to analyse international space politics because the history of international space politics is very
similar to the history international politics. 
Chapter III  is a neorealist analysis of space war in the First and Second Space Age. The
chapter, which is meant to determine whether the first and second neorealist hypotheses are correct,
is organised in five subchapters. The four first subchapters are separate neorealist analyses. The first
neorealist analysis, based on DN and ON, concludes that a bipolar balance of space power
decreased the risk of space war in the First Space Age. The second neorealist analysis concludes
that the risk of space war decreased because the USSR never reached parity with the US in the
underlying components of space power in the transition between the First and Second Space Age.
The third neorealist analysis argues that a unipolar balance of space power and its underlying
components decreased the risk of space war in the Second Space Age. The fourth neorealist analysis
concludes that China seems more likely than the USSR to reach complete power parity with the US
during the ongoing space power transition between Second and Third Space Age. The fifth
subchapter is the third partial conclusion. The core argument of the partial conclusion is that the
distribution of space power so far in the Space Age has been prone to peace, but that the world is
heading towards a more dangerous balance of space power in the international system. 
The conclusion is a synthesis of the three partial conclusions of the thesis. It provides three
different answers to the research question. First, a neorealist analytical framework has proved that it
14
can capture the essence of international space politics. However, competing theories show great
potential, especially since a structural theory like neorealism reduces complex phenomena to simple
concepts. Second, a history of international space politics between 1957 and 2018 has revealed that
international politics in space and on Earth are deeply connected. The causes of space war are
closely related to the causes of war. Third, a neorealist analysis has concluded that the distribution
of space power has been prone to peace so far in the Space Age. However, further research is
needed on the causes of war, security and peace in space. 
*****
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CHAPTER I 
A Theoretical Framework for International Space Politics
“Our visions of space and of our role and purpose
in the cosmos are as varied as individuals themselves
and include ideas as sweeping, extreme, and contradictory
as universal peace and total domination.” 
– Peter Hays, Space and Security.96
Chapter I will establish an analytical framework that will be used in Chapter III to analyse the
historical evidence presented in Chapter II. In order to analyse international space politics, a
theoretical framework is needed. According to Waltz, the realm of international space politics must
be isolated using a mental picture – a simplified representation –  to deal with it intellectually.97
Furthermore, Waltz argues, a paradigm is needed as a “handbook” for the conceptual toolkit of the
thesis.98 
The first chapter is organised in five subchapters, each of them containing several sections.
First, international space politics is presented through an overview – a crash course – of space
geography, space power, space actors, and space regimes. Second, a literature review brings the
reader up to date on the state of the art. The literature review is structured around authors discussing
several IR paradigms, and those applying realist, liberalist and constructivist theories. Third, the
concepts of defensive and offensive neorealism (DN+ON) are extrapolated to formulate the first
neorealist hypothesis: that a bipolar balance of space power in the international system has
decreased the risk of space war. Fourth, concepts from power transition theory and hegemonic
stability theory (PTT+HST) are similarly extrapolated to formulate the second neorealist
hypothesis: that a preponderance of space power in the international system has decreased the risk
of space war. Thus, four theories are divided in two camps on the question of space war,
disagreeing on whether a bipolar balance of space power or a preponderance of space power in the
international system will decrease the risk of space war and increase space security. The fifth and
ultimate subchapter is the first partial conclusion of the thesis. It makes the case for going forward
with a widely defined neorealism. In short, the argument of the first partial conclusio rests on the
96 Hays, Space and Security, 1. 
97 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Neorealism: Confusions and Criticisms,” Journal of Politics and Society 15, no. 1 (2004): 2. 
98 Nye and Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, 55. 
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the fact that IR theory has proved applicable to international space politics in the past, and that a
widely defined neorealism, mixing both concepts and conclusions from two opposing camps, seems
best suited to explain why there has never been a space war. 
1.1 Crash Course: International Space Politics
Where does space begin? Where does it end? How does it work? Who operates there? And how do
they operate? Still today, space is a largely unknown, unfamiliar and mysterious place – even to
experts. The first subchapter of Chapter I, divided in four sections, therefore outlines the basics of
space in order to build a theoretical framework for international space politics. 
The first section deals with the geography of space. In the second section, a range of public
and private space actors are presented – states being the most powerful and most important. Third,
the concept of space power is defined as material capabilities like launchers, satellites and space
weapons. In the fourth and last section, the most important international space regimes – in the
shape of treaties and organisations – are presented to the reader. 
1.1.1 Space Geography
Space begins “at  the  lowest  perigee  required  for  orbit  and  extending  out  to  in finity”99.  The
environment of space, characterised by a hard vacuum, high levels of radiation and very low
temperature, is extremely harsh to humans.100 Without protection from advanced and expensive
technology, like spacecrafts and space suits, humans loose consciousness within seconds and die
within minutes. Since aerodynamic principles cannot be exploited, the energy expenditures of
operating in space are many times greater than on Earth.101 
There is no clear boundary where space begins. The Kármán line, located at an altitude of
100 kilometres above sea level, is the lowest altitude capable of supporting unpowered orbit and
therefore used as a jurisdiction line in international law.102 Keeping with this legal definition, space
is  defined  in  the  thesis  per  Klein  as  “beginning  at  the  lowest  perigee  required  for  orbit  and
extending out to infinity”103.  Objects which are launched into space and placed in orbit end up in
99 John J. Klein, Space Warfare (London: Routledge, 2014), 6. 
100 Andrew A. Pilmanis and William J. Sears, “Physiological Hazards of Flight at High Altitude,” The Lancet 362, no. 
1 (2003): 16-17, PMID: 14698113. 
101 M. V. Smith, Ten propositions regarding spacepower (Maxwell: US Air Force Air University Press, 2002), 38. 
102 Dolman, Astropolitik, 60. 
103 Klein, Space Warfare, 6. 
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“regular, unceasing motion around the entire globe on a regular basis”104. Klein argues that even
though “space in fact includes much more than just near-earth orbits, at present this is where most
of our interests in space lie”105. 
Geopolitical scholars like Dolman106, Al-Rodhan107, McDonald108 and Duvall109 are at the
forefront of developing a theoretical body suited for the studying states international space politics.
Dolman, especially, is praised for his contributions to the study of geopolitics in space, but is
criticised for mixing theory and ideology in his research and simply wanting to maximize US hard
power. Dolman has, in short, advocated that the US should seize control of space and enforce free-
market principles as a benign hegemon.110 Furthermore, he has criticized the current space legal
regime for not stimulating competition and commerce in space111 and criticized COPUOS for
conducting “sterile exchanges of pious internationalist rhetoric”112.
One purpose of the thesis is to consider how IR theory holds up in an analysis of
international space politics. Geopolitical space theory, or astropolitical theory, will therefore not be
treated as an independent IR paradigm. The justification for the exclusion is twofold.113 First, the
scope of the thesis does not allow including a sufficient coverage of the geopolitical debate. Second,
the history of geopolitics as an academic subject sets it apart from the realist paradigm of IR. Some
useful concepts, however, will be borrowed, like Dolman's four distinct astropolitical regions. 
In his book Astropolitik, Dolman divides space into the four distinct astropolitical regions
Earth, Earth space, Moon space and Solar space.114 Earth includes everything between the surface
of the Earth and the Kármán line at 100 kilometres. All human space launches going to or from
space must go through the Earth. Space launches, command and control, tracking, data downlink,
R&D, production, anti-satellite activities, and service, repair and storage operations are performed
on the surface of the Earth. 
Earth space, which stretches from the Kármán line to about 36,000 kilometres, is the natural
104 Howard, Kleinberg, “On War in Space,” Astropolitics 5, no. 1 (2007): 1-27, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14777620701544600. 
105 Klein, Space Warfare, 8. 
106 Dolman, Astropolitik. 
107 Nayef R. F. Al-Rhodan, Meta-Geopolitics of Outer Space: An Analysis of Space Power, Security and Governance 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
108 Fraser MacDonald, “Anti-Astropolitik — Outer Space and the Orbit of Geography,” Progress in Human 
Geography 31, no. 5 (2007): 592-615, https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132507081492. 
109 Jonathan Havercroft and Robert Duvall, Critical Astropolitics (London: Routledge, 2009). 
110 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, 134-135. 
111 John Hickman and Everett C. Dolman, “Resurrecting the Space Age: A State-Centered Commentary on the Outer 
Space Regime,” Comparative Strategy 21, no. 1 (2002): 1-20, https://doi.org/10.1080/014959302317350855. 
112 Dolman, Astropolitik, 137-138. 
113 The same arguments justify the lack of in-depth deterrence theory in the thesis. 
114 Dolman, Astropolitik, 59-60. 
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habitat for the military’s most advanced reconnaissance and navigation satellites and space-based
weaponry. Earth space can further be divided into three satellite orbits (See Figure 10): Low-Earth
Orbit (LEO) at about 2,000 kilometres, Medium-Earth Orbit (MEO) at about 10,000 kilometres and
Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) at about 35,800 kilometres. Moon space is the region from GEO
to just beyond the orbit of the Earth’s moon, while Solar space consists of everything within our
solar system beyond that point. Space is proven to have its own lines of communication, common
routes, choke points, and critical nodes.115 For instance, the Earth lies at the bottom of a gravity well
which spacecraft can escape by reaching orbit.116 The interactions between states in Earth space and
on Earth will be the central focus of the analysis, because these are the regions of space in which
states primarily operate.
In short, space can be defined as everything above 100 kilometres from the surface of the
Earth. Space is further divided into various regions and orbits. The closest region, which Dolman
calls Earth space, is currently the most important in the study of international space politics. 
1.1.2 Space Actors
States are the most important space actors. They possess the most space capabilities, invest the most
money in space research and have authority over and responsibility for national private space actors
like companies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and universities. During the Cold War,
the US, and the USSR dominated international space politics. Today, after the USSR collapsed, the
US is the dominant space actor (See Figure 1, Figure 3, Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8).
However, the US is facing challenges to its hegemony from China and others. Since the beginning
of the Space Age in 1957, the number and type of space actors have increased due to the
proliferation and decreasing costs of space capabilities and market growth, much due to the
information revolution or third industrial revolution. Space is now home to international
conglomerates, private companies as well as universities. 
Space actors can be divided in developed space actors (DVSAs) and emerging space actors
(EMSAs).117 DVSAs include the US and the USSR/Russia, which dominated space during the Cold
War, as well as the United Kingdom (UK), France, the European Union (EU) and Japan. EMSAs
include all the space actors that do not rank among the the DVSAs. Harding has proposed to divide
EMSAs into first, second and third tier states based on their advancement.118 The first tier states,
China, Brazil and India, have national space programs derived from ballistic missile and nuclear
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programs and their own national space agencies. Furthermore, these states can produce space
technology autonomously and launch their own orbital and geosynchronous satellites. The second
tier states, Iran, Israel, South Africa and Iraq, can produce some of their own space technology,
have national space agencies and basic launch capacity, and often produce space technology in
cooperation with advanced states. The third their states include a large group of smaller players that
occasionally contribute to space technology, but rely heavily on more developed states to achieve
their space policy goals. 
Three space actors, namely the US, Russia, and China, stand out as the most powerful in the
military realm of space. The US and Russia are the two archetypical DVSAs, but China has quickly
developed a full range of space capabilities typically found only in DVSAs, and is therefore the
space actor closest to shedding its “emerging” classification.119 According to Hays, China's space
capabilities are now “parallel to those of the US in all mission areas except for space-based missile
launch detection”120. Meanwhile, as mentioned above, several notable DVSAs – primarily the UK,
France, the EU and Japan – has never wielded sizeable military space capabilities.121122123 
In short, the number and types of space actors have increased over the course of the Space
Age. However, states are still the dominant actors in international space politics. Three states with
comparable space capabilities – the US, Russia and China – are considered to be the most powerful
actors in international space politics. 
1.1.3 Space Power
What is space power? There is an ongoing effort among scholars, experts and analysts to answer
the question, but the effort has not yet resulted in any clear consensus. However, there seems to be
unison agreement that states need space power in order to access, operate in and benefit from space.
Since technology is a “critical cornerstone of space travel, and hence, of space warfare”124, power
will be defined in terms of material capabilities instead of behaviour. Thus, space power is defined
per Krepon, Hitchen and Katz-Hyman as “the total sum of capabilities that contribute to a [state’s]
ability to benefit from the use of space”125. 
Space power rests on material capabilities that make spaceflight – ballistic flight into or
through space – possible. To overcome the gravity of the Earth, all spaceflight normally begins with
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a rocket launch.126 A rocket that can be used to carry a payload, like an artificial satellite, into space
is called a space launch vehicle (SLV).127 SLVs normally need two or three stages of engines and
propellants, a liquid or solid mix of fuel and oxidizer, to generate enough thrust to achieve vertical
motion, overcome gravity and carry payloads into orbit.128 The first and most powerful stage lifts
the SLV from the Earth, before falling back to the ground or the ocean. The second stage carries the
rocket into space. The final stages release and position the payloads in the correct orbit. All states
want launch sites, or spaceports, located as close as possible to the Earth’s equator, where the
rotational spin of the Earth makes it possible to save fuel consumption.129 
Spaceflight is often associated with astronauts, but sending humans to space is not the most
useful way for states to benefit on a daily basis. Human spaceflight is a complex activity that can
generate enormous prestige, but still remains a relatively rare phenomenon due to the harsh climate
of space. Exposing a human to excessive gravitational changes and extreme temperatures, while
guaranteeing oxygen and food supply and handling waste, involves high costs and risks.130 Only
three states – the USSR/Russia, the US and China – have independently achieved human
spaceflight.131 In 1961, the Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first human ever to travel
in space. Today, over 500 people have done the same.132 China sent their first taikonaut to space in
2003.133 Since 1972, however, no humans have traveled beyond LEO.134 
States primarily benefit from the use of space in the form of information.135 Klein argues that
information, defined as “facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form, along with their transfer
and the meaning assigned to them”136, is gathered or broadcasted in space by using space
capabilities based in space or on Earth. Information can then be used for a wide range of military,
commercial and scientific purposes. States use satellites to gather and broadcast information in and
from space. In simple terms, a satellite is “a body that orbits around another body in space”137. For a
man-made, artificial satellite to orbit Earth, as opposed to flying off into space or falling back to the
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ground, its speed must be balanced with the Earth’s gravitational pull.138 As of November 2018,
there were 1.957 satellites in orbit.139 
Satellites are classified according to their function, like communication satellites,
observational satellites and navigation satellites.140 Communication satellites, often called
“comsats”, transmit signals between earth stations and thereby support both military communication
and everyday services like mobile phone calls and high-speed internet.  Observation satellites
provide imagery of the Earth, which can be used for a wide range of purposes, including monitoring
crop yields, managing refugee camps and verifying arms control agreements. Navigation satellites,
like the Global Positioning System (GPS), guarantee precise navigation and timing (PNT) for
planes, ships, cars, nuclear missiles, and much more. A satellite navigation system with global
coverage is termed a global navigation satellite system (GNSS). Missile approach warning systems
(MAWs) “monitor ICBM launch areas and station areas of submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), in addition to tracking space vehicles in low and high orbits”141. The International Space
Station (ISS) is the largest satellite in orbit.142 
Depending on their function, satellites mostly travel in LEO, MEO and GEO (See Figure
10), all located within what Dolman calls Earth space.143 Located at an altitude of less than 2,000
kilometres, LEO is the closest orbit to the Earth, making it beneficial for observation and
communications with mobile devices and easy to reach with a space launch. Roughly half of all
satellites, including the ISS, orbit in LEO. Most precision timing and navigation satellites, including
the GPS, are located in MEO, at about 10,000 kilometres, where they can cover large ares of the
earth and triangulate with each other without losing their connection with receivers on Earth. GEO,
located at about 35,800 kilometres, is the highest orbital band in use. At this height, satellites travel
at the same speed as the Earth’s rotation. They are ideal for detecting missiles and nuclear tests
because they “appear to be motionless, allowing them to “stare” continuously at large, continent-
sized areas on the ground”144. 
The threat of space weapons have been part of international space politics since the dawn of
the Space Age. For clarity, space weapons can divided in two types: weapons based in space, and
weapons based on Earth which can threaten objects in space. The first type has never been
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deployed, but the latter type has. The US and the USSR have developed so called counterspace
capabilities since the beginning of the Cold War (See Figure 3 and Figure 4), but the proliferation
of space capabilities have lead an increasing number of states to develop counterspace capabilities
of their own.145 Counterspace capabilities can be both offensive and defensive in nature, but are
always supported by information on the space environment or space situational awareness (SSA).146
Defensive counterspace capabilities help protect one’s own space assets from attack, while
offensive counterspace capabilities help to prevent the adversary from using their space assets by
attacking the satellite, ground system or communications link between them.147 Furthermore,
counterspace capabilities can be ground-based direct-ascent, co-orbital, directed energy, electronic
warfare or cyber weapons.148 
The most notable substrata of counterspace capabilities – anti-satellite weapons or ASATs –
can destroy satellites in space. The US and the USSR tested nine nuclear weapons in space between
1958 and 1962, but quickly understood, after nuclear ASATs destroyed satellites indiscriminately,
that further testing or use would severely limit the uses of space, and so nuclear ASAT tests were
banned in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.149 The superpowers continued to developed more
conventional ASAT weapons in the following decades, and between 1968 and 1982, the USSR
developed a co-orbital ASAT which could be launched into space and slowly move towards another
satellite and destroy it, before the US developed and tested a direct-ascent ASAT which could be
launched from a fighter jet in the 1980s.150 In 2007, China tested a ground-based direct-ascent
ASAT by destroying one of its own satellites.151 The US quickly responded by conducting another
test in 2008.152 
Space capabilities are most often useful to both the military and the civilian sector, both
offensive and defensive in nature, and inherently vulnerable. SLVs are dual-use because they are
modified ICBMs. While ICBMs are designed to go through space at a very high speed to hit a target
on Earth, SLVs “lift a payload to a desired altitude above the Earth and then give that payload
enough forward speed to remain in orbit at that altitude”153. Furthermore, it is hard to separate
between offensive and defensive space weapons. The US space program “Brilliant Pebbles”, which
explored the idea of putting hundreds of lasers and thousands of interceptions in space, was an
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obvious space weapons program born from the US Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) – popularly
known as Star Wars.154 The same goes for the US proposal dubbed “Rods from God”, which
involved bundles of tungsten rods in space being dropped at “hypersonic velocities to vaporize
targets on terrestrial targets”155. Some space weapon systems are harder to classify. Antiballistic
missile (ABM) systems can be used both to protect people from nuclear missiles and destroy
satellites in space.156 Satellites that rely on computers to transmit and manage data can be hacked by
computers, jammed or attacked by microsatellites.157 Last, satellites are hard to defend. Defensive
measures, like decoys, extra fuel storage for manoeuvrability, ground-based spares, low-visibility
paint, and shutters to keep out damaging laser interference have been proposed, but satellites are
shiny objects orbiting in well-known trajectories against a black background.158 
In short, states use space power in the form of SLVs to launch humans and satellites into
space to gain valuable information. They have also developed space weapons, like ASATs, to
threaten vulnerable satellites and defend them from attack through deterrence. At a fundamental
level, most space capabilities are dual-use, offensive-defensive and vulnerable to attack. 
1.1.4 Space Regimes
Four core international treaties – the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Rescue and Return Agreement
of 1968, and the Conventions on Liability of 1973 and Registration of 1976 – regulate space
activities.159 Four additional agreements, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the SALT I/Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) of 1972, International Telecommunications Convention of 1973,
and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques of 1980, address or have addressed military-specific concerns.160 Four
UN-related bodies also stand out as some of the most important international space regimes – the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) in Vienna, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in Geneva and the UN
General Assembly under the First Committee – as well as the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) in Geneva.161 
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The Outer Space Treaty (OST) commits the signatory states to the peaceful uses of space
and bans the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit.162 However, the treaty does not put
a ban on the deployment or use of conventional weapons in space. The OST, which was modelled
on the Antarctic Treaty of 1957, makes activities in space subject to international law, reaffirms the
principles of freedom of use of space and forbids national appropriation, nuclear testing and certain
military activity on celestial bodies.163 In the three other core treaties, states have accepted
responsibility for national space actors through the supervision, authorisation and registration of all
non-governmental space activities, given launching states the joint liability for space objects and
promised to rescue and return all astronauts. Additionally, the Limited Test Ban Treaty164 bans
nuclear tests in space, while the ABMT –  signed by the US and the USSR – limits ABM systems
that can be used as offensive ASATs or to dramatically alter the nuclear balance.165 However, the
US effectively withdrew from the ABMT in 2002.166 
The CD, established by the UN General Assembly in 1979 as the only multinational forum
for negotiation of arms control and disarmament, has the most impact on traditional security in
space, but progress has stagnated due to disagreement between the great space powers.167
Discussions on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) began in the CD in 1985,
but was disbanded in 1994 and has remained informal ever since.168 China and Russia have fought
for a ban on space-based weapons through PAROS and the 2008 draft treaty PPWT, which the US
abstained to vote on when 163 other states adopted it.169 
COPUOS was established by the UNGA in 1959 to promote the peaceful use of space,
research, information sharing, international cooperation, education, development and legal issues.170
Over the last decades, COPUOS has been slowed by intra-agency tensions over space security and
other technical issues, but showed progress on a voluntary guideline for avoiding the creation of
space debris.171 The ITU administers the Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum and satellite operational
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positions on orbit – known as “slots”.172 Both the RF spectrum and slots legally considered to be a
limited natural resources that all states have equal rights to use. States can use the spectrum freely
within their own borders, but satellite communication signals cross borders. States must therefore
apply to the ITU for the rights to use frequency bands and slots. Military satellites are exempted,
but most militaries still comply with ITU rules. The First Committee has mainly been preoccupied
with so called Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs), but face many of the
same problems as the CD and COPUOS. The ISO is a non-governmental agency which produces
technical and industrial practice standards.173 
In short, the international space regime, which includes a number of treaties and institutions,
many of them associated with the UN, is designed to regulate how space actors, primarily states,
can use space power and interact in space. However, the regime is to some degree outdated and
troubled by ineffective cooperation.  
1.2 Literature Review: IR Theory on International Space Politics 
What has already been written on international space politics? The second subchapter of Chapter I,
divided in four sections, is a survey of the existing IR literature on space war. At first glance, the
literature seems to be in its infancy. Surprisingly few scholars have explicitly applied existing IR
paradigms and theories to problems related to space. The space security field is dominated by
military analysts and policy experts, most of whom unconsciously utilize and mix theoretical
concepts from IR without ever  explicitly accounting for their theoretical framework.
Several Cold War historians, most notably McDougall174, have pointed IR scholars in the
right direction by uncovering some of the core dynamics of international space politics. Moltz175
have distinguished between different schools of thought on space security, often overlapping the
realist, liberalist and constructivist paradigms of IR, to categorize existing views both inside and
outside academics. Moltz argues that there are four main schools: space nationalism, global
institutionalism, technological determinism and social interaction.176 Excluding technological
determinism177, the three remaining schools roughly correspond to realism, liberalism and
172 Ibid, 515-517. 
173 Ibid, 517-518. 
174 McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth.
175 James C. Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
176 Ibid.
177 Technological determinism holds that state competition in space is inevitable due to technological progress. 
26
constructivism. Moltz considers space nationalism and global institutionalism, much like realism
and liberalism in IR, to be the opposing poles and the largest schools.178 In other words, familiar
debates from IR seem to be implicitly represented in the existing literature on the space security.
Techno-nationalist theory is also worth mentioning, as it has helped IR scholars explain
technologically driven activities like international space politics while keeping the nation state as
the key unit of analysis.179180
The second subchapter is divided in four sections. The first section presents a brief summary
of studies discussing space security in general terms through the theoretical lenses provided by the
various paradigms of IR. The three following sections are dedicated to space security studies using
realism, liberalism and constructivism. In short, all the dominant IR theories seem useful in the
study of international space politics, but realism seems to explain the core dynamics, especially in
the First Space Age.
1.2.1 Space Studies Discussing IR Paradigms
Sheehan181 and Pfaltzgraff182 have both explored international space politics by using the three
dominant paradigms in IR. Galloway183, Hansel184, Słomczyńska Irma 185Weeks186187, Mutschler188,
Kahn and Kahn189, and Petroni and Bianchi190 have used several paradigms in their analysis. 
Sheehan concludes that the dominant paradigms of international relations continue to clash
on international space politics.191 The history of the Space Age, especially the space race during the
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Cold War, seems to support both classical realist and neorealist international relations theory.
Classical realism explains how the the USSR and the US ventured into space to acquire military
capabilities, like nuclear missiles and reconnoissance satellites, to gain unquantifiable degrees of
prestige and demonstrate relative power capabilities without resorting to nuclear warfare.
Neorealism explains the convergence in goals between major powers’ space programs as a case of
functionally similar states emulating each other to survive in the anarchic system. The theory of
techno-nationalism, which holds that “the economic and political power associated with access to
the most advanced technology has made it the crucial determinant of international power and
status”192, helps realist theory in explaining international space politics. Liberalism is useful for
studying international space law, international space institutions and international space
cooperation. Constructivism, especially post-structuralism, helps us understand why certain ideas
about space are seen as valid and others not. 
Pfaltzgraff has used IR theory to explore both near-term space issues, like how space affects
international politics on Earth, and longer term issues like future space colonies.193 Near-term space
issues are the most relevant for this thesis. Pfaltzgraff argues that realism can explain space politics
as a struggle for power and explain why technologically advanced states view the ability to defend
or destroy space assets as a national security concern, why they want a large private space sector,
and why developing countries seek to slow or stop more developed states from becoming too
powerful in space. Geopolitical theory can explain how technology has made space more important
in international politics. Neoliberalism can explain the effects of formal and informal space-related
regimes, especially among democracies, as well as increasing interdependence in space and
spillover effects from the space sector to other sectors. Constructivism is fertile because it allows us
to analyse the existing rules of behaviour in space and show that we can make space whatever we
want it to be. Since no IR theory can single-handedly explain, describe or prescribe politics on
Earth, Pfaltzgraff concludes that we must be careful when drawing on IR theory to theorize about
space. 
Galloway has analysed the consequences of the search for extraterrestrial intelligence
(SETI) from the perspectives of realism and idealism, arguing that realism will portray first contact
with extraterrestrials as conflictual, while idealism suggests that we could bond over our similarities
and even help each other.194
Hansel has assessed the advantages and disadvantages of various space arms control
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proposals from the perspectives of interdependence theory, neoliberal institutionalism and
neorealism.195 Interdependence theory suggests that an international regime against space-debris
producing activities that can hurt the space environment irreversibly and indiscriminately, like the
use of kinetic energy in space, coupled with additional codes of conduct and guidelines would
produce the most absolute gains. Neoliberal institutionalism suggests a similar solution: an
international treaty on the use of kinetic energy to lower the incentives of cheating.  Neorealism
suggests that the major powers have opposing interests: the US would benefit from an agreement
against collision and destruction of spacecraft, because of its reliance on space assets, while Russia
and China would benefit more from a ban against space-based weapons, which are useful for
missile defence, because they threaten their strategic nuclear weapons.
In her Gramscian analyses of the role of private-sector business and free market ideology in
the international space regime, Weeks first considered the value of the three dominant IR
paradigms.196197 She concludes that realism explains the role of the US and the USSR in the early
development of the regime. Neoliberalism explains the later inclusion of economic, social and
environmental issues and the growing importance of non-state actors. Constructivism explains that
beliefs about space are shaped by discourse production. 
Słomczyńska has analysed US space power theories with reference to IR theories.198 Based
on the assumption that space systems and space exploitation are becoming an increasingly
important factor for states and non-state actors, Słomczyńska reviews existing literature and
concludes that no comprehensive space power theory has been formulated or challenged IR. 
Mutschler has analysed security cooperation in space using neorealism, neoinstitutionalism
and constructivism/liberalism.199 Neorealism points out that any space security cooperation must
produce balanced gains to stand a chance of success. For neoinstitutionalism, interdependence in
space provides strong incentives for cooperation. Ultimately, constructivism/liberalism suggests
that states must learn to overcome their belief in unilateral action in space.
Kahn and Kahn has explored Chinese space capabilities through the IR paradigms of
realism, liberalism and constructivism – as well as technological determinism.200 They conclude that
China´s space program is “motivated by space nationalism, technological determinism, and security
dilemma imperatives” and that China, on the whole, “has proved that it is not only a regional space
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power, but also a prospective global space power”.201 
Petroni and Bianchi have analysed space policy in the post-Cold War world from the
perspectives of realism and liberalism.202 They conclude that realism best explains the space policy
of the bipolar Cold War, while liberalism better explains the commercially driven space policy of
the multipolar post-Cold War world. However, economic leadership in space remains the basis for
military supremacy in the multipolar international system.
In short, most of the scholars seem to agree that the three dominant IR paradigms all have
value in the study of space security. The same paradigms continue to clash against each other on
issues related to space. Realism can explain international space politics as a struggle for power over
space assets that have become a national security concern. Neorealism can explain international
hostilities and conflict in space as well as convergence in goals due to insecurity. Liberalism can
explain international space regimes, space law, space institutions, space cooperation and spillover
effects in the space sector. Constructivism can uncover rules of behaviour and help us understand
why certain ideas are valid and others not. 
1.2.2 Space Studies Using Realism
Colaresi and Rennstich203, Johnson-Freese and Erickson204, Bolton205, Burzykowska206, López207, and
Harding208 have explicitly applied realist theories to specific space-related problems. 
Colaresi and Rennstich have applied a theory of two-level rivalry dynamics in a in-depth
quantitative study on the US-Soviet space race.209 Their study findings “confirm a two-level logic
for rivalry maintenance, whereby increased competition from an enemy is inflated by domestic
politics and inflames further competition in the future”210. According to the authors, evidence
further suggests that US presidents have used space launches for political boosts when approval
ratings are low, and that superpower conflict in space has diverted other types of conflict. 
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Johnson-Freese and Erickson have used a techno-nationalist balance of power theory to
analyse the emerging China-EU partnership in space.211 They conclude that “all potential great
powers, believing that they must depend only on themselves, engage in techno-nationalist
realpolitik”212 in space because dual-use space technology is essential for economic development
and valuable to both the civilian and the military sector. Thus, techno-nationalism, which informs
Chinese, US and Russian perceptions, lifts all space activities to the strategic, state level. More
importantly, it can help explain geotechnological posturing as a high-technology form of balancing
behaviour. 
Similarly, Bolton has used neorealism coupled with elements of techno-nationalism to show
that the Sino-European cooperation on the Galileo project is an attempted effort to balance agains
the US.213 In other words, Bolton considers investments in advanced civilian dual-use technology to
be balancing behaviour.
Burzykowska has analysed the role of smaller states in the new balance of power in space,
concluding that the increase in new spacefaring nations has created a multipolar security
environment which has influenced “the current state of affairs related to the militarization and
weaponization of outer space, the security postures of the already established space powers and the
global balance of power in general”214. 
Harding has used realist theory in his recent monograph on space policy in developing
countries.215 He concludes that developing states, just like already developed ones, now view space
activities as “the ultimate measure of national power, international prestige, and demonstrated
national potential”216. 
López has used structural realism to analyse the assumptions behind the argument that the
US placement of weapons in space would inevitability lead to an arms race in space.217 Drawing on
other notable scholars of international space politics, like Dolman and Moltz, López ultimately
concludes that such an outcome is only probable and that the continued use of the argument
weakens the overall argument of anti-space weapons proponents. 218 
In short, powerful states engage in self-help behaviour and techno-nationalist realpolitik in
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space. International space politics is driven by rivalry in which innovations in high-technology and
alliance-building works as a form of balancing behaviour. Moreover, international conflict in space
can possibly divert conflict on Earth. As most states have discovered the value from space
capabilities , the distribution of space power in the international system has gone from being bipolar
to more multipolar. 
1.2.3 Space Studies Using Liberalism
This section serves as a state of the art of literature applying liberalism to problems related to space
security. Sadeh219, Stuart220221 and Luzin222 have explicitly applied liberalist theory to specific space-
related problems. 
Sadeh has used theories of bureaucratic politics to analyse the creation of space policy as
foreign policy.223 He concludes that “[s]pace policy-making, whether in the civil, commercial or
military sector, involves a multitude of advocacy coalitions, government actors and agencies and
commercial corporations competing over resources and objectives and control of space programmes
and projects”224. 
Stuart has used regime theory to analyse the international space regime.225226 She concludes
that regime theory does provide tools for “understanding those instances in which actors pursue
coordination in areas of complex governance, such as the realm of outer space”227 and for
“explaining the negotiations and preference formations that lead to cooperate regimes”228. However,
Stuart admits that regime theory is not a “grand theory capable of providing generalizable
conclusions”229 and that it might overlook social and constructivist forces because of its rationalist
approach.
Luzin has used soft power theory to analyse space as Russia’s soft-power tool and concludes
that Russia’s historical and continued success in space gives the country many opportunities to
improve its international standing in several indirect ways – for example in shaping the international
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space agenda.230 However, Russia needs a more clearly articulated space strategy to live up to its
full soft power potential.
In short, liberalism can explain commercial competition, complex governance, negotiations,
preference formations, advocacy coalitions and soft power in international space politics. 
1.2.4 Space Studies Using Constructivism
This section serves as a state of the art of literature applying constructivism to problems related to
space security. Litfin231, Mueller232, Peterson233, Peoples234235236, Bormann and Sheehan237, and
Moltz238 have studied space security-related problems with a constructivist approach.
Litfin has analysed the influence of space technology on epistemic sovereignty, concluding
that earth-sensing satellites has made it harder for states to control information about what happens
on their own territory.239
Mueller has attempted to depolarize a space weaponisation debate that is “typically cast in
simplistic, unidimensional terms, while many participants caricature their opponents as naive
pacifists or rabid warmongers”240, and debunk the inevitability thesis. 
Peterson has traced the the use of analogies as mental constructs in the development of space
law.241 
Peoples has written several articles about the discourse on space security, for example on
overcoming the inevitability thesis242, the securitisation of space243 and the Japanese discourse on
space security244 
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Bormann and Sheehan have co-edited the book Securing Outer Space, in which most of the
chapters are dedicated to constructivist and critical theory.245 The book includes interesting
contributions from Stuart246, Peoples247, and Griffin248, among others. Stuart contrasts her regime
theory research, outlined above, with a theory of cosmopolitan sovereignty. Peoples draws on
Marcuse to critically analyse the relationship between space and strategy. Griffin uses gender theory
to deconstruct the space discourse in the US. Most of the book's chapters deal with “questions of
conceptualization and the way that space is socially constructed to have particular meanings”249. 
Moltz has analysed space security using a framework of environmental learning and argues
that the growing commercial space industry can play in important role as an epistemic community
fighting for the sustainable use of space.250
In short, constructivism is useful in the analysis of  discourse on space and when navigating
questions of sovereignty, inevitability, sustainability and gender in international space politics. 
1.3 The First Neorealist Hypothesis: Space Security through Balance of Space
Power 
The first neorealist hypothesis holds that a bipolar balance of space power in the international
system has decreased the risk of space war. The third subchapter of Chapter I explores the
theoretical underpinnings of the hypothesis to extrapolate useful concepts for the theoretical
framework on international space politics.
The subchapter is divided in two sections: the first on defensive neorealism (DN) according
to Waltz, and the second on offensive neorealism (ON) according to Mearsheimer. Both neorealist
balance-of-power theories suggests that anarchy is the permissive cause of space war and that the
distribution of space power is the key variable. They also suggest that an international system with a
rough balance between two great space powers, a bipolar system, is the the most stable and the least
prone for space war.251 In A Theory of International Politics, Waltz argues that the anarchical
structure of the international system constrains states to maximise their security through self-help
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behaviour and power politics.252 In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer has
challenged Waltz on the incentives for expansion under anarchy.253 Building his theory on
assumptions similar to Waltz’s, Mearsheimer agrees that bipolar systems are the least war prone,
but argues that anarchy forces states to maximise power instead of security.254 Consequently,
Mearsheimer’s theory has been labelled offensive while Waltz’s theory has been labelled defensive.
1.3.1 Defensive Neorealism (DN) on Space War
The essential elements of Waltz’s DN, a systemic balance-of-power theory, is the anarchic structure
of the international political system, the functional equality of its constituent state units and the
distribution of material capabilities among those state units.255 Waltz considers the international
political system to be decentralized and anarchic.256 The system, like economic markets, is formed
through the coexistence of self-regarding units and “[w]hether those units live, prosper, or die
depends on their own efforts”257. Under anarchy, security and survival are the highest ends.258 Since
units in an anarchic system have to rely on themselves to maintain security and achieve objectives,
self-help is the principle of action. Thus, the international system is a self-help system. 
Waltz considers states to be the only units of the international system because non-state
actors show no sign of rivalling or surpassing the great powers.259 The units are considered to be
functionally undifferentiated because they are all autonomous, political units facing the same tasks,
but are distinguished by their greater or lesser possession of material capabilities for performing
those same tasks.260 In other words, states have different levels of power – military, economic and
other capabilities – which they use to provide for their own security. They are ranked according to
the sum of their population, territory, resources, economy, military competence and political
stability.261 Because authority in the anarchical international system is expressed through
capabilities, states compete for power to stay secure.262 
The distribution of capabilities in the system strongly influences state behaviour and the
outcomes of state interaction.263 Balancing is a type of behaviour and war is a type of outcome.
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States can balance by converting wealth into military power, forming counterbalancing alliances,
passing the buck to another state, entering into postwar peace settlements, and by emulating other
states.264 Since states seek security before all other objectives, states tend to balance against the
most powerful state by joining the weaker side of two coalitions.265 They do this to avoid
domination by the strongest state. Balancing is the result of uncoordinated action between self-
regarding states, whether or not those states consciously aim to establish and maintain such a
balance.266 
Balancing is done differently in multipolar systems, containing three or more great powers,
than in bipolar systems, containing only two great powers.267 In opposition to what he calls
“conventional wisdom”, which preaches that multipolar systems are the most stable, Waltz argues
that bipolar systems are the most stable because balancing is more effective when there are only two
great powers.268 Waltz writes: “In a bipolar world, two states check and balance each other. In a
unipolar world, checks on the behaviour of the one great power drop drastically.”269 Unipolar
systems, in which there is only one great power, most often disintegrates when other states balance
against it or challenge the hegemonic state. That is why unipolar systems quickly become bipolar or
multipolar. Wohlforth has challenged this view, arguing that the US is so preponderant in terms of
economic, military, technological and geopolitical power that the current unipolarity is both
durable, stable and prone to peace.270 Jackson and Sørensen sum up Walt’s bipolarity argument in
three points. First, the possibilities of great-power war is reduced, because there are fewer great-
power conflicts. Second, less great powers involved means easier deterrence. Third, the chances of
miscalculation are lower.271 In short: “the two rival superpowers can keep their eyes steadily fixed
on each other without the distraction and confusion that would occur if there were a large number of
great powers”272, but they might also broaden the range of factors included in competition, since
“anything that happens anywhere is potentially of concern”273. 
In short, DN suggests that the decentralized and anarchic nature of space forces self-
regarding states to seek space security through self-help behaviour and space power politics. These
states face the same tasks in space, but are differentiated by their amount of space power. Thus,
states probably compete for space power. The distribution of space power among states should
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affect the outcomes of international space politics – like space war and space security.
Consequently, the great space powers should matter the most. Furthermore, DN suggests that states
engage in balancing, buck-passing, post-war settlements and emulation in space, and that they can
turn their wealth into space power. States can be expected to balance against the dominant space
power. Waltz's argument on the safety and stability of bipolarity should hold up in space, as states
can “keep their eyes steadily fixed on each other” there as well as on Earth.
1.3.2 Offensive Neorealism (ON) on Space War
Mearsheimer’s ON is based on five assumptions about the international political system.274 First, he
assumes that great powers are the main actors in international politics, because they have the largest
impact, and that the international system lacks central authority. The state system is therefore
labelled anarchic. Second, all states are assumed to have some offensive military capability which
can inflict damage on other states. Third, states cannot be sure about the intentions of other states.
Fourth, the main goal of states is survival. Fifth, states are assumed to be rational actors.
Where Waltz argues that excessive amounts of power can make a state less secure because
other states tend to balance against it, Mearsheimer argues that the structure of the international
system always gives states incentives to pursue hegemony.275 Since the international system always
provides incentives for further expansion, the world is left with recurring great-power competition.
Glaser and Kaufmann has argued that the balance between offensive and defensive weapon
technology can limit and boost cooperation in the international system.276277 Mearsheimer, however,
does not accept their arguments. In his opinion, becoming the dominant power is the best way to
assure survival.278 Great powers will defend the balance of power, through balancing and buck-
passing, when it favours them and undermine it, through war and blackmail, when it does not.279
Unless a state reaches the goal of world hegemony, so that it can dominate all the other states in the
system, it will not be satisfied with the status quo – it always wants more power. 280 However, the
large bodies of water on Earth makes the goal of achieving global hegemony incredibly hard and
highly unlikely. The best-case scenario is to achieve regional hegemony while preventing other
states from achieving a similar position in another region.281 
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Mearsheimer defines power as the “particular material capabilities that a state possesses”282
or ”tangible assets”283, but makes a distinction between latent power and military power. Military
power, judged by the army and its supporting air force and navy, is the most important form of
power because “a state’s effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how they
compare with the military of rival states”284. However, states need societal resources to develop
military power. Resources like money, technology and people, based on wealth and population size,
are therefore gathered under the umbrella term latent power.285 Big armies can only be raised in
states with large populations. Similarly, powerful armies cannot be equipped, trained or modernized
without money and technology.286 Interestingly, Mearsheimer considers space technology to be an
example of latent power.287 
In short, ON suggests that anarchy in space forces great space powers, with some offensive
space capabilities at their disposal, to maximize their space power and aim for space hegemony to
assure their survival. However, the geography of space, like the geography of Earth, should make
this a difficult task. Thus, ON might imply that states seek space hegemony or at least aim to keep
their rivals rom achieving the same goal. Furthermore, states can be expected to engage in
balancing, buck-passing, blackmail and war to maintain a beneficial balance of space power.
Military space power should, according to ON, be the most important, but latent space power, in the
form of money, technology and man power, is an essential component. 
1.4 The Second Neorealist Hypothesis: Space Security through Preponderance
of Space Power 
The second neorealist hypothesis holds that a preponderance of space power in the international
system has decreased the risk of space war. The fourth subchapter of Chapter I explores the
theoretical underpinnings of the hypothesis to extrapolate useful concepts for the theoretical
framework on international space politics. 
The fourth subchapter is divided in two sections: the first on power transition theory (PTT)
according to Organski288, and the second hegemonic stability theory (HST) according to Gilpin.
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Both suggest that space wars are most likely to occur when there is an approaching balance of
power between the dominant nation and a major challenger. In World Politics, Organski argues that
states go through various stages of industrialisation and that war is likely to occur when a
dissatisfied state experiences so much internal growth that it achieves power parity with the
dominant state in the hierarchically organised international system. In War and Change in World
Politics, Gilpin ascribes the reoccurrence of war to power parity caused by differential growth rates
among states, but he uses states’ expected marginal costs and benefits – the expected net gain –
related to systemic change to explain when war is most likely to break out. PTT and HST part ways
with DN and ON in their rejection of balance of power as a source for peace and stability, their
description of the international political system, and their inclusion of dynamic factors. However,
both theories are included in the paradigm by Taliaferro because of their systemic approaches and
focus on powerful state actors.289 
1.4.1 Power Transition Theory (PTT) on Space War
Organski, who founded PTT, was the first scholar to present a thorough critique of balance-of-
power theory: he thinks it “distorts grossly the meaning of events, that it is an alien plant plucked
from another discipline and forcibly transplanted in the field of international power relations. What
is more, the theory is not even consistent with itself”290. Organski rejects the idea that a balance of
power brings peace and stability to the international system. On the contrary, he argues, balances of
power have caused the most destructive wars in modern history.291 Similarly, Lemke, another
prominent power transition scholar, rejects that “exclusive logical claim behind bipolarity as a
stabilizing effect”292. Shifts in power caused by industrialization cause instability.293 Three stages of
industrial growth political modernisation boosts the major determinants of a state power, which are
population size, political efficiency and economic development.294 States first experience an initial
stage (1) of potential power marked by slow or no growth, followed by a second stage (2) of rapid
transitional growth, and a third stage (3) of power maturation in which the state returns to slow
growth rates.295
The history of international relations is divided into three distinct time periods (which
should not be confused with the three stages of industrialisation).296 In the first period, which lies in
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the past, no state had yet industrialized – all states were in stage 1 of industrialization. Power gaps
were small and not based on industrial strength. In the second period, which is the current period of
industrial revolution, some states have and some have not yet industrialized. Since states are passing
through different stages of industrialization, the power gaps between them are huge, but states
entering stage 2 are starting catching up with states in stage 3. In the third period, which is still a
prospect of the future, all states will have entered stage 3 and begin to resemble each other. Because
states do not go through the process of industrialisation together, the relative distribution of power
in the international system is always changing.297 And because the constant change in power
relations brings instability to international politics, internal growth rates are considered to affect
international politics more than military strength and alliances politics.298 
Organski acknowledges the lack of a central government in the international system, but
views the structure of the international system as more orderly and hierarchical than the anarchical
structure described by Waltz and Mearsheimer International politics is organised in a clear
hierarchy separating powerful and weak states, with one dominant state above all the others. The
dominant state in the system always seeks to establish an international order that benefits itself and
some other states in the form of wealth, security and prestige.299 The international order determines
how goods are distributed and how states should behave in the international system. Some states
will always be satisfied with the international order and therefore wish to defend it, while others
will be dissatisfied and wish to change the international order into a more beneficial one.300 
States normally compete for power, but they do not easily swap one international order for
another.301 What happens then, when a rising state tries to do just that? PTT predicts that the
international system is the most war prone when a dissatisfied state reaches power parity with the
dominant state. The combination of power parity, or a balance of power, and dissatisfaction makes
war the most likely.302 If a rising state is satisfied, it will not be interested in going to war to change
the international order when it reaches power parity. Similarly, a weak state may be dissatisfied, but
will not be able to challenge the dominant state. Rising and dissatisfied states, however, have grown
strong after the rules were made and benefits allocated – now they want a better deal. Approaching
parity with the dominant state, such states suddenly have the power to do something about their
dissatisfaction and start demanding changes to the ruling international order or try to establish their
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own. The dominant state, which has established the ruling order – the status quo – to suit its own
interests, will resist any attempt to change or replace it. 
Tensions between the rising challenger and the dominant state easily lead to a major war.
Scholars disagree, though, on whether the dominant or the rising state is likely to attack first.303
Regardless, the war will determine the new status quo in international politics – until the next
unsatisfied challenger comes along.304 On the contrary, the international system is safer as long as
the dominant state remains preponderant.305 Some additional factors can make war more or less
likely, like the size of the challenger, the speed of the rise of the challenger, the dominant state's
flexibility in its policies, the amount of friendship between then dominant nation and the challenger,
and the challenger 's relationship with the existing international order.306
If uneven growth is such a dangerous phenomena, how do states behave to meet the threat?
According to Organski, states have three different strategies, none of which are satisfactory, to
choose from.307 First, they can stop the rival’s industrialisation by destroying their economy,
preventing it from developing rival industries, encouraging export of agricultural products, raw
materials or light industries, forcing regime change and going to preventive war. Second, they can
engage in half-measures to delay industrialisation, like trade barriers, embargoes and aid refusal,
without active interference. Third, they can help the rival industrialize and hope that it remains
friendly.
In short, PTT rejects the first neorealist hypothesis and suggests that different rates of
internal growth, industrialization and modernization, which boost space power determinants, lead to
continuous space power shifts and, once in a while, space power parities that increase the risk of
space war. The ruling order in space, a status quo that benefits some and not not others, could be far
more hierarchical than what DN and ON suggest. PTT suggests that states are going through three
stages of growth in space power. First, a stage of potential space power, followed by a second stage
of rapid transitional space power growth, and, last, a third stage (3) of space power maturation.
Furthermore, the history of the Space Age could probably be divided into three distinct periods.
First, a period in the past with small space power gaps in which no state had yet gone to space.
Second, a period with huge space power gaps in which some states have gone to space and some
have not. Third, a period in which a all states have gone to space. Ultimately, PTT suggests that the
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risk of space war is at its highest when a dissatisfied great space power reaches space power parity
with the dominant space power because disagreements and tensions over the status quo in space
culminate in those moments. The dominant state may try to stop the rising challenger in space by
destroying it, weakening it, delaying it or helping it, but none of these strategies are likely to be
sufficient. 
1.4.2 Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) on Space War
Gilpin’s conceptualisation of HST, which was first developed by Kindleberger, rests on five
assumptions about the behaviour of states.308 First, the international system is assumed to be stable
unless states see system change profitable. Second, states only attempt to change the international
system when there is an expected net gain. Third, states seek system change through expansion until
the expected marginal costs outweigh the marginal benefits. Fourth, once there is an equilibrium
between the costs and benefits related to system change and expansion, the economic costs of
maintaining the status quo tend to rise faster than the economic capacity to support it. Fifth, the
resulting disequilibrium, if left unresolved, tend to force a system change reflecting the new
distribution of power among states. These assumptions underpin Gilpin’s explanation of why and
when hegemonic war is the most likely to occur, which is similar to Organski's explanation. In
short, hegemonic wars between a hegemony and a challenger – the basic mechanism for political
change – is likely to happen when there is a disjuncture between the existing international system
and the redistribution of power towards those states that would benefit the most from changing the
international system309.
The description of the international system in HST lies somewhere in between the perfect
anarchy presented in defensive and offensive neorealism and the power hierarchy presented in PTT.
Gilpin argues that “[i]nternational relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power
among independent actors in a state of anarchy”310. In spite of economic and technological
developments, the fundamental nature of international politics remains the same.311 Still, the
international system is quite orderly.312 The dominant powers control how states can interact in the
system. Control over the system is a function of three factors. First, the distribution of power among
states determines who governs and whose interests are mainly promoted. Second, a hierarchy of
prestige, “the everyday currency of international relations”313, also affects the governance of the
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system by making lesser powers follow the lead of the dominant state. Prestige is based on material
capabilities, but also on reputation: states must be willing and successful at using power, especially
military power, to get prestige.314 Third, the interaction among states are influenced by a set of
rights and rules, ranging from mere understandings to complex treaties.315
According to Gilpin, a disequilibrium between the hierarchy of prestige and the actual
distribution of power among states is a normal cause of instability and sometimes war. Once in a
while, a secondary state’s growth and subsequent development of material capabilities can lead to a
mismatch between the perceived and actual power relationships in the system. Yet again, there is a
rising challenger, but in HST, the variable of satisfaction with the status quo has been exchanged for
the expected costs and profits of changing the status quo. Still, the story is familiar. Differential
growth rates redistribute power in the system and change the expected net gains from system
change. In turn, the altered cost-benefit ratio changes interests as well. The dominant state faces
decline as consumption goes up and production and defence become more expensive. Skills that
once gave it a comparative advantage gradually proliferate to less developed countries and a fiscal
crisis occurs. In the rising state, the opposite happens: “lower costs, rising rates of return on their
resources, and the advantages of backwardness”316 gradually make it profitable to change the
system. The hierarchy of prestige and the rights and rules of interaction, all established in the past,
are undermined by the dramatic changes in the distribution of power. The dominant state can no
longer impose its will on the rising state, and the rising state can start demanding changes. If the
dominant power cannot counter the challenge and restore equilibrium, the stale mate over who will
run the system is often settled through war.317 
If growth rates can cause so much harm, how do states behave to counter the threat? First,
they can increase the resources devoted to maintaining their commitments and position in the
international system, by, for example, increasing domestic taxation, collecting tribute from other
states, manipulating the terms of trade, or increasing efficiency.318 Second, they can try to reduce
their existing commitments, without jeopardising their international position, by reducing costs,
weakening or destroying the challenger, expanding to a more secure and less costly perimeter, or
reducing international commitment through withdrawal, rapprochement, alliances, or
concessions.319 
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In short, HST also rejects the first neorealist hypothesis and rather suggests that space wars
are most likely to occur when there is a disequilibrium between the existing international system
and the redistribution of space power towards those states that would benefit the most from
changing the international system. Though HST accepts that the system is anarchic, it still suggests
that international space politics is quite orderly due to a number of rights, rules, treaties and
understandings. Furthermore, a dominant space power is expected to be on top of a hierarchy of
space prestige based on both space capabilities and the reputation of using them successfully.
Ultimately, HST suggests that space war most is likely to occur when different growth rates create a
disequilibrium between the hierarchy of space prestige and the actual distribution of space power.
Thus, space war could be a result of stalemates that occur when the dominant power, in spite of
trying to allocate new resources and reduce space commitments, faces decline in space and the
rising challenger suddenly can afford to change the system. 
1.5 The First Partial Conclusion: The Case for A Widely Defined Neorealism
The fifth subchapter of Chapter I presents concluding remarks and reflections based on the findings
of the thesis so far. The purpose of the thesis is to explain why a space war has not yet occurred,
and the theoretical framework must serve that purpose. The first partial conclusion argues that IR
theory is in fact applicable to international space politics, and that a widely defined neorealism that
mixes concepts and conclusions from two opposing camps within the same theoretical body can
best explain why there has never been a space war. 
First of all, IR theory can be applied to international space politics. In fact, it has already
been done in the past. The paradigms of IR still clash above the Kármán line because Earth and
Space are not truly separated. Earth and Earth Space are so connected in Dolman's astropolitical
regions just because the transition between them is so gradual. Space technology is made on the
ground, launched from the ground, controlled and used on the ground. In other words, Slomczynska
seems to be right in the claim that IR stands unchallenged even in the study of international space
politics. 
Realism seems well suited for studying the topic of space war. Classical and neoclassical
realism appear useful in explaining states´ foreign policy in space. However, since space war is an
international outcome, a phenomena that result from the interaction of two or more actors in the
international system, a systemic international relations theory is best suited to explain the likelihood
of space war. With the help of techno-nationalist theory, realism seems to have, at least partly,
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explained the behaviour of states in space. 
Neorealism is built upon a small number of assumptions about the international system and
its units. That involves good parsimony, but perhaps too much simplicity? A neorealist analysis
would reduce international space politics to the interaction of similar units with the same functions
regardless of domestic politics and culture. However, combining the explanatory power of
defensive neorealism (DN), offensive neorealism (ON), power transition theory (PTT), and
hegemonic stability theory (HST) with an eclectic approach will hopefully enrich the analysis. 
Defensive neorealism (DN) suggests that the anarchical international system should force
states to maximize space security through self-help behaviour and space power politics. States face
the same tasks in space, but are differentiated by their amount of space power. Furthermore, DN
suggests that states engage in balancing, buck-passing, post-war settlements and emulation in space,
and that they can turn their wealth into space power to balance against the dominant space power
Offensive neorealism (ON), on the other hand, suggests that anarchy forces states to
maximize space power instead of security and aim for space hegemony. However, the geography of
space, like the geography of Earth, should make this a difficult task. Thus, ON suggests that states
seek space hegemony, or at least aim to keep other great space powers from achieving it, through
balancing, buck-passing, blackmail and war. 
Power transition theory (PTT) suggests that a dominant state in the international system
distributes wealth, security, prestige and power through an international space order. Some states
are probably satisfied with the status quo in space, others not. Differentiated internal growth rates
should mean that the relative distribution of space power in the international system is changing.
Currently, there are huge space power gaps in the international system, but latecomers are catching
up with the most powerful states in space. When a rising dissatisfied state reaches space power
parity with the dominant state, the risk of space war should be at its highest. 
Hegemonic stability theory (HST) goes even further than PTT in accepting the realist
premiss of an anarchical international system, but suggests the existence of a hierarchy of space
prestige based on material space capabilities, the willingness to use it, and various formal and
informal rules. Different internal growth rates should influences the cost-benefit calculations of
changing the status quo in space and gradually lead to a stalemate of space power which carries
with it the risk of space war. 
There are at least five good reasons why neorealism provides us with the most useful
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theoretical toolkit for studying the absence of war in space. First, there is a gap in the literature. The
existing literature, outlined above, seems to support realist explanations of international space
politics more than those produced by competing theories. However, no one has purposefully applied
several theories encompassed by neorealism side by side in a historical analysis of the entire Space
Age. The goal of the thesis is to help fill that gap.
Second, the extended theoretical body associated with neorealism has produced clear and
contradictory explanations as to why and when war is likely to happen. Neorealism is not great at
accounting for the specific causal mechanisms leading to war without help from theories like
neoclassical realism, which seeks to explains why states pursue particular strategies in the
international arena. Neorealism can, however, account for the occurrence or absence of war without
attributing it to the behaviour of any single state. 
Third, the theories associated with neorealism have enough similarities to be used in
combination. All the four theories have been made to study war and insecurity. They all consider
great powers – the most powerful states – as the most important actors in international politics.
Neorealist scholars do not deny the existence of international institutions, multinational companies
or NGOs, but largely ignore non-state actors in their analyses because they rely on states for their
security and survival. The distribution of power, defined as material, military capabilities, among
the most powerful states is the essential explanatory variable for war.
Fourth, a widely defined neorealism, encompassing power transition theory and hegemonic
stability theory, has enough internal diversity to generate a complex causal story about the absence
of war in outer space. Neorealist scholars disagree on how the distribution of power affects state
behaviour and on which distribution of power is the most war prone. Conclusions on the matter can
be divided in two camps. The traditional conclusion is that a balance of power, in which there is no
marked difference in power between the leading states, facilitates peace and stability by making the
use of force too costly for single any state or alliance. Other scholars conclude that a preponderance
of power, in which one state is far more powerful than the others, facilitates peace by making the
most powerful state feel secure – attempts at challenging the leading state are doomed to fail. 
Fifth, neorealism offers a worst-case scenario for international space politics. A future space
war could have dire consequences for all humanity. Thus, the somewhat cynical world view of
realism actually serves a purpose. Neorealism should not be the only perspective to explain
international space politics, but it gives useful insight on competition and conflict in international
space politics and probably also space war. If you assume the very worst when studying the past,
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you could be positively surprised by future events. If you assume the best, a harsh reality might
catch you by surprise. 
The first partial conclusion makes the case for using a widely defined neorealism to explain
the lack of space war so far in the Space Age. IR theory is in fact applicable to international space
politics. Liberalism can explain international space regimes, space law, space institutions, space
cooperation and spillover effects in the space sector. Constructivism can rules of behaviour certain
ideas are valid and others not. Realism, however, seems to have the most explanatory power on the
question of space war. Neorealism, if defined widely enough, provides explanations of war that are
sufficiently similar and different. DN, ON, PTT and HST have enough internal diversity to generate
a complex causal story of the absence of space war. In addition, neorealism offers a useful
perspective on the worst-case scenario for international space politics. More importantly, the four
theories all suggest that the causes of space war all lie in the distribution of space power. The well-
known “big dogs” on Earth – the US, China, Russia – have the most material military space
capabilities. They play the most important parts in the game of power, anarchy, competition,
conflict, balancing, prestige and complex regimes in space. The history of international space
politics will be explored in Chapter II.  
*****
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CHAPTER II 
A History of International Space Politics in the First and Second Space Age
“Man transcends his element without ceasing to be man,
 for he is Homo faber, the toolmaker, the technologist. 
And man explores through idiosyncratic choice, 
because he is also Homo pictor, the symbolist, the dreamer.”
– Walter McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth.320
Chapter II presents an international political history of the Space Age which is analysed in Chapter
III using the analytical framework established in Chapter I. The history revolves around the US, the
USSR/Russia and China in the First and Second Space Age. All three states have made huge
investments in space capabilities, both civilian and military, and successfully demonstrated
technology few other actors in the world can match. The following history of these activities is
purposefully descriptive in nature and based on Thies' guidelines for historical IR research321 to
minimize investigator bias and unwarranted selectivity. Historical sources are triangulated to verify
facts, while explanations and interpretations are saved for Chapter III. 
The Secure World Foundation has recently compiled and assessed publicly-available
information on the counterspace capabilities being developed by the US, Russia and China.322 The
evidence shows significant research and development of a broad range of kinetic and non-kinetic
counterspace capabilities, but only non-kinetic capabilities are actively being used in current
military operations.323 The evidence shows that the US possesses the dual-use space capabilities
necessary to develop all types of counterspace capabilities if it chooses to do so.324 There is strong
evidence that Russia has embarked on a set of programs over the last decade to regain some of its
Cold War-era counterspace capabilities.325 Ultimately, the evidence strongly indicates that China
has a sustained effort to develop a broad range of counterspace capabilities.326 
The second chapter is organised in four subchapters. The first three subchapters correspond
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with the three state actors under analysis. Each of the subchapters begin with an overview before
three distinct sections. The first section is a brief historical background to contextualise the state's
relationship with space up until 1957. The second and third section correlate with the First and
Second Space Age. Th e fourth and final subchapter – the second preliminary conclusion of the
thesis – points out the striking similarities and interconnectedness of history in space and on Earth.
It argues that IR theory is fit for the task of analysing international space politics because
“space history is Earth history”. Space is part of the international system. The risk of space
capabilities being used together with nuclear weapons in a potential WWIII was high and
will remain high going into the future. In short, the causes of space war are associated with
the more familiar causes of major war. 
2.1 The US in Space
The first subchapter of Chapter II presents a descriptive, contextualised international political
history of the US in space during the First and Second Space Age. Today, the US state is the world's
largest space program (See Figure 1).327 The largest de-facto space program is not NASA, but the
US military.328 The US has 849 operating satellites (See Figure 7)329, a two-digit number of
spaceports, Cape Canaveral being the most important, and a wide variety of SLVs, including the
Atlas, Delta, Falcon and Antares series, which can lift everything from microsatellites to heavy
payloads into orbit.330
According to the Secure World Foundation´s latest open source assessment of counterspace
capabilities331, the US currently has the best military space capabilities in the world. The US also
has the most experience putting their military space capabilities to use in actual conflicts. In co-
orbital ASATs, the US has tested dual-use satellites like DART, XXS-10 and -11, Orbital Express,
Prowler, MiTEx, GSSAP and Angels. No direct-ascent ASAT program has been acknowledged, but
the US has tested both conventional and nuclear ASATs in past and tested dual-use ABM systems
like the Ground-based Midcourse System (GMD) and ship-based Aegis system, which both
represent a large and flexible capability in future conflict. Additionally, the US can jam satellites,
327 Mark Hilborne, “China’s Rise in Space and US Policy Responses: A Collision Course?” Space Policy 29, no. 2. 
(2013): 122-123, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2013.03.005.
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including the Russian GLONASS and Chines Beidou GNSS systems, as far away as GEO through
its operational electronic warfare system Counter Communications System (CCS).  
2.1.1 Historical Context
Physics professor Robert Goddard carried out cutting-edge military rocket research for the US
government during WWI. In 1940, Goddard's team launched the most advanced rocket in the world
outside Germany, but its research was largely ignored by the US military until Japan's attack on
Pearl Harbor in 1941.332 In the final phase of WWII, the US raced the USSR to capture German
scientists and rockets, and Operation Paperclip transferred more than 120 German scientists -
including lead scientist Werner von Braun – and 100 V-2 rockets to the US Army in New
Mexico.333 
In the first decade after WWII, low spending, inter-service rivalry, military conservatism,
bureaucratic red tape and indecision among policymakers left US ballistic missile and satellite
development trailing far behind that of the USSR.334 The CIA estimates that the US spent around 14
percent on the military of its national product on the military between 1945 and 1957, while the
USSR spent about 20 percent 335 The US Air Force, Army and Navy all had their own small missile
research programs, but a superiority in bomber planes made military space a non-priority.336 In
1945, for example, the US Navy sponsored a satellite research program, but it was quickly
cancelled.337 In 1946, the US Army Air Force started Project RAND to research future weapons.338
Later that year, a RAND report concluded that the US could launch a satellite within five years and
that satellites would help the development of ICBMs, weather forecasting, damage assessment,
communications, navigation and weapons targeting.339 In October 1946, the US took the first ever
picture of Earth from space using a modified V-2 rocket.340 
In the mid-1950s, a growing nuclear threat from the USSR lead to a substantial increase in
US spending on missile and satellite research.341 In 1953, when the USSR tested its first hydrogen
bomb and demonstrated improved ballistic missile technology, US funding for missile research rose
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sharply to US$3 million.342343 The US prioritized work on photoreconnaissance satellites and the
creation of an international legal regime that would legitimize their use to improve its intelligence
on the closed Soviet state.344 In 1954, the top secret Technological Capabilities Panel,
commissioned by president Eisenhower to prevent another Pearl Harbor, suggested that the
principle of freedom of space could be established in international law by launching a small
satellite.345 Meanwhile, a report urged the US Air Force (USAF) to secretly develop and deploy a
spy satellite as soon as possible, labelling it a “vital strategic interest”346. The first US satellite
program, named WS-117L, was eventually started by USAF in November 1954 and would lay the
scientific groundwork for all the main types of reconnaissance and surveillance satellites used over
the next three decades.347348
The year of 1955 was highly important in US space history. First, USAF set requirements
for WS-117L and began work on the higher-priority Atlas ICBM program.349 Second, the budget
allocation for missile research rose to US$161 million.350 Third, the US announced plans to launch a
small satellite during the International Geophysical Year (IGY), a period of maximum solar activity
during 1957-1958, in which 67 countries - including the USSR - would agree to participate.351
Fourth, the US announced the “Open Skies” initiative designed to allow overflights in space, which
was quickly turned down by the USSR.352 Fifth, the secret directive “United States Scientific
Satellite Program” (NSC 5520), issued by the National Security Council (NSC), decreed that the
SLV for the first US satellite should not be military in nature, gave impetus to the production of spy
satellites, the U-2 spy plane and the first Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), and stressed
a satellite's importance to US security, role in legitimizing future spying, sand benefits in terms of
psychological warfare, prestige and propaganda.353 Ultimately, in line with the constraints of NSC
5520, the US decided to launch the IGY satellite under the US Navy's Vanguard programme with
an upgraded version of the Viking sounding rocket – the only non-military option available at the
time.354
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2.1.2 The US in the First Space Age
The start of the Space Age was a traumatic event in the US. In the fall of 1957, the USSR
successfully launched Sputnik I and Sputnik II, effectively destroying the perception of US
superiority in science and technology.355 Traditionally, two large oceans had worked as defensive
buffers between the US and the USSR, but new dual-use rocket technology suddenly made them
less important.356 The US subsequently overestimated the USSRs missile capabilities, spreading the
idea of a “missile gap” between the two superpowers.357 President Eisenhower initially tried to
downplay the Sputniks’ political significance and even congratulated the Soviets, but US media
painted a picture filled with self-doubt, fear and hysteria. Newsweek Magazine, for example, asked
whether “the crushers of Hungary could be trusted with this new kind of satellite”358. But the media
was not alone in handing out such warnings. Senator Henry Jackson, US Information Agency
director George Allen, and the NSC all separately declared that the Soviet space program
challenged US security, prestige, and scientific and technical leadership.359 
The US responded to the Soviet Sputnik launches by investing massively in space science
and education and reorganising the military space sectors. Ultimately, the response resulted in the
“white space program”, the “blue space program”, and “the black space program”.360 The white was
led by NASA, the blue was run by the Department of Defense (DOD), and the black was run by the
intelligence agencies. President Eisenhower quickly created the Presidential Science Advisory
Committee (PSAC) to allay public fears after numerous congressional inquiries revealed a highly
fragmented space program.361 Senator Lyndon Johnson's Preparedness Subcommittee hearings led
to a final report saying: “We are in a race for survival and we intend to win that race”362. The DOD
created the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) to direct all military space programs and
accelerated the development of the Minuteman ICBM.363364 USAF began working on the manned
spaceflight program Man in Space Soonest (MISS).365 On December 6, 1957, however, the first US
satellite, Vanguard TV-3, exploded on the launch pad on live television.366 The Washington Post
concluded that the US was facing “cataclysmic peril in the face of rocketing Soviet military
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might”367. 
The seriousness of the US response to the USSR in space became evident during 1958. On
January 31, the first US satellite, Explorer I, was launched into orbit from Cape Canaveral,
Florida.368 A few days later, Eisenhower gave ICBMs, IRBMs and satellites highest national
priority. In August, the first comprehensive US space policy, “Statement of Preliminary U.S. Policy
on Outer Space” (NSC 5814/1), was approved in secret.369 In October, NASA was established with
8,000 employees, including the Army’s best rocket scientists, and US$100 million at its
disposal.370371 In the same piece of legislation, science and technology education was given a
US$188 million boost.372373 NASA got authority over manned spaceflight under Project Mercury,
but DOD kept the final word on NASA’s space activities. 374 In November, after almost a year of
US-Soviet talks, COPUOS was created as a part of the UN, adopting the US wording “peaceful
purposes” rather than “nonmilitary purposes”.375 Meanwhile, the MIDAS early-warning satellite and
the Advent communications satellite were cancelled because they were considered too provocative
and costly.376 
The burgeoning international space regime allowed the US to increase satellite spying, test
ground-based ASAT weapons and conduct cutting-edge space R&D.377 In the late 1950s, the US
conducted two high-altitude nuclear detonations, the world’s first conventional ASAT test, and
began R&D efforts on the short-lived SAINT satellite interception and inspection system.378 Around
the the same time, the X-15 program demonstrated the feasibility of hypersonic travel in near space,
and research on the X-20 Dyna-Soar – a hypersonic, suborbital space plane – was approved.379 In
1960, the Corona spying program became the world’s first operational satellite photo-
reconnaissance system – providing the US with new intelligence that debunked the idea of a
“missile gap”.380 Later that year, the classified National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was created
after the CIA got more involved in Corona.381 By 1961, the US had launched almost five times more
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satellites than the USSR382, including the first ever remote sensing weather satellite.383 
With Kennedy as president, the US prioritized human spaceflight to land a man on the
moon, supported the international space regime and negotiated space-related arms-control. In his
inaugural address in 1961, Kennedy, who had roasted Eisenhower over the missile gap during the
election, called for superpower cooperation in space and promised to push the US to a “new
frontier”.384 Three consecutive events early in 1961 –  the March 25 Mercury explosion, the April
14 Gagarin spaceflight, and the April 17 Bay of Pigs fiasco – triggered the largest US space
program to date: the Apollo manned moon landing program.385386 After getting joint support from
NASA and DOD, Kennedy committed the US to achieving the goal within the decade.387388
Meanwhile, fears of Soviet orbital nuclear weapons gave US ASAT development a new sense of
urgency.389 At COPUOS, the US proposed that all states should register their space launches while
emphasizing the peaceful nature of its own space policy.390 In 1963, following the Cuban Missile
Crisis, arms control negotiations resulted in the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the UNGA Resolution
1884.391 In the fall of 1963, two months after the Soviet Cosmos 21 Mars lander failure and two
months before his own death, Kennedy suggested a joint US-Soviet moon landing.392 
After Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, president Johnson kept expanding the US
space program, especially in manned spaceflight and satellite launches. The $660 million manned
X-20 Dyna-Soar program was cancelled393394, but the US tested395 and deployed two nuclear-tipped
ASATs – the Army’s Program 505 and USAF's Program 347 – in the Pacific.396 The 505 and 347
ASATs were tested three more times, but president Johnson remained sceptical to their military
utility.397 Apollo, however, was given much higher priority than the many bold military space
programs proposed by USAF at the time.398 As NASA’s budget rose from $964 million in 1961 to
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$5.1 billion by 1964, the DOD’s budget rose from $814 million to only $1.6 billion.399 The Mercury
spacecraft produced two suborbital manned flights before Glenn became the first American in space
in 1962, followed by two additional one-man missions in 1963.400 Between 1964 and 1966, the two-
man Gemini spacecraft produced an unmanned flight, a manned flight, the first American
spacewalk, a rendezvous in orbit and the first successful docking in orbit.401 In 1967, the OST was
signed by 62 states and unanimously approved in the US Congress under the clear assumption that
the treaty did not ban ASAT-weapons.402 After a fire killed three astronauts in 1967, the Apollo
mission successfully sent humans beyond Earth space to circumnavigate the Moon for the first time
in 1968 before famously landing Armstrong, Aldrin and Collins on the Moon on July 20, 1969.403
However, the Apollo success came at a price. The program cost US$25 billion –  nearly 4,5 percent
of the federal budget – and distorted other objectives in space, especially in military manned
spaceflight.404 For example, the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) was cancelled in 1969405. The
total number of US satellite launches peaked in the 1960s at nearly 80 per yer.406 
In the 1970s, under presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter, the US prioritized force-enhancing
and early warning military satellite capabilities, non-nuclear ASATs and bilateral space cooperation
with the USSR while slowing down its satellite launch rate. The cost-conscious Nixon
administration immediately established a Space Task Group to review future space plans.407 The
505 and 437 ASAT programs were scaled down when several NSC studies concluded that the US
was more dependent on satellites than the USSR.408 In 1970, Nixon endorsed the space shuttle as the
primary post-Apollo goal in space, before approving the dual-use Space Transportation System
(STS) design two years later.409 From the beginning, USAF required a shuttle that could place spy
satellites in polar orbit410, and its rationale grew even more militarized when DOD had to save it
economically under president Carter.411 Signed on May 26, 1972, SALT I, which relied on spy
satellites for verification and legitimization, prohibited space-based ABM systems under the
ABMT.412 That year, the first civilian remote-sensing satellite, Landsat, was launched.413 Later in
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the decade, in the spirit of détente, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project of 1975 symbolised a “hand-
shake in space” between the US and USSR, and several Soviet launches would carry US biological
experiments into orbit.414 In 1977, president Ford authorized a non-nuclear ASAT that would
become the Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV).415 In 1979, president Carter issued PD-37, the first
National Space Policy since Eisenhower, which included an aggressive long-term program for
military space systems.416 Carter continued the MHV ASAT program while engaging in secret
ASAT negotiations with the USSR due to fears of its growing conventional ASAT arsenal.417
However, the talks broke down over issues like the dual-use STS design, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and Reagan’s election victory.418 By the end of the decade, the US had revolutionized
military operations and fielded the GPS system, by deploying comprehensive military space
capabilities that are still operational in updated form, including surveillance, communication and
navigation satellites and an electro-optical system providing direct data downlink in near-real
time.419 
The US under president Reagan invested heavily in military space systems and largely
opposed space-related arms-control. In 1981, the Columbia Space Shuttle became the world’s first
reusable spacecraft two years behind schedule and US$2 billion over budget420  – a vehicle the
Soviets considered to have ASAT potential.421 During the same year, the US military space budget
surpassed that of NASA for the first time in three decades.422 The Space Station named Freedom
program was born, paving the way for the ISS.423 Despite significant space cooperation with the
USSR in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the US under Reagan broke off virtually all cooperation
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and imposition of martial law in Poland.424 In his first
speech on space policy, Reagan underlined the importance of assuring access to space.425 Shortly
after, Reagan first formal space policy426, called NSDD-42, the US reemphasised that space systems
were considered national assets and included a program to deny the enemy use of space and space
assets in a time of was and crisis.427 During the period, the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC)
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was created.428 
Reagan’s famous “Star Wars” speech, held on March 23, 1983, initiated the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) to investigate if space could be utilized for a layered, strategic defence of
the entire US population against a massive Soviet nuclear attack.429430431 In his speech, Reagan called
upon the US scientific community to render USSR nuclear weapons obsolete.432 After the speech,
two feasibility studies – the Fletcher Committee and the Hoffman Study – rendered a perfect, global
ABM system practically impossible.433 Still, one year later, the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization (SDIO) was chartered to research and develop the necessary technology.434 The SDIO
proposed to put a ABM system of thousands of kinetic interceptors and lasers in space to defend the
country against the nuclear weapons of the USSR.435 The goal of the SDI, under which “ASAT
projects were adapted for use as anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and vice versa”436, aimed to
“develop US technological advantage, bind America’s allies closer, and to push the struggling
Soviet economy to its limit”437. ASAT projects were adapted for use as anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and
vice versa. The SDI was “a critical development”438 for the USSR because it would practically end
the nuclear deterrence doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) and render its second-strike
nuclear capabilities useless.439 When the USSR demanded that the SDI would be confined to
laboratory research, the US declined440 – clearly ending the period of détente in space.441 
In 1984, USAF flight tested the Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV) ASAT system for the
first time, and then, in 1985, used the system – based on a small arsenal of ASM-135 air-launched
missiles442 – to intercept a satellite in space.443 After the test, US Congress prohibited further ASAT
testing unless the USSR conducted one first.444 The 1986 Challenger accident led to a more
balanced US reliance on reusable and expendable launchers.445 In 1986, space-based infrared
sensors and kinetic weapons performed simulated boost-phase intercepts in a SDI-related
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experiment.446 By 1987, however, the US had – despite scepticism towards Soviet change – yet
again developed a working relationship with the USSR on deep space explorations.447 In 1988, the
US space station program was designated as Space Station Freedom for political propaganda,
triggering the renaming of the Soviet space station to Mir – the Russian word for peace.448
Nonetheless, a revised national space policy, also issued in 1988, reflected nearly a decade of US
space development and embraced USAF’s typology of space support, force enhancement, space
control and force application.449 And by the same year, the SDI project had evolved into the
“Brilliant Pebbles” system, which consisted of a number of single kinetic interceptors and
associated tracking systems.450 
President Bush continued along president Reagan’s political path in space and created the
National Space Council,451 issued a new National Space Policy and several National Space Policy
Directives (NSPDs).452 Intensive research effort on the SDI continued under the Bush
administration, but the US military was unable to “overcome the enormous technological obstacles
to creating such a defensive system”453. After China’s fierce crackdown at Tiananmen Square in
1989, the US imposed economic sanctions, including a prohibition on the export of dual-use
satellite technology.454
2.1.3 The US in the Second Space Age
In clear contrast to beginning of the First Space Age, the US entered the Second Space Age as
the leading global space power. When the USSR collapsed, the US reoriented the SDI towards
regional instead of global conflicts, and ABM systems like THAAD and Aegis began seeing the
light of day.455 Operation Desert Storm was named the first “space war” because the US
demonstrated a clear superiority in force-enhancing military space capabilities, which provided
advantages in navigation, communications, commercial imaging and weather prediction, by
defeating Iraq, the world's fourth largest army, in only 10 days.456 The US also took the lead in
the commercial satellite manufacturing field with an average market share of more than 80
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percent.457 However, the early 1990s saw restrictions on the deployment of space-based
interceptors458, congressional bans on the MIRACL chemical laser and Army direct-ascent ASAT
program linked to the SDI,459 as well as the cancellation of the X-30 manned space vehicle.460 
Under president Clinton, the US invested in the ISS, began efforts to safeguard US
satellites from attack, and tightened export controls on dual-use space technology. In 1993, vice
president Gore announced that Russia would join the ISS  and the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), for which the US paid Russia an initial sum of $400 million and a total of $800
million in ISS funding from 1994 to 1998.461 In 1995, the Global Positioning System (GPS)
achieved full operational capability with 24 satellites providing precise PNT to civilian and military
users, for example supporting precision weapons like gravity bombs to cruise missiles.462 In 1996,
Clinton released a National Space Policy stating that “purposeful interference with space systems
shall be viewed as an infringement on sovereign rights”463 and urging that “directs that steps be
taken to protect against attack through such measures as deploying sensors on satellites, hardening
them to electromagnetic effects and radiation and improving the security of ground stations and
communication links”464. That same year, the ban on the Army´s direct-ascent ASAT and MIRACL
chemical laser was lifted, and the system was tested against a US satellite in 1997.465 In the late
1990s, the US placed Chinese commercial satellites and related technologies under International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) as well as on the State Department’s Munitions List due to the
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.466 
The US continued to invest heavily in space through the early 2000s in both the military and
civilian sector, while acting on a more aggressive space police doctrine and pulling out of the
ABMT. The primacy of military space was codified in under Bush.467 Already in the late 1990s, the
Rumsfeld Commission warned of new “space pearl harbor” and outlined a bold new space strategy,
calling for urgent action to protect vulnerable space capabilities through deterrence and defence:
“we know from history that every medium—air, land and sea—has seen conflict. Reality indicates
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that space will be no different”468. When Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense, military
doctrine changed from being threat-based to becoming capabilities-based and came to focus on
concepts like “space superiority” and “space dominance”. Throughout the period, the US focused
on developing a full spectrum of space capabilities to support national security objectives, including
global satellite communications, remote sensing and PNT. In 2002, the US withdrew from the
ABMT469, US: approved funding for selective counterspace capabilities470, created the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA)471, and began conditionally sharing military satellite data with
Taiwan472. The decision was arguably due to the ABMT being outdated after the Cold War, but
the move also allowed the US to restart development of operational, local ABM systems473 after
Russian weapons sales proliferated military space capabilities474. The decision also prompted
increased lobbying for space arms control reform by Russia and China.475 
The Afghanistan and Iraq wars – operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom –
demonstrated far more superior US military space capabilities than ever before, but also revealed an
growing US vulnerability in space. Compared to Desert Storm, the percentage of precision-guided
air-delivered munitions rose from 8 to 70, while communication speeds to battle units rose 50
times.476 The war made China even more aware of the US military dependence on space.477 In 2003,
however, the Columbia Space Shuttle exploded, killing all seven astronauts on board.478 The
accident gave China an opening on the global market.479 The second Bush administration “brought
into office a group of neoconservative thinkers that perceived US space systems as vulnerable
and concluded that the weaponization of space could be the cure to this problem”480. In 2004, the
US military released a document entitled “Counterspace operations” in which they wrote that
“adversaries will target space capabilities in an attempt to deny that combat advantage”481, so “[w]e
must also be prepared to deprive an adversary of the benefits of space capabilities when American
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interests and lives are at stake”482. The Counter Communications System (CCS) became operation
that same year.483 The US protested the European Galileo GNSS system and also put pressure on
Europe not to lift its arms embargo on China.484 In the 2006 directive on US Space Transportation
Policy, Bush codified the primacy of military space and made national security objectives a priority,
downplaying civilian and cooperative activities. The 2006 National Space Policy emphasized
“space control”, “freedom of action in space”, “national interest” and US opposition to new space
regimes485 – and opened the door for preemptive strikes also in space.486 As military space was
prioritized, the US focused its human spaceflight program on trips to LEO and space stations using
the space shuttle. In addition, the US conducted missions with robotic exploration, remote sensing
of the Earth from space for climate monitoring and meteorology. When China tested an ASAT in
2007, the US quickly responded by blocking the PPWT draft treaty487 and destroying a failed US
reconnaissance satellite in space with its own conventional ASAT in 2008.488 However, as a number
of other countries, including Russia, formally protested, the US kept a relatively low profile due to
its own military space doctrine, capabilities and history of ASAT tests in the First Space Age.489 
Under president Obama, the US engaged more in space cooperation, but never strayed far
from its focus on national security in space. Obama tried to adjust to a range of new space actors
through diplomacy, arms control, TCBMs, by abstaining instead of voting against a Sino-Russian
space treaty draft at the UN, and endorsing the EU Code of Conduct.490 Both the 2010 US National
Space Policy and the 2011 National Security Space Strategy were moderate compared to previous
documents. Smith argues that the National Space Policy is “particularly striking for its change in
tone from the previous policy issued by President George W. Bush”491. Brachet and Pasco writes
that the policy “does indeed avoid the strong, rather undiplomatic, language of the 2006 version,
which surprised many of the USA’s space partners worldwide”.492 However, the 2011 National
Security Space Strategy refers to space as “increasingly congested, contested and competitive” and
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concludes that “space is vital to U.S. national security and our ability to understand emerging
threats, project power globally, conduct operations, support diplomatic efforts, and enable global
economic viability”493. Meanwhile, the Wolf Amendment kept the US from spending “any federal
funds on participating, collaborating or coordinating in bilateral cooperation with China”494. In
2011, Obama and Hu Jintao made a joint statement on improving US-Sino space cooperation, but
the initiative never materialized.495 
In recent years, under the Trump administration, the US has focused on new satellites, dual-
use ABM systems, the creation of a US Space Force, renewed space exploration, and a new space
plane. The Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) has been demonstrated to the world as an “effective
ASAT system for destroying satellites at up to 1,500 kilometres altitude”496. The same is true for the
ship-based Aegis-system based on the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptors.497 In recent years, the
X-37B robotic spaceplane has been developed as an unmanned miniature version of the Space
Shuttle that can stay in orbit for longer periods of time.498 The space plane could potentially be used
for either peaceful or offensive military purposes. Several private companies have developed their
own SLVs by means of large government contracts. Most notably, SpaceX has developed and
successfully operated the Falcon 9 reusable commercial SLV.499 Recently, the Trump administration
has revived the advisory National Space Council500,  moved toward the creation of a space force501502,
developed major projects like the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Orion capsule503, and revived
the US human spaceflight program to return to the Moon and send the first humans to Mars.504
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2.2 The USSR and Russia in Space
The second subchapter of Chapter II presents a contextualised, descriptive international political
history of the USSR/Russia during the First and Second Space Age. Russia is ranked among the
great space powers (See Figure 1) for having reached space milestones like the first satellite, first
dog in space, first human, first object to the Moon, first two-man spaceflight, first woman in space,
first space walk, and the first space station. Russia currently has 152 operating satellites in orbit
(See Figure 7)505 and, some argue, “the most complete launch program in the world”506. Russian
SLVs include the Rockot, Soyuz, Zenit, and Proton507, and the fifth super-heavy-lift Angara.508
Russia uses two main space ports at Baikonur, the world’s largest space launch facility509510, and
Plesetsk, and is now constructing a third in Vostochny which is expected ready by 2020.511 Russia
also leases one spaceport from Kazakhstan.512 Over the past two decades, Russia has become one of
the leaders in the global commercial launch market, and it is currently one of two states, next to
China, that can launch humans to space – and thus the sole provider of human transportation to the
ISS,.513 The Russian GNSS is called Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS).514  
According to the Secure World Foundation´s latest open source assessment of counterspace
capabilities515, Russia has been testing co-orbital ASAT technology through the Cosmos satellites
series, with links back to the Cold War Istrebitel Sputnikov (IS) system, since 2010. Russia is
almost certainly capable of limited direct-ascent ASAT attacks in LEO through systems like Nudol,
Kontakt and S-500, but does not currently field operational weapons. Furthermore, large
investments have been made into integrating electronic warfare into military operations through
tactical system that can jam targets – at least within a local area, but has no publicly known
capability to interfere with the US GPS system. Finally, Russia is developing directed energy
weapons, like lasers, from its strong knowledge base in this field. 
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2.2.1 Historical Context
The Russian space program can be traced back to 19th century rocket scientists like Tsiolkovskiy.516
In the 1930s, the Soviet government centralized various decade-old rocket teams in the GIRD group
to tie rocket science to the military establishment, before imprisoning and killing many leading
scientists during the Stalinist purges.517 When Nazi Germany invaded in 1941, surviving rocket
scientists were forced to produce wing-borne rockets and ballistic missiles for the war effort.518 In
the last leg of the war, the USSR captured many low-ranking German engineers and gathered
intelligence on V-2 production, but the effort was hindered by the US through Operation Paperclip,
British bombing and internal competition.519
In the years after 1953, when the first Soviet hydrogen bomb was tested and Stalin died,
Soviet rocket scientists worked under the Ministry of Medium Machine Building on mid-range
rockets able to deliver nuclear bombs over greater distances, as well as a satellite side-project.520521
Khrushchev, an ambitious risk-taker and fan of science, gave the scientists more influence over the
agenda.522 The NII-88 Institute, lead by Korolev, got easier access to government and military
officials as the rocket-friendly Ryabikov rose to leadership over the Military Industrial Commission
(VPK). The R-7 ICBM project was decreed and given state importance in 1954 and grew to become
the biggest ever Soviet military research project after the nuclear bomb, involving over 200
institutes and 25 ministries.523 In 1955, building commenced on the Baikonur Cosmodrome long-
range launch facility in Kazakhstan.524 Meanwhile, the USSR helped China with missile technology
transfers and technical support.525 Following the US IGY press conference in 1955, the USSR
announced its own press conference and official decree to launch a IGY satellite.526 By the summer
of 1957, the R-7 rocket, which included the world’s first guidance system, inflight-steering and
vertical launch pad, was ready for testing.527 After two dramatic launch failures in May and June,
the R-7 flew 6.500 kilometres on August 21, 1957.528 An official communiqué in Soviet media
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proclaimed that the test proved the “possibility of launching missiles into any region of the
terrestrial globe”529.
2.2.2 The USSR in the First Space Age
On October 4, 1957, the USSR successfully launched the world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik I,
into orbit using a R-7 rocket.530 Sputnik’s radio transmitter emitted a beep that was clearly
detectable in Europe and the US.531 One month later, the five times larger Sputnik II carried a dog
named Laika into orbit.532 The Soviet satellites would not have been given priority without an
intense lobbying campaign from Korolev in the late 1950s. Khrushchev, however, took full
advantage of the successful launches conducted on the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian
Revolution.533 He said Sputnik had been launched to convince “the people of Russia, China, India as
well as Europe that our system is the best”534. According to opinion polls, most Italians, French and
British at the time thought the USSR was leading the US in science.535 Publicly, Khrushchev gave
the impression of a “missile gap”, but in reality the R-7 was only being produced in small
numbers.536 The Sputniks helped give Khrushchev the confidence necessary to build the Berlin Wall
and place nuclear missiles on Cuba.537
After the two Sputnik launches, the USSR kept reaching new milestones in space before the
US. In 1958, the first spacecraft was launched towards the Moon, and during the following year
Sputnik 5 returned dogs safely from orbit, while Luna 2 crash-landed on the Moon and Luna 3
produced the first photographs of the far side of the Moon.538539 In April 1961, Gagarin achieved
manned spaceflight for the first time in history.540 In August 1961, a second manned flight
deliberately took focus away from the Berlin Crisis.541 In 1962, Vostok 3 and 4 achieved the first
rendezvous in space, and in June 1963, Tereshkova, the first woman in space, spent more time in
orbit than all US astronauts combined.542 The successive space “firsts” were yet again used as
evidence for the superiority of the communist system. New discoveries from the Luna 3
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photographs were given names like “Mount Lenin” and “Sea of Moscow”.543 Gagarin credited the
Communist Party for his success, received the Order of Lenin, had a victory parade in the Red
Square, the first televised by western media, and went on a world tour, while Popovich, a
cosmonaut launched in 1962, said he was “blazing a trail for all mankind to the communist
future”544. The USSR ignored Kennedy’s proposed joint lunar mission in 1963.545 
In the early 1960s, the accelerating US space effort led to a new emphasis on ASAT
weapons and military space in the USSR, but funding was running below what the design bureaux
requested to compete – in spite of counting approximately US$ 3.4 billion per year.546 The disparate
space program, which was plagued by fierce inter-bureau competition and ad hoc decision-making,
was mainly seen as a propaganda tool by the leadership, forcing scientists to adapt existing
technology instead of focusing on useful scientific gains.547 The manned spaceflights between 1961
and 1965 “were often little more than stunts”548. The three-man Voshkod spacecraft, for example,
was just a slightly modified Vostok meant to fool the US.549 Proposed research on a reusable
spacecraft was dismissed.550 As a direct response to US high-altitude nuclear tests, the Soviets
quickly turned to testing high-altitude nuclear explosions and developing space-based tactical
systems and conventional ASATs.551 The USSR, unsuccessful at prohibiting satellite overflight at
the UN, launched its own surveillance satellite Cosmos in 1962.552 When the two superpowers
signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the USSR agreed to ban nuclear ASAT tests. 
Under Brezhnev, the USSR invested heavily in military space while signing major space
treaties like the OST and the ABMT. In 1963, the anti-space defence establishment Protivo
Kosmicheskaya Oborona (PKO) was created.553 The USSR developed and tested the Fractional
Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), ground-based lasers, directed-energy weapons and a co-
orbital satellite-killing vehicles guided by radar and infrared sensors.554555 Work began on the
manned military space station Almaz in response to the US MOL project.556 More importantly, the
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Istrebitel Sputnikov or Satellite Destroyer co-orbital ASAT, which was conceived already in the
1950s557 and could be launched from an ICBM and overtake and destroy satellites in LEO without
contravening the newly signed OST558, was tested for the first time in 1963, paving the way for an
conventional ASAT test scheme which would last well into the early 1980s.559 A new military
strategy outlined that space could be used for space weapon systems for combat effectiveness, to
prevent other countries from utilizing space and to develop strategic offensive systems able to
conduct battle in space.560 
In the 1970s, the USSR continued to exceed the US in co-orbital ASATs and long-duration
manned missions, but lagged behind in communications, early warning, and military reconnaissance
satellites. After the first US moon landing, the USSR denied that a manned lunar landing was ever a
Soviet goal and instead began developing manned space stations.561 Satellite capabilities were
expanded to support tactical and strategic military operations.562 Extensive ASAT testing continued
well into the early 1970s.563 In 1972, SALT I and ABMT affirmed US-Soviet parity in strategic
nuclear weapons and highlighted that using ASATs could be destabilizing to international
politics.564565 In 1975, the USSR docked with the US in space during the symbolic Apollo-Soyuz
mission.566 By the following year, the Soviets had begun a new series of co-orbital ASAT tests that
lasted until June 1982.567 In 1979, improving Soviet force-enhancing military space systems
prompted new ASAT talks with the US.568 Parallel to the negotiations, several potential ASATs
were deployed at the Baikonur spaceport.569 In the late 1970s, the first Soviet early-warning system
was deployed using a small constellation of Cosmos satellites in highly elliptical orbits.570 
In the 1980s, the USSR launchd a manned space station, navigation system and space
shuttle, unilaterally halted ASAT tests, and forged a new space alliance with China after grave
financial troubles had left the space programme underfunded. In the early 1980s, the construction of
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the space space station Salyut 7 reaffirmed Soviet supremacy in human spaceflight.571 As mentioned
above, conventional ASAT testing continued up until 1982.572 That year, the USSR launched
GLONASS to compete with the US GPS.573 When the US developed their MHV ASAT weapon,
Andropov proposed a bilateral moratorium on ASAT testing which was turned down by Reagan.574
In August 1983, after the US launched the SDI program, the USSR unilaterally stopped all ASAT
testing.575 The SDI was deemed a critical threat to the effectiveness of Soviet nuclear weapons, but
the USSR did not dear challenge the US directly because it would most likely reveal its struggling
economy and technological limitations.576 Instead, the USSR promoted discussion on PAROS at the
CD and proposed several draft treaties on space arms-control.577 However, a 1984 Soviet Military
Space Doctrine reveals that military superiority in space remained a priority.578 In 1986, the Soviet
space station was launched under the new name Mir – the Russian word for peace – to highlight the
military nature of the SDI program.579 In 1988, the unmanned space shuttle Buran, a direct response
to the US STS, SDI, and Space Station Freedom programs, was successfully tested.580 In 1989,
GLONASS reached initial operational capabilities with an accuracy of about 10 meters.581582
However, serious financial problems in the late 1980s led to reduced funding for maintenance,
operations and new spacecraft.583 In 1989, Gorbachev re-approached China with an offer to sell
Soviet technological experience.584   
2.2.3 Russia in the Second Space Age
The breakup of the USSR in 1991 lead to a “virtual collapse of Soviet spacepower”585. Russia lost
control of its main space port at Baikonur in Kazakhstan, for which it now had to pay to use, and
parts of its extensive network of ground control facilities, receiving stations and tracking facilities
in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.586 The Russian economy was devastated by political
instability, ethnic conflicts and the rapid transition to market economy.587 A sharp fall in GDP
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between 1991 and 1996 followed by the financial crisis of 1998 was reflected in space and defence
budgets.588 Military launches dropped from 31 in 1992 to only four in 1999.589 Russian combat
aircraft and vessels had to rely on US and Canadian satellites, and long-term R&D in military space
was neglected.590 Insufficient funding caused gaps in the GLONASS and early-warning satellite
systems, which required several maintenance launches per yer, while the Mir space station was left
empty until it was shut down and de-orbited in 2001.591
To counter the space power collapse, Russia under president Yeltsin commercialized SLVs
and reorganized the military space sector. Between 1995 and 2011, Russian commercial launches
accounted for about 40 per cent of the global space launch market.592  The Soviet space program
was a conglomerate of state-controlled design and production facilities, so the Russian space
industry remained strictly compartmentalized from the rest of the civil economy.593 Converted
ICBMs were sold to Western countries as commercial SLVs to generate income during the crisis.594
In a similar fashion, leading private space companies like Khrunichev and Energomash began
making commercial products for Western companies like Boeing and Lockheed Martin, while
others made deals with states like Iraq, Syria and India.595 Russia partially opened a door to China,
which became a small-scale space partner in this period.596 In 1992, the Russian Military Space
Forces (VKS) were created, based on the Soviet military architecture, and set to operate the launch
centre at Baikonur, on which Russia signed a long-term contract with Kazakhstan.597
Simultaneously, the civilian Russian Space Agency (now Roscosmos) was established.598 Russia
invested heavily, both financially and politically, in joining the ISS, but Russian contributions were
often delayed.599 In 1997, the VKS merged with the strategic missile forces, space forces and ABM
forces to become the VRKO. In the late 1990s, Russia joined with China and others at UN to work
for a ban on weapons in space through the PAROS initiative.600 
In the early 2000s, with president Putin in power, Russia launched several ambitious
initiatives to strengthen its military and commercial space capabilities. The Russian Space Agency
no longer faced imminent bankruptcy, and military space, human spaceflight and science received
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more funding.601 In 2001, the Space Forces (KV) were created to consolidate military space and
operate military spaceports, ground control centres, ground radar sites and the A-135 ABM system
protecting Moscow.602 In 2002, after the US pulled out of the ABMT, Russia submitted a UN draft
treaty meant to ban weapons in space, followed by a non-paper on the issue.603 In 2003, Putin
announced at the UN that Russia had adopted a “no-first deployment” policy on offensive space
weapons.604 Meanwhile, the A-135 system was expanded and modernized.605 After the 2003 US
Columbia disaster, Russia replaced planned US shuttle missions.606 Three major space policy
documents were issued in this period to enhance the space industry's global competitiveness,
improve GLONASS and develop the country's space ports.607 In 2004, GLONASS satellite launches
resumed608, just as Russia and Kazakhstan agreed on a new long-term lease on Baikonur lasting
until 2050.609 During the Second Chechen War, Russia disrupted satellite and phone
communications between Chechen rebels and Iran.610 However, Russia could not shake all of the
negative effects of the 1990s. In comparison, the US space budget in 2004 was still 20 times larger
than that of Russia.611 
In the second half of the 2000s, the Russian state took more control over the space sector
with semi-successful results. Backed up by several new space policy documents, the Russian
government heavily intervened in the space and defence industries, reoriented their production
towards the national armed forces and subordinated them to the newly created Military-Industrial
Commission (VPK) in 2006.612 These trends were accompanied by a steady and sharp increase in
the Russian space budget, even during the 2008 financial crisis.613 However, Russia's space budget
remained relatively low in comparison to the biggest spenders, with one estimation placing it
around $1 billion in 2007.614 In 2006–2007, bold plans for the Svobodny space port in the far east
was abandoned.615 The 2008 war with Georgia highlighted obvious weaknesses in Russia's
command and control system. Satellite targeting, for example, could not be used because
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GLONASS was non-operational and GPS was unavailable over Georgia.616 In the aftermath of the
conflict, Russian decision-makers pushed for further modernization in space.617 In 2008, Russia and
China proposed the PPWT draft treaty to ban weapons in space, but the effort was not supported by
the US.618 
In the last decade, Russia put enough resources into space capabilities to maintain its
positions as the world's second largest space power.619 Satellites was placed in orbit to update early
warning, military communication and reconnaissance systems, and GLONASS is fully operational
with 24 satellites in orbit – with China and India as users.620 However, Russia did not respond to all
of China's overtures for military space cooperation and excluded joint SLVs and satellites.621
Russia still has ten operational ground stations scattered on its territory.622 Existing early warning
radars was modernized while a new generation was tested.623 One electro-optical space monitoring
station and one command and control site have been commissioned. New SLVs, like the modular
Angara rocket, are under intensive development.624 The once top-secret Plesetsk space and missile
launching range is undergoing broad modernization and expansion.625 Once ready, the Angara-
Plesetsk combination will, despite the site's location far north of the equator, be able launch military
payloads into all operational orbits.626 Russia's Space Forces, unified in one air and space force
called the Aerospace Defense Forces (VVKO) in 2011627628, are refocusing their personnel to
sovereign territory.629 
However, Russia undoubtedly saw a “lost decade” in space in the 1990s, leaving it lagging
far behind the US.630 In terms of current space budget allocations, estimated at somewhat higher
than $1 billion631, Russia barely enters in the top five internationally.632 Private funding for
cooperative ventures with Western companies, foreign government contracts, and space tourism
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now constitute a significant portion of the Russian space industry’s overall budget.633 The early
warning system, which was designed only to observe ballistic missile launches from the US, still
lacks global detection capabilities.634 Russia is facing difficulties in military earth observation, and
military space satellites in general and GLONASS in particular focus on Russian territory and the
near abroad.635 Additionally, no ocean surveillance satellite has been launched after 2006636 In 2015,
the space force merged with the Russian air force to become the Russian Aerospace Forces.637 The
US currently pays Roscosmos 80 million USD for every american astronaut launched aboard the
Soyuz SLV.638 Russia has been jamming GPS signals during both the Ukraine and Syria conflicts.639
However, Russian satellites still have a very short operational lifetime in orbit640, and tensions with
Kazakhstan over drop zones have led to launch delays.641 Like the US and China, Russia is currently
developing a small dual-use robotic space plane similar to the X-37B.642
2.3 China in Space
The third subchapter in Chapter II presents a contextualised, descriptive international political
history of China during the First and Second Space Age. China, which currently fields 284
operating satellites (See Figure 7)643, has become “one of the top space powers644 in the world after
decades of high prioritization and steady investment from its leaders, indigenous research and
development, and a significant effort to buy or otherwise appropriate technologies from foreign
sources”645 (See Figure 1). Most Chinese space activity has been either directly or indirectly
controlled by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)646, but has also established The China National
Space Association (CNSA) as a civilian interface with other space agencies, the China Aerospace
Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) to handle commercial aspects, and 130 other
organisations supporting the space program.647 China has, with good help from the USSR and
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Russia, developed more than 10 SLV models, most of them belonging to the Long March (LM)
series.648 The LM-3A series have realized more than 50 launches alone. There are four spaceports in
China: Jiuquan, Taiyuan, and Xichang and Wenchang.649 Beijing has a very active ASAT program
and appears to have attempted at least six ASAT tests.650 
According to the Secure World Foundation´s latest open source assessment of counterspace
capabilities651, China has conducted multiple tests of the SJ satellite series that could lead to a co-
orbital ASAT. Through several tests, perhaps dating back as far as 2005, China has proved to have
between one and three different direct-ascent ASAT programs, which are either dedicated ASAT
systems or dual-use ABM systems. These systems can like reach satellites in LEO, but systems that
can target satellites in MEO and GEO are still in an experimental or developmental phase.
2.3.1 Historical Context
China is called ”the cradle of rockets” because the Song Dynasty invented black powder rocket in
the eleventh century.652 In 1232, the Chinese invaded the Mongols with flying fire arrows in the first
documented use of solid-propellant rockets in war.653 By the late 1500s, Chinese military forces
already used an early form of multi-stage rocket.654 During the 150 years of humiliation”, from 1800
to 1949, China was invaded by Japan and Western powers, for example during the Opium War of
1839 and the loss of Hong Kong to Great Britain.655
In the 1920s, Chinese intellectuals identified science and technology as key to re-
establishing Chinese superiority.656 After WWII, Chinese-born scientists were invited back from the
West to develop the space program.657 Among those who returned, though involuntarily, was
professor Qian Xuesen.658 He had been among the founders of the US Army’s Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL) during WWII, directly involved in debriefing Nazi scientists in Operation
Paperclip, and a protégé of Theodore Kármán.659 In 1951, at the peak of McCarthy's “red scare”,
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Qian was accused of being a communist and placed in house arrest for five years.658 A diplomatic
row between the US and China followed, lasting until Qian was exchanged with US prisoners from
the Korean war.659 Once in China, Qian became essential to the Chinese missile program, doing
work on ICBMs, the Long March SLV family, and the Silkworm cruise missile.660 He also helped
establish the classified Fifth Research Academy of the Ministry of National Defence in 1955 – the
year China declared its intention to develop a nuclear weapon.661  
2.3.2 China in the First Space Age
China’s modern space program was born in the late 1950s.662 A small space program was set up
under PLA control in 1956.663 Having witnessed the prestige effects of the Sputniks and dual use
nature of SLVs, chairman Mao pushed forward on missile and space launch technology in pursuit of
great power status.664 But China was far poorer than the US or the USSR665 and relied on Soviet
technical support, technology transfers and education.666 The USSR helped China build its first
missile, the DF-1, and set up the classified Missile and Rocket Research Institution, and provided
plans and R-2 rockets under the New Defence Technical Accord of 1957.667 At the Eighth Congress
of the CCP in 1958, Mao announced his intention to build the first Chinese satellite, and so the
Chinese Academy of Science tasked Group 581 with launching one on top of a sounding rocket.668 
Chinas´s space program remained a “weak and under-funded effort that suffered tremendous
hardships during the 1960s”669. In the midst of domestic political turmoil caused by the Great Leap
Forward670, an ideological split with the USSR brought technical assistance and technology
transfers to a halt.671 In 1960, as China launched its first liquid-fuelled rocket using a bicycle pump
to pressurize the fuel tank, Soviet specialists were ordered home.672 Thus, China had to to assume
full ownership of its own space program. In the mid-1960s, shortly after the Cuba Missile Crisis,
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China tested a nuclear weapon and an IRBM capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.673 In 1965, the
space program's institutional framework was decided.674 Satellites and manned spaceflight became
the next primary objectives.675 In 1966, the first Chinese human spaceflight program was started.676
With an imminent US moon landing as a backdrop, Mao founded the Chinese Academy for Space
Technology in 1968.677 However, in 1969, a Sino-Soviet border conflict brought the relationship to
a new low.678 
One year later, in 1970, China’s LM-1 rocket successfully launched the Dongfanghong-1
(DH-1) satellite into low Earth orbit679 – playing the patriotic song “The East is Red”680. That made
China the fifth country in the world to launch a satellite independently.681682 The Chinese Air Force
started selecting pilots for human spaceflight training, sometimes using cardboard and wooden
spacecraft mockups683, and even scheduled a test flight for 1973.684 But as the US and USSR signed
SALT I and ABMT, Mao cancelled the human spaceflight program in 1972 due to financial
pressure, scientific problems and political opposition.685 However, in 1975, China successfully
launched and recovered a remote-sensing satellite for the first time.686 
After Mao's death in 1976, China under Deng tried to recover from the Cultural Revolution
by reengaging with the international community and prioritizing civilian and commercial space over
military space. The Cultural Revolution destroyed much of the Chinese economy, but spared most
of the space science community.687 A s “technology and Western military concepts had begun to
displace politics and ideology as the underpinnings of China’s military policy”688, the entire defence
sector, including the space program, was scaled back and reoriented to make commercial
products.689 The Great Wall Industry Corporation (GWIC), founded in 1980, would play a central
role in the commercial effort by selling launch and satellite services and technology on the global
market outside the firm grip of the PLA.690 The GWIC conducted 29 commercial launch missions
673 Ibid.  
674 Ibid, 86. 
675 Shu-Hsien, “Will China become a military space superpower?,” 206. 
676 Perfilyev, “The Sino-Russian Space Entente,” 21. 
677 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 86. 
678 Perfilyev, “The Sino-Russian Space Entente,” 21. 
679 Long and Li, “The Chinese Space Launch Program,” 869. 
680 Harding. Space Policy in Developing Countries, p. 86. 
681 Long and Li, “The Chinese Space Launch Program,” 869. 
682 The satellite launch did benefit from German electronics and French technical assistance. 
683 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 86. 
684 Perfilyev, “The Sino-Russian Space Entente,” 21.
685 Ibid. 
686 Hou and Liu, “Chinese Satellite Programs,” 886. 
687 Harding, “Space Policy in Developing Countries,” 86. 
688 John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernisation in the Nuclear 
Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 165.
689 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 87-88. 
690 Ibid. 
75
for 35 satellites from 1987 to 2009 and established business relationships with more than 100
companies and organizations throughout the world.691 In 1982, at a space conference in Switzerland,
China officially declared its entrance into the commercial satellite market.692 China even tried to
buy a US communications satellite, but the deal fell through.693 In 1983, China signed the OST, and
kept on seeking adhesion to space-related multilateral agreements.694 In 1984, China launched the
first communications satellite into GEO aboard a LM-3 rocket from the new Xichang space
port.695696 In the years after, China delivered commercial launch services to Hong Kong, Saudi
Arabia, Sweden, and Australia, before going after markets in Asia, Africa, and South America.697
New satellites for remote sensing, meteorology, and military uses followed.698 Still, the Chinese
military reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities of the 1970s and 1980s were far inferior to
those of the USA and the USSR.699 Programs devoted to signals intelligence (SIGINT) space
capabilities, for example, were scrapped.700 
In the late 1980s, China invested in space R&D and used its growing commercial space
power to provide a reliable, cheap SLV alternative to the US and USSR. A series of events in 1986
impacted China's trajectory. First, several Western space accidents in a row: the US Space Shuttle
Challenger exploded, two leading US SLVs exploded, and a European Ariane crashed.701 After the
accidents, Deng was advised by leading space and nuclear scientists to urgently invest more in
science and technology.702 Plan 863 aimed to strengthen high-technology in general and the space
industry's competitiveness and R&D in particular.703704 Its goal was to “stimulate massive
improvements in biotechnology, information technology, lasers, automation, energy, and
aerospace”, “position China to concentrate its space program on practical applied satellites”, and
“free China from external technology dependencies”.705 After president Reagan announced the SDI,
China began to modernize its strategic missile forces.706 The LM-2 SLV launched satellites for a
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French company and a German consortium in 1978 and 1988.707 In 1988, an expert group of 17
Chinese space experts met and debated the future of China’s space program.708 In the aftermath of
the Tiananmen Square incident, Western states imposed an arms embargo on the country.709 The
USSR on the other hand, in crisis, opened its door to China and contributed to the creation of the
Chinese Shenzhou spacecraft based off the Soviet Soyuz module.710 An indigenous meteorological
satellite was produced and launched into polar orbit, making China the third country in the world to
do so.711 In 1989, the Chinese Aerospace Corporation was created to unite the country's major space
technology facilities.712
2.3.3 China in the Second Space Age
The Chinese push into science and technology continued into the Second Space Age, as did space
alliance with Russia. The first Chinese five-year plan for 1991 to 1995 put focus on space
technology.713 In 1990, China launched two atmospheric DQ-1 satellites that had many of the
characteristics of a SIGINT satellite.714  Contacts on the highest official level followed suit.715 In
1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited China, after a delegation from the Beijing Aerospace
University had visited the Russian Mission Control Centre.716 China and the USSR laid the
foundation for revitalised space cooperation when they signed the Intergovernmental Agreement in
the Field of Exploration and Use of the Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes.717 Project 921,
authorized in 1992 and later renamed Shenzhou, became China’s second attempt at a human
spaceflight program718 – and Russian technology was essential to the project.719 The CNSA,
established in 1993 as a civilian, executive agency for space functions, claimed it to be the largest
and most expensive project ever undertaken by China.720 In 1994, China and Russia signed an
interagency agreement that facilitated cooperation between the new space agencies Roscosmos and
CNSA.721 
The US military dominance displayed in the Gulf and Kosovo wars was a wake-up-call in
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China – and made the PLA conclude that space had become the new strategic high ground.722 China
observed that the US was highly dependent on “complex but exposed network of sophisticated
command, control, communications and computer-based intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance systems operating synergistically in and through space”723. The PLA noted that
some 70 US military and commercial satellites were employed, providing 70 per cent of US data
transmission capacity and 90 per cent of its strategic intelligence.724 China clearly understood that
space forces can provide time-critical data and information related to ballistic missile attacks,
world-wide communications, up-to-date weather information, pinpoint navigation and
positioning.725 A Chinese military scholar on the country’s calculus wrote that an effective defence
strategy would include the development of robust reconnaissance, tracking, and monitoring space
systems to also include anti-satellite capabilities and space attack weapon systems.726 In 1993, the
PLA produced a new set of “Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period”, introducing the
concept of “local wars under modern, high-tech conditions”727, later updated to “local wars under
conditions of informational”728. Joint military operations, especially integrated joint operations, had
become dependent on the ability to gather, share, and apply information from air, land, and sea
areas but also outer space and cyberspace.729 
In the 1990s, China continued to grow its commercial space sector and increase international
cooperation, but it was criticized by the US for proliferating dangerous space capabilities. China’s
Space Leading Group (SLG) was established in 1991 and has overseen and coordinated all space
activities in a broad policy-making role.730 In 1992, Chinese, Pakistani, and Thai officials proposed
the creation of an Asian grouping to discuss space matters.731 Launch providers continued to
compete against counterparts in the US, Europe and Russia.732 China aggressively sought out
international space partnerships, and was accused of selling missile technology to Iran, North
Korea, and Iraq.733 The Divestiture Act of 1998 wrested control of these purely commercial
activities from the PLA and “reassert[ed] government dominance over what many considered to be
an institution rife with corruption and ill-prepared for the demands of the professional military of a
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hegemonic state”734. 
In transition to the new millennium, China developed a space-based navigation system, a
successful launch service, published a space white paper, and became a member of the
exclusive human spaceflight club with the US and Russia. The autonomous Beidou Navigation
System (BNS) was fielded, together with the Qu Dian C4I system, as well as new reconnaissance
capabilities and dual-use technologies. These capabilities were officially intended for territorial
survey, disaster monitoring, and space science, but also provided the PLA with five meters targeting
accuracy.735 In 1999, a LM-2F successfully launched the first experimental Shenzhou spacecraft on
China's 50th anniversary.736737 In 2000, China issued the first of many white papers on space
activities.738 The 2000 white paper was the first to introduce China’s space achievements, strategy,
and policies systematically and outline its space program’s primary goals as space exploration,
space applications, and economic development.739 By October that year, China had launched over
100 of its own satellites, with a success rate of over 90 percent.740 In the following years, four
additional unmanned spacecraft missions showed an increasing level of complexity.741 The 2001
Shenzhou II flight carried a monkey, a dog, a rabbit, and snails into space for seven days.742 In
October 2003, China’s first independent manned space mission was a success when the Shenzhou V
launched “taikonaut” Yang Liwei into space.743 
The early 2000s brought a wave of space cooperation to Beijing, but the bilateral
relationship to the US in space sank to a new low. Already in 1999, the joint venture China-Brazil
Earth Resource Satellite (CBERS) was launched.744 The program gave China “multi-sensor payload
and digital transmission capabilities with considerable sophistication”745, but did not provide high-
resolution imagery immediately.746 Annual prime minister meetings with Russia on space was set up
in 2000, and the first of three multi-year agreements was agreed to a year later.747 Cooperation with
the ESA and European countries “blossomed”.748 In 2003, Brussels and Beijing signed the “Sino-
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European Galileo Plan Technology Cooperation Agreement”, to which China contributed US$ 265
million.749 In November 2005, the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) was
established.750 In 2006 and 2007, China gave several countries new receiving stations.751 After a
1995 commercial launch failure created a backlash in US-Sino space cooperation, the Cox
Commission Report, issued by the US Congress in 1999, asserted that Loral Space and
Communications and Hughes Electronics damaged US national security by transferring sensitive
space technology to China when they assisted with the investigation of two Chinese rocket
explosions that destroyed their satellite.752753 The US tightened its technology export control regime
on dual-use space technology and transferred licensing authority to the US State Department.754 In
January 2003, two days after the launch of the Shenzhou IV, Hughes and Boeing were accused of
passing sensitive space and missile technology to China.755 
After the US unilaterally withdrew from the ABMT in 2002, China responded by trying to
change the international space regime while testing ASAT weapons. China, Russia and five other
countries introduced a PAROS working paper aimed at preventing the deployment of weapons in
outer space to the CD, followed by two non-papers on space two years later.756757 In 2006, China
presented yet another, revised round of hypotheses on PAROS.758 A new space white paper
opposed the weaponisation of space.759 And a new five-year plan for space development was
implemented.760 Furthermore, China initiated space cooperation with countries like Nigeria,
Venezuela and Bolivia.761 Parallel to diplomatic efforts, China tested ASAT-weapons – which dated
back to the period between the 1960s and the 1990s – on several occasions.762 First, China blinded a
US satellite with a laser in 2006.763 More importantly, in 2007, China tested a ground-based ASAT
for the first time.764 After failed attempts in 2005 and 2006, an IRBM was launched from the ground
to target and destroy a Chinese weather satellite in space.765 The event produced one of the largest
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clouds of space debris – 525 large fragments in LEO – in history.766 The US quickly responded by
conducting its own direct-ascent ASAT test in 2008.767
Regardless of the ASAT exchange with the US, China has continued its stride in space. The
first lunar probe satellite, Chang’e-1, was quickly launched into orbit around the Moon, sending
China into the field of deep space exploration.768769 In 2008, a taikonaut conducted a spacewalk for
the first time outside the Shenzhou VII.770  The spacecraft released a small, manoeuvrable
companion satellite called BX-1, which was presumably used to orbit around the Shenzhou Orbital
Module, perhaps to train for a future docking, but could also have the ability to move in space and
target other states' satellites.771  The Chinese spaceflight notably passed only 45 kilometres from the
ISS, leading analysts to believe that China had developed a co-orbital ASAT. 2008 also saw the
joint support of China and Russia for the PPWT.772 The US responded to all these events by
shooting down an old spy satellite with a sea-based ABM system on the USS Lake Erie and
sanctioning China for proliferation of missile-related technologies.773 US Congress blocked
Beijing’s effort to join the ISS through ITAR.774 During president Obama's visit to Beijing in 2009
and president Jintao's visit to Washington D.C. in 2011, both nations expressed willingness to
discuss a closer space cooperation.775 However, the two space programs remain less engaged than
the US and Soviet space programs during the First Space Age.776 
In the last decade, China was on a clear path to join the US and Russia in possessing full-
spectrum space capabilities.777 China demonstrated that it is capable of human spaceflight and that it
possesses ASAT weapons and limited ABM systems.778 It also developed counterspace capabilities
like satellite jamming technologies and ground-based lasers.779 One of the most important recent
developments has been China’s establishment of a reliable space-tracking network, a prerequisite to
effective manned, commercial, and military programs.780 The space cadre is about two decades
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younger than its counterparts in the US and Russia, which are now retiring.781 In 2010, China was
able to intercept a missile in mid-flight, an essential component of an effective ABM system. 782 In
2011, the first portion of China's first space station, Tiangong I, was launched into LEO.783 China is
now pushing to reach even more ambitious milestones in space, like going to the moon, while
boosting its satellite coverage and the competitiveness of its launch service. Halfway through 2012,
the LM SLV series had sent 190 spacecrafts into orbit over a total of 165 launches – with a success
rate of 95 percent.784 The Shenzhou IX spacecraft and the Tiangong I docked successfully in
2012.785 Tiangong II and Tiangong III missions followed.786 Cooperative invitations were sent to
Canada, the ESA, and Russia, with the US notably missing from the list.787 In May 2013, China
reportedly tested ASAT capabilities that could reach critical US national security satellites in
GEO.788 In late 2014, China opened the Wenchang Satellite Launch Centre on Hainan Island and is
now aiming to “achieve a complete spectrum of space combat systems”. There are also indications
that China has test flown an unmanned space plane, the Divine Dragon, similar to US and Russian
capabilities.789 In late 2015, the PLA established the Strategic Support Force (SSF) with the
responsibility of developing and employing most of Chinas spaces capabilities.790 In recent years,
under President Xi Jinping, Chinas space program has been incorporated in the “China Dream” and
“Belt and Road Initiative” to stimulate both military and civilian space infrastructure, industry and
innovation.791 In 2018, China tested ASATs in most categories and conducted more satellite
launches than the US for the first time in history.792 The LM-5 heavy lift SLV was prepared for
comeback after a two-year hiatus, while China works towards a new modular space station and
global, 24/7 coverage from its Beidou GNSS system.793
2.4 The Second Partial Conclusion: Space History is Earth History
The fourth subchapter of Chapter II presents concluding remarks and reflections based on the
findings of the thesis so far. The purpose of the thesis is to explain why a space war has not yet
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occurred, and the history of international space politics must serve that purpose. The second
partial conclusion argues the history of international space politics in the First Space Age (1957-
1991) and the Second Space Age (1991-) is very similar to the history of international politics on
Earth in those same time periods.
The space race between US and the USSR was initially a weapons race spreading from
Earth to space. It started perhaps already with the scramble for German rocket capabilities at the
end of WWII. After the war, the US was the most powerful state in the world, and could have
invested more in space, but had no urgent need to do so. The double-nuking of Japan proved to the
world that the US in fact had the ability to deliver nuclear weapons across the globe. However, a
rapidly growing USSR was catching up fast in both nukes and rockets. From the very beginning,
international space politics played a central part in the Cold War. The quest for space power and
power in general went hand in hand. Threats saw no borders, nor did the need to assure survival.
The question quickly becomes: how similar are the causes of war and space war? 
Moments of tension in space often occur during unstable times on Earth. The Space Age
began after the Korean War, when Cold War war suspicions were already deep-rooted. A few years
later, the USSR launched a manned space flight to draw attention away from the Berlin Crisis.
Similarly, the Bay of Pigs fiasco triggered the iconic Apollo moon landing program. As the world
stood on the brink of nuclear war around the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US and USSR
were developing and testing space weapons. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put an end to
ASAT-talks and paved the way for the SDI, which ultimately helped cause the collapse of the
USSR. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had direct consequences on China's
space program. Stalin's death, the Sino-Soviet split, and the death of Mao were all important events
in space history. The same can be said of incidents like Tienanmen Square, 9/11, Putin's ascendence
to power, or, more importantly, the gradual rise of China. 
The history of the First Space Age is in essence a history of the Cold War. The USSR took
the first leap into space to project power and deter a nuclear US on Earth. At first, the US was
caught by surprise and threatened by the Soviet superiority in space. Achievement after
achievement was being used to prove the superiority of the Communist system. In essence,
international space politics was a game of two superpowers circling each other, pushing the limits
of space technology, demonstrating it in real life, and copying each other while making threats.
However, the Cold War in space also ended with a collapse, as rising military expenditures proved
too large for the Soviet economy.
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The history of the Second Space Age is also a history of US dominance – even with a slow
Russian revival and rapid Chinese growth with no end in sight. Since the end of the Cold War, the
US has been the most advanced superpower the Earth has ever seen. Especially during the wars in
the wake of 9/11, space power served as a key power component. The US has made bold, unilateral
moves like pulling out of the ABMT, exploring weapons systems like “Rods from Gods”, and
widespread use of force-enhancement, navigation, spying and missile defence. China and Russia
feel threatened by this dominance. Therefore they are challenging US space superiority and taking
advantage of its vulnerability. China, no longer focused only on commercial space, is testing space
weapons while building legal resistance against them in the UN system together with Russia – at
least the space weapons they don't have themselves. Russia is still a space superpower in many
regards, but China is undoubtedly the “elephant in the room” called space. 
Will China play the lead in the history of the Third Space Age? Leap-frogging on existing
knowledge – especially from Putin's revivalist “patron space power” – the rising Chinese
superpower has achieved impressive achievements in a short timeframe, taking its space program
from fringe to world-class. Cutting-edge military counterspace capabilities, like ASATs, jamming
and manoeuvrable microsatellites, have been developed, while new space alliances have been
forged. The future in space is dependent on the future of Earth. China could overtake the US and
become the next space superpower while Russia is making up for its lost decade. Meanwhile, a
multitude of new states and private companies have began competing for space power. If the most
powerful states will ever go to war in space, it seems likely to be because of a ground conflict in
some shape or form.  
The second partial conclusion argues that the history of international space politics is very
similar to the history of international space politics. In hyperbole, “Space history is Earth history”,
and the causes of space war seem to be closely related to the causes of major war in general. The
Space Age began with a cold war superpower rivalry in space. Then, the US became the most
powerful state. Now, China's space power is growing rapidly. Since international space politics is so
closely related to international politics, there is a high risk of space capabilities being used together
with nuclear weapons and other military capabilities in a potential great power war. A conflict on
Earth could escalate into space, or a space war could lead to a major war on Earth. Thus, the two
neorealist hypotheses, based on IR theory developed for international politics on Earth, both appear
more plausible. The two different hypotheses will be tested in Chapter III.
*****
84
CHAPTER III 
A Neorealist Analysis of Space War in the First and Second Space Age
“You should not encamp in low-lying ground.”
– Sun Tzu, The Art of War.794
Chapter III is a neorealist analysis of the historical evidence presented in Chapter II based on the
analytical framework established in Chapter I. The fundamental research question underpinning the
thesis remains the same: Why have the most powerful states on Earth never fought a war in space?
Or framed more precisely: Why have the US, the USSR/Russia and China not overtly destroyed
each others space assets through offensive action between 1957 and 2018? The following eclectic,
neorealist analysis of international space politics will try to answer the question by looking at the
relationship between space war (the dependent variable) and the distribution of material space
power among the three most powerful states in the international system (the independent variable).
The goal is to determine whether the first and second neorealist hypotheses are correct and, more
generally, why space war has never occurred. 
The third chapter is organised in five subchapters. The first four subchapters each contain
their own analysis of historical evidence from a given time period. In the first subchapter, the first
neorealist hypothesis, based on Waltz´s defensive neorealism795 (DN) and Mearsheimer´s offensive
neorealism796 (ON), is tested against the historical evidence from First Space Age. This historical
analysis is meant to determine whether a bipolar balance of space power in the international
system has decreased the risk of space war. The second neorealist hypothesis, based on Organski´s
power transition theory797 (PTT) and Gilpin´s hegemonic stability theory798 (HST), is then tested
against the evidence on the First and Second Space Age to determine if a preponderance of space
power in the international system has decreased the risk of space war. Third, the first neorealist
hypothesis (DN+ON) is tested against the evidence on the Second Space Age, before the second
neorealist hypothesis (PTT+HST) is tested against the same evidence on the Second and potential
Third Space Age in the fourth subchapter. The fifth and last subchapter of Chapter III is the third
partial conclusion. The core argument of the partial conclusion is that the distribution of space
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power has been prone to peace in the First and Second Space Age, but that the risk of space war
will be rising going into the Third Space Age. 
3.1 The First Neorealist Analysis: Balance of Space Power in the First Space Age
The first subchapter of Chapter III is a neorealist analysis of international space politics in the First
Space Age. The analysis is based on Waltz´s defensive neorealism (DN) and Mearsheimer´s
offensive neorealism (ON). The goal is to test the first neorealist hypothesis, that a bipolar balance
of space power in the international system has decreased the risk of space war in the First Space
Age. 
All the dangers associated with anarchy – the security dilemma, self-help behaviour,
relentless competition and the constant risk of war – played a central part of international space
politics from the beginning of the Space Age. To deal with insecurity in space, the superpowers
developed space weapons to assure their own survival in the face of insecurity.799800 Under anarchy,
argue both Waltz801 and Mearsheimer802, states develop military capabilities because they can never
be sure of each others intentions. Logically, the development of space weapons in the early Space
Age entailed a real risk of states using those weapons in armed aggression. Space – often dubbed
the “final frontier” – was in fact conquered through war. Military inventions from WWII, like the
radar, ballistic missile, computer and atomic bomb, played a central part in opening the space
frontier in the 1950s.803 Furthermore, Sheehan has shown how the existential threat of the war made
the conflicting states venture into space for the first time.804 The US and the USSR was triggered by
two aggressive and at times technologically superior states, Japan and Germany, to invest heavily in
the rocket capabilities that paved the way for the first SLVs.805806 While the US mostly ignored its
own rocket scientists before the war, the USSR killed or imprisoned theirs.807 The historical
evidence shows that their behaviour changed, however, when the two states' faced direct threats.
The security dilemma influenced state behaviour throughout the First Space Age. Insecurity
in space was by no regards a mere by-product of WWII. As the war was coming to an end,
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practically annihilating several great powers, growing insecurity between the US and USSR carried
over from Earth into space.808 Neither of the former allies would accept ending up inferior in
advanced rocket technology, as this could cause their own annihilation in the future. In the
aftermath of the war, the USSR rushed make the larger and better rockets deter a nuclear attack
carried out by US bomber planes.809 In other words, the security dilemma produced the Soviet R-7
rocket to fight nuclear war – a capability which would also carry a satellite into space as the first
SLV.810 The US explored the same technology, for example through RAND and ARPA, but was not
incentivised from the threat of bomber planes.811 Having already fulfilled its fundamental need for
survival, the US consequently lagged behind the USSR on investments in rockets, but saw a clear
national interest in the added information from surveillance.812 
Space weapons were made to heighten security, but only escalated tensions and increased
the risk of space war. Satellites were existential threats in and on themselves because the technology
was so new and advanced at a time of rapid innovation in weapons technology.813 Some satellites
were obviously meant for spying, force-enhancement or early warning, but even those satellites
could potentially have been the precursor of a new generation advanced space weapons. The first
US ASAT tests were conducted while the two superpowers were unsure of each others intentions
and level of sophistication.814 Even after the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the OST and
SALT I/AMBT, both states had well-founded fear of a surprise, first-strike ASAT attack. The dual-
use nature of most space capabilities made the growing mistrust even harder to handle.815
Ambitious, but defensive space programs, like the SDI, could just as well have been used for
aggression in space.816 Programs which appeared to be purely scientific, like research satellites,
manned spaceflight programs, space shuttles and space stations, were motivated by fears and
spurred new ones. Ground-breaking scientific milestones like the first human in space, the first
human step on the moon and the first reusable space vehicle were considered potential threats due
to the classic security dilemma.817818 Thus, as Pfaltzgraff has shown, destroying and defending those
space assets became a matter of national security and survival.819 
The historical evidence suggests that the risk of space war was at its highest early and late in
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the First Space Age. Thus, most IR scholars seem to agree that realism´s conflictual view of
international politics explains this period the best.820821 In the early 1960s, at a time of great
instability on Earth, the US and the USSR developed and tested nuclear anti-satellite weapons for
the first time (See Figure 4).822 Space insecurity rose when the US tested and deployed a nuclear
ASAT in the Pacific, while the USSR conducted high-altitude nuclear tests and when when both
stater later began developing a range of more conventional ASAT weapons.823824825 In the years
leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, various new ASATs – motivated by mutual fear – were
being researched and developed.826 Considering how close the world came to nuclear war on Earth
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the risk of space capabilities becoming involved in a major war
must be considered to be quite high. 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the world came closer to a space war yet again. The two
superpowers converted large amounts of wealth into military space research while already wielding
limited, yet operational counterspace capabilities.827828 As the relationship between the two
superpowers deteriorated after failed ASAT arms control negotiations and the USSR invasion of
Afghanistan, the US made risky moves to secure a favourable space power balance. The Space
Shuttle was in many ways a huge US civilian space achievement, but was considered a potential
weapon in the USSR – and it partly was – thus proving a thorn in the side during secret ASAT
negotiations.829830 The development of the Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV) meant that the US
could shoot satellites from fighter jets in the 1980s.831 Still, the SDI was perhaps the most
provocative space program in the First Space Age. The program, which aimed to protect the entire
US mainland from nuclear attack, threatened to leave both the USSR and China more vulnerable for
a US first strike.832833 Many of the most radical SDI proposals never came to life834, but the USSR,
which was in possession of less advanced, but operational counterspace capabilities, could not
know that at the time and could easily have misinterpreted US behaviour. The USSR later urged the
820 Petroni and Bianchi, “New Patterns of Space Policy in the Post-Cold War World.”  
821 Weeks, Politics of Space Law in he Post Cold War Era 
822 Krepon and Schoenberger, “Annex: A Comparison of Nuclear and Anti-Satellite Test, 1945-2013.”
823 Mowthorpe, “US Military space policy 1945–92.” 
824 Anantatmula, “U.S. Initiative to Place Weapons in Space: The Catalyst for a Space-Based Arms Race with China 
and Russia,” 144.  
825 Arbatov, “Russian Perspective on Spacepower”. 
826 Mowthorpe, “US Military space policy 1945–92.” 
827 Ibid, 29-30. 
828 Moltz, “Russia and China: Strategic Choices in Space,” 271. 
829 Mutschler, 51. 
830 Hays, Space and Security, 30-31. 
831 Ibid, 38. 
832  Sheehan, The International Politics of Space, 177.  
833 Hitchens and Chen, “Forging a Sino-US “Grand Bargain” in Space,” 129. 
834 Webb, “Space Weapons: Dream Nightmare or Reality?” 33-34. 
88
US to keep the SDI in the lab, but the US refused to cooperate.835 Considering Soviet fears of ABMs
and the potential loss of second-strike nuclear capabilities836, programs like “Brilliant Pebbles”
could have triggered a slowly failing USSR to engage in a first-strike in space. Indeed, the US was
growing dependant on force-enhancing satellites for conventional wars at the time, making itself an
increasingly attractive target.837 
States turned to self-help behaviour and balancing – or “techno-nationalist realpolitik”838 – in
space to deal with insecurity in the First Space Age. In the beginning of the First Space Age, in the
face of anarchy and the omnipresent risk of war, states had to rely on their own efforts in space to
survive. The physics of space made achieving security an incredibly hard, but similar task for all
states. The US, the USSR and China all dealt with insecurity by emulating each other in the
development of space capabilities, but still had different material capabilities at their disposal.839
The USSR channeled resources through from its growing state-controlled economy and large
territory to make military space capabilities.840 The US did the same through a more dynamic,
capitalist economy with more societal resources and higher technological competence.841 China
attempted to develop space capabilities as a part of its large, often failed collectivistic economic
experiments.842
Two states – and two states only – could compete militarily in space during the First Space
Age. As predicted by ON, insecurity constrained both the US and the USSR to develop military
space capabilities to survive international space politics. The USSR was initially the leading space
power in the international system, but by the mid-1960s, the US was showing signs of space power
parity.843 To maintain the bipolar balance, the US and USSR invested in space capabilities that were
most often dual-use, carrying with them a potential threat and the ability to strike back in case of
attack. As soon as one state demonstrated an upper hand, the rival levelled  the playing field. The
USSR quickly followed the US in publicly announcing a IGY satellite.844 When the two Sputniks
shifted the space power balance in the favour of the USSR, the US managed to counter with the
Explorer I, in spite of some initial struggles.845 Further, the US used the Sputnik launches as a basis
to establish a regimes that legitimised space overflight, later serving to its advantage by opening up
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for spy satellites.846 Meanwhile, China started a satellite program of their own to balance against the
two most powerful states in space.847848849850 The effort was aided by the USSR, serving as a soviet
counterweight against US space cooperation with allies like Europe and Japan.851 However, China
kept lagging far behind the US and USSR in both civilian and military space capabilities. 852853854
Furthermore, the space alliance between the USSR and China also suffered from mutual distrust
under anarchy.855
The two superpowers used space weapons to balance against each other in space. Explicit or
implicit nuclear ASATs tests were carried out on both sides until they were banned by the new
international space regime.856 Since conventional ASATs were intentionally ruled out from the
Limited Test Ban Treaty, the USSR established the PKO and started developing FOBS.857858859
When the USSR launched a man into space, the US went all the way to the moon.860 The Soviet
Almaz station was a direct response to the US MOL project. Later, the US announced Space Station
Freedom in response to the Soviet space station Mir. As the USSR grew powerful in co-orbital
ASATs, the US invested in the MHV and the SDI programs.861 At the same time, they adapted each
others´ two-track approaches to arms-control negotiations: negotiate while researching new space
weapons. In the 1950s, the USSR was China’s patron state, providing key technical assistance to
China’s nuclear and military space program.862 In the 80s, China began successfully emulating US
and Soviet launchers and satellites and scaled back its military space sector to enter the commercial
space market.863 At the brink of collapse, the USSR balanced against the US in space by passing the
buck to China through sales of key space capabilities and transfer of knowledge.864 
The bipolar balance of space power seem to have decreased the likelihood of space war in
the first half of the First Space Age. According to DN and ON, a clear bipolarity between the US
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and USSR , gradually demonstrated through a “tit-for-tat” pattern of technological developments in
SLVs, satellites, ASATs, human spaceflight, space shuttles and space stations, should have made
space deterrence and space cooperation easier. Similarly, the historical evidence suggest that the
bipolar balance of space power decreased risk of space war at a time of great tension. Especially in
the years leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the chances of miscalculation appear to have been
high. However, the explicit linkage of military space capabilities into the nuclear deterrence
doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), made the consequences of attacking each other
more obvious and thus simplified space deterrence.865 Drawing on Waltz, the two superpowers seem
to have developed its first space weapons with eyes fixed only on each other.866867 The international
space regime was initially established by the US for its own advantage, but eventually made the
bipolar structure more durable both in Space and on Earth.868 The enormously destructive capability
of nuclear ASATs, whose electro-magnetic pulse could impair the majority of satellites in orbit,
highlighted the potential consequences of a first-strike in space.869 
The bipolar balance of space power was easy to codify into an international space regime
because the fear of relative gains was less of an issue. In the beginning of the First Space Age, the
US used its power in international institutions to pass international law to legitimise spying and
space weapons research – despite Soviet discontent.870 After a few years of increasing international
tension, however, a new bipolar regime was established, first with the Limited Test Ban Treaty in
1963871, the OST in 1967872, the SALT I/ABMT in 1972873 and the US-Soviet “handshake in space”
in 1975874. The new space regime was, largely synonymous with the “MAD doctrine”875, banned
nuclear ASATs were banned876 scaled back ABMs877, but never placed a ban on conventional
ASATs.878 Thus, space cooperation partly succeed in the face of anarchy because the bipolar
balance of space power still rested on a bipolar distribution of military space capabilities within a
slightly more restricted spectrum. Furthermore, the existence of satellites on both side made it easier
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to gather information on nuclear capabilities and detect nuclear strikes before they even occurred.879
The result was that the international space regime became easier to enforce.880 
The bipolar space power balance gradually eroded in the second half of the First Space Age,
but the bipolar military space power balance did not fundamentally change. The US and the USSR
were the only two countries with a limited arsenal of operational ASATs.881 Furthermore, the
linkages to nuclear power made bipolar structure of the international system sufficiently durable to
keep space safe from war until the USSR suddenly collapsed and the First Space Age ended. As
China, Japan and European state grew stronger in space, the space power balance became less
bipolar and more multipolar.882883 According to DN and ON, the shifting space power balance shod
have made international space politics slightly more unpredictable, but the military bipolarity in
space – coupled with a maturing international space regime – seems to have worked in the opposite
direction by increasing stability. China opened the door the West after it grew sceptical of the
USSR, but remained weak, especially in the military space sector, compared to the two
superpowers.884 Meanwhile, a strengthening Europe and Japan decided to stay away from the most
potent space weapons.885886887 The US, however, was slowly showing signs of superiority compared
to the USSR. By the moon landing in 1969, the US had demonstrated a technological lead in space,
but the lead did not extend into all weapons categories.888 Still, fearing that the USSR would
conduct a first combined ASAT and nuclear strike, the US invested heavily in space weapons
research through the SDI program.889 China, on the other hand, began building its commercial space
sector and joined the international space regime, with a growing awareness of modern military
space capabilities.890 
The risk of space war during the First Space Age appear to have decreased because states
seemed more inclined to maximised space security than space power. States sometimes attempted to
maximise space power, but it seems to have happened in periods with the highest risk of armed
confrontation in space. The USSR could be said to have maximized its space power in the years
starting with the Sputnik launches, and so could the US response to the Sputniks. However, states
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developed space weapons primarily to stay secure. Furthermore, the US and USSR limited the
development of nuclear ASATs quite early in the First Space Age. In spite of having highly
provocative plans for military space, all the states held back on R&D to a certain degree to protect
the tangible benefits from a secure space environment. The US, for example, chose the non-military
Viking rocket design for its first satellite launch891 and cancelled the Midas and Advent programs892,
as well as the X-20 Dyna-Soar893 and military MOL space station894. More importantly, the 505 and
437 nuclear ASAT programs were scaled down.895 After the superpowers signed the SALT
I/ABMT, China cancelled its first human spaceflight program as it did not longer see the urgent
security risk.896 International space regimes, though established and promoted to serve self-interest,
were also attempts at increasing space security.897 The USSR, for example, reached out to sign a
joint memorandum on stopping ASAT tests898 before unilaterally halting such tests899, and the US
later decided to halt further unprovoked ASAT tests unless the USSR tested these capabilities
first.900 
However, high costs and technological immaturity clearly limited space power expansion in
the First Space Age. Space activities have always been incredibly expensive and risky. Thus,
balancing in space is quire rarely a straight-forward path. After the initial space race, soaring costs
from practically endless room for expansion  and limited usefulness forced states to make cheaper
capabilities serving the most important goal – staying secure on Earth.901 In the US, the Nixon
administration tried to cut costs drastically.902 The USSR had to adapt old technology to create an
illusion of staying in the race903, while China made relatively small investments and even cancelled
its human spaceflight program.904 In much of the First Space Age, space capabilities were still in
their infancy, so even if states tried maximising space power, the technology behind space
capabilities like space planes or space-based interceptors were often not mature.905 A long list of
accidents, including the US Explorer906 and Challenger907 accidents, were proof that new space
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capabilities were often demonstrated in front of other states before they were ready. These facts
support Mearsheimer´s908  and Fredriksson´s909 argument that land power ultimately is of highest
value to human beings.
The goal of the first neorealist analysis was to test the first neorealist hypothesis, that a
bipolar balance of space power in the international system did decrease the risk of space war, and
explain why space war never occurred in the First Space Age. Anarchy had a profound influence on
international space politics from the beginning. To deal with insecurity in space, the US and USSR
developed space weapons to balance against each other. The bipolar balance of space power in the
international system made the “space game” easier to predict and decreased the risk of space war,
but did not make space completely safe from international competition or conflict. There were
several moments of high risk in which space capabilities like rockets, satellites and ASATs were
part of an extended nuclear brinkmanship between the US and USSR. Considering the Cold War
risk of nuclear war on Earth, especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1980s weapons
race, a space war was far from impossible. If these conflicts had escalated, they could have
triggered a new sense of urgency leading to increased investments in new space weapons. However,
states seems to have maximised space security to assure their own survival on Earth, while high
costs and technological immaturity clearly limited space power expansion. In sum, the hypothesis is
correct, but would be more precise if it included these additional factors. The conclusion is that a
bipolar balance of space power between the US and USSR, together with deep linkages to nuclear
stability, high costs, technological immaturity and possible space security maximisation, did
decrease the risk of space war in the First Space Age.
3.2 The Second Neorealist Analysis: Space Power Transition between the First
and Second Space Age
The second subchapter of Chapter III is a neorealist analysis of international space politics in the
transition between the First and Second Space Age. The analysis is based on Organski´s power
transition theory (PTT) and Gilpin´s hegemonic stability theory (HST). The goal is to test the first
neorealist hypothesis, that a preponderance of space power in the international system has
decreased the risk of space war in the transition between the First and Second Space Age.
Internal growth rates – just like anarchy – influenced international space politics from the
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beginning. According to PTT910 and HST911, industrialisation and modernisation boosts the
determinants of power. Since space power is deeply interlinked with other forms of power,
especially military power, it too was boosted by the same forces.912 A robust, hight-tech and
adaptive economy has been and still is imperative to stay competitive in space.913 A modern
weapons industry and access to advanced materials, chemicals and electronics were the minimum
requirements for developing space capabilities.914 These resources were essential when trying to
develop cutting-edge space capabilities like SLVs, satellites, ASATs and space stations.915 In other
words, internal growth rates affected which states were able to dominate international politics –
both in space and on Earth. 
Going into the First Space Age, internal growth rates had already begun shifting the power
distribution in the international system. After WWII, the US was the most powerful state in the
world, producing roughly half of the world´s GDP, as its industry was left was intact from large-
scale bombing.916 The war effort, which resulted in military inventions like the first nuclear bomb,
showed that large-scale government spending on technological R&D could produce extraordinary
military results.917 Space capabilities, however, were not prioritised by the US918, despite having
captured world-leading German scientists and technology.919 The USSR, on the other hand, invested
heavily in space power to gain prestige and challenge a dominant US.920 When the US dropped
nuclear bombs on Japan, the challenger surpassed the US in space capabilities by developing
research groups, like the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, inside its centrally planned
industrial-complex.921 China was undoubtedly underdeveloped at the time, but started realising its
potential for long-term industrial growth after a century of being dominated by stronger
states.922923924925926
The USSR was a rising, dissatisfied challenger to the US on Earth, but was initially the most
powerful state in space. In the years leading up to the first Sputnik launch, the USSR appears to
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have transitioned from a state of potential space power to a state of rapid space power
growth.927928929 Thus, the shifting power distribution on Earth began reflecting in the distribution of
space power. The possession of new, dual-use space capabilities was demonstrated trough a series
of successful “firsts” to gain space prestige.930 Such demonstrations –  from the R-7 and Sputnik to
Gagarin´s spaceflight and the Vostoks – were obvious attempts at closing the general power gap to
the US, and even surpass it. The USSR started on top in the hierarchy of space prestige, but entered
a race it could not win in the long run. For a moment, the rising, dissatisfied challenger on Earth
was the dominant state in space, but the USSR never became the dominant state in the international
system. 
The US was the dominant state of the international space order in the Second Space Age.
Shocked by the rapid growth in USSR space power, the US began realising the potential space
power resting in its advanced military capabilities, modern industry and large population – thus
appearing to enter a stage of rapid transitional space power growth.931932933 Being a “late starter” in
space, the US could initially study Soviet pioneering efforts and leapfrog into the lead. Furthermore,
international space politics was incorporated into the existing capitalistic international order.
Through institutions like NATO, IMF, World Bank and GATT, the US distributed space power and
space security to weaker states in return for loyalty.934 As with the League of Nations, the US were
the leading force behind the UN, while the Soviets were negative at first. The UN, with
headquarters in New York, initially was dominated by a western majority and ingrained in the
Bretton Woods-based global free market system held up by US dominated institutions like the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.935
The risk of space war seems to have peaked early in the First Space Age when the USSR
used space to challenge the international order ruled by the dominant US. The USSR presented an
alternative, communist order in opposition to the ruling capitalist one.936 Sputnik I and subsequent
firsts in space made US allies question the whether the capitalist system was superior.937 In the
aftermath, the USSR tried to impose new rules to ban overflight through the UN system, for
example by blocking the US Open Skies initiative, but failed because the first satellite had taken
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advantage of that exact freedom.938 As a communist state, China followed in the footsteps of the
USSR in space, embracing its revolutionary attempt at establishing a new order. However, the US
fought back to preserve the status quo. Despite initially being weaker than the USSR in terms of
space power, the US managed to establish an international space regime legitimizing spy
satellites.939 Then, it successfully convinced other states into accepting the term “peaceful purposes”
in the international treaties and register their space launches with the UN.940 Rapidly advancing US
space capabilities in the form of spying satellites revealed that the communist alternative was less
powerful than first assumed.941 Regardless, two opposite orders came head to head in space in the
1960s, perhaps not coincidentally at the same time as when the US and the USSR started testing
ASATs for the first time (See Figure 4).  
The risk of space war seems to have decreased as the USSR proved incapable of changing
the international space order. In the early 1970s, the two competing states demonstrated proximate
parity in space and on Earth. The SALT/ABMT treaty in 1972 placed bans and limitations on
space-based weapons and used modern verification methods based on surveillance and early-
warning satellites, placing space power parity at the heart of international stability.942 In 1975, the
“handshake in space” made it look like the US and USSR were equals above the atmosphere.943 In
reality, however, the USSR was facing decline. As the USSR´s cost of expansion in space rose,
Gilpin would argue, system change proved too expensive for the unsatisfied challenger.944 As the
USSRs net gains from system change began decreasing, the US industrial base was realising
enough potential space power to avoid a communist revision of the international order in space.945
Space – and the whole globe – was contested in the struggle for dominance, but the the USSR could
not keep up with US in the long run. As force-enhancement satellites took off in the late 1960s and
1970s946, the Soviet state proved less effective at adapting to new technology.947 Instead of fostering
true innovation, it relied on old space capabilities to perform “stunts in space”948. By the moon
landing in 1969, if not sooner, the US had demonstrated space power parity.949 As the US invested
heavily in the SDI and successfully tested the MHV ASAT, the USSR had its proposed bilateral
ASAT memorandum rejected, and unilaterally stopped testing ASATs altogether.950 
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The risk of space war rose again in the late 1980s and early 1990s because the USSR´s space
power was collapsing. Drawing the fundamental elements of PTT951 and HST952, there seems to
have been a dangerous mismatch between hierarchy of space prestige and the actual distribution.
The crisis of the 1990s left large gaps in the Soviet early warning satellite constellation.953
Considering the interconnectedness of nuclear and space capabilities, the risks were many. The
USSR, who had based its security largely on a large nuclear arsenal, was left vulnerable to potential
US first-strikes from space, threatening to render a core piece of its nuclear doctrine obsolete. 954
Facing such a threat, the USSR could have decided to strike first – before it was too late – to have
one last shot at changing the international order in its advantage. In such a scenario, ASAT weapons
would be a natural part of a major war – as demonstrated by exercises and war games.955956
However, within short time after the Soviet collapse, the financial crisis dramatically reduced the
USSRs ability to even maintain operational ASATs.957 
The US came out stronger than the USSR from the transition between the First and Second
Space Age. Institutions like the NATO, the IMF and the World Bank have all survived into the new
millennium, while GATT has solidified into the WTO. As the ISS, dominated by the US958, became
the primary symbol of international space cooperation, the international order was further
consolidated.959 However, China already started appearing as a potential challenger on the US radar.
Even before the USSR collapsed, the US began obstructing Chinas space industry.960 Already in the
1980s, China started looking like a potential challenger to the US in space as it transitioned into a
role as a more commercial space power, gradually entering the international order dominated by the
US.961 After the tumultuous years of the the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, which
almost destroyed China´s cadre of space scientists962, China benefitted heavily from a latecomers
advantage.963 This advantage was demonstrated through the rapid growth of companies like the
Great Wall Industry Corporation (GWIC).964 In addition, China benefited from technological
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transfers from a cash hungry USSR.965966 
The goal of the second neorealist analysis was to test the second neorealist hypothesis, that a
preponderance of space power in the international system has decreased the risk of space war, and
explain why space war never occurred in the transition between the First and Second Space Age.
The USSR was a rising dissatisfied power that used space power to close the general power gap
with the US. The mismatch between the hierarchy of space prestige and the distribution of the
underlying components of space power increased the risk of space war in the early First Space Age.
Deep power shifts in the international system were reflected in the distribution of space power. The
First Space Age began with the growth of the USSR on Earth, but ended after what looked like a
potent challenger, proved unable to compete with US industrial might in the long run. Even though
the USSR had more space power  The collapse showed that the USSR never had the potential to
stay ahead of the US in space, because the US always had a larger potential for internal growth. As
a consequence, the US international order survived the transition into the Second Space Age. In
sum, the second neorealist hypothesis is partly correct, but it did not account for states' unfulfilled
space power potential. Thus, the conclusion is that a US preponderance in the underlying
components of space power in the international system decreased the risk of space war in the
transition between the First and Second Space Age.
3.3 The Third Neorealist Analysis: Balance of Space Power in the Second Space
Age
The third subchapter of Chapter III is a neorealist analysis of international space politics in the
Second Space Age. The analysis, based on DN and ON, is meant to test the first neorealist
hypothesis, that a bipolar balance of space power in the international system has decreased the risk
of space war in the Second Space Age.
The Second Space Age started with a unipolar moment. After the Soviet “collapse in space
power”967, the US was left alone as the dominant space power in international space politics. Going
into the 1990s, the US was developing a full spectrum of new space capabilities, reaping the dual-
use counterspace capabilities from the massive SDI investment while standing largely unopposed.
The First Gulf War, launched on the back of the Bush administrations increasingly militaristic and
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unilateralist space doctrine968, was dubbed the “first space war” because of the US display of
cutting-edge force-enhancing military space capabilities.969 Meanwhile, US companies took the lead
in the growing international space market (See Figure 8).970 Today, the US is still the leading force
behind the ISS971 and the only state to have used GPS-guided precision weapons in war.972 
The risk of space war seems to have decreased substantially in the beginning of the Second
Space Age because no other state could threaten the US in space – the ideal position for any state
seeking security according to Mearsheimer.973 The US had, by force of all its satellites, the most to
lose from a space war, but also the most space weapons to strike back. The US had already
developed conventional and nuclear ASATs together with a slowly maturing ABM  systems, both
domestically and regionally. All of these space capabilities came on top of conventional military
capabilities, which was in turn was enhanced further by US capabilities. Meanwhile, the USSR lost
physical control over its primary spaceport, Baikonur, and important ground facilities as the union
broke up in the transition between the First and Second Space Age.974 By joining both the ISS975
and the MTCR976,  and commercialising and selling its space launchers977978979980, Russia appear to
have admitted to US space hegemony – at least temporarily. Chinese space capabilities were
growing, but placed under strict export controls by the US.981 In sum, a space attack from any state
could undoubtedly have been met with even harsher US attacks in retribution. 
The US was a threat to other states in space in the second Space Age.982 Several unilateralist
moves in space proved that the distribution of space power was in fact unipolar. The US pulled out
of the ABMT, a corner-stone treaty of space stability, on the back of an explicitly unilateralist space
doctrine.983 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US conducted what has been called
“informationalised warfare” in Afghanistan and Iraq.984 All along, new space weapons ideas – like
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the “Rods for Gods” concept – were being explored.985 Space institutions under the UN provided
some goods to China and Russia, but ultimately served the US better, as made clear by the latter
states´ attempts at replacing central international space treaties.986 As the US invested in advanced
defensive space power systems, the two other states faced a dilemma. Enter into an arms race with
the US in space and potentially lose? Or give away sovereignty by being dominated by superior US
space weapons circling above? Regardless, US dominance in space during the Second Space age
was a source of insecurity to less powerful states. 
China and Russia dealt with growing space insecurity by balancing against the US in space.
China has built and tested a broad range of military space capabilities987, developed its own
counterspace strategy based on the observed US “informationalised warfare”988, and lobbied for
new international space weapons laws through the UN system.989 The EU and China has become
less dependent on GPS by investing in the Galileo and Baidu navigation systems, which Bolton
argues to be a form of techno-nationalist balancing.990 The two challengers have united to change
the international space regime in their advantage by suggesting a ban on space-based weapons
instead of Earth-based ASATs like the ones they possess themselves.991 In order to stop the return of
an idea like “Brilliant Pebbles”, China emulated the US and Soviet two-track approach. To develop
ASATs while negotiating to ban them. Russian re-took control over some of the commercialised
space sector, invested in and reorganised military space, and restarted GLONASS launches. 
The risk of space war in the Second Space Age has so far peaked in 2007 and 2008. Ever
since the mid 1980s, before the USSR collapsed and the Second Space Age ended, the two reigning
superpowers had abstained from further ASAT testing.992 Suddenly, the old bipolar balance of space
power was gone. At first, the balance of space power became unipolar, allowing the US to pull out
from a core space treaty like the ABMT.993 China, however, had a larger population and growing
wealth from industry and advanced technology. Ever sine the new millennium, China had been
developing new space weapons. To prove that it was one the countries with such a capability and
realise its potential threat, China decided to begin conducting ASAT tests.994 By studying and
emulation US “informationalised warfare”, China developed and demonstrated capabilities which
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can take advantage of US vulnerabilities in space. This has played into the historical fear of a new
“Pearl Harbor” in the US. If a “tit for tat” pattern of ASAT testing had manifested, tensions between
China and the US could have escalated into direct confrontation. 
The gradual shift to multipolarity seems to haves increased the risk of space war during the
Second Space Age. For the last decades, new actors – primarily China – have been able to level the
playing field, while space capabilities have become cheaper and more easily available.995 As
Petroni and Bianchi found, economic leadership has become the foundation of military space
supremacy in the multipolar world.996  China benefited greatly from what Mearsheimer's might call
latent military space power997 from its rapidly growing commercial satellites industry, but Russia
also focused its attention to its commercial sector in the Second Space Age.99899910001001  Multipolarity
in space comes with increased complexity and likelihood of miscalculation. In that light, China's
balancing act with an ASAT test in 2007 appear even more dangerous. The US answered in turn
with their own ASAT test, destroying their own satellite to match the Chinese one circling Earth as
scattered debris.1002 Russia's attempt in the last decade to counterbalance against the US has also
been reflected in international space politics, in the shape of more state control, military spending
and reorganisation, and new alliances. Sino-Russian space cooperation, however, is not running on
full throttle, as China is now developing more capabilities at home, while Russia is spending more
at home. Wohlforth argues that the current US unipolarity is stable because of the superpower´s
preponderance1003, but judging by the behaviour of China and Russia, the perceived threat seems
large enough to trigger balancing behaviour in space. 
The quest for regional hegemony on Earth has increased the risk of space war. As China
grows stronger, US military hegemony, especially in Asia, is being challenged. Satellites have
long played an important part in wars far off the US mainland. From Vietnam to the two wars in
Iraq, the Balkan Wars, Afghanistan: military space capabilities have been involved involved in
all of them. Similarly, the US military presence in the western Pacific also relies on space power to
a high degree. The US still enjoys an overwhelming space superiority compared to China and
Russia (See Figure 6), but experts believe that China aims to use its rapidly growing arsenal of
asymmetric counterspace capabilities to deny US space dominance in case of a conflict in Asia over
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critical national interests, such as the status of Taiwan.10041005 In a potential war over  the Taiwan or
Spratlay Islands, China could be tempted to try to delay US aircraft carriers by destroying, blinding
or jamming the satellites such carriers rely on for navigation, coordination and precision strikes.1006
The strategy involves denying opponents access to information by interfering with their space
capabilities and thereby retarding their command and control. In short, by denying an opponent the
ability to use space freely, the PLA would be denying them the ability to achieve information
dominance and therefore make them less able to fight an “informationalised war”. O´Hanlon
predicts that if “China could find major U.S. naval assets with satellites, it would only need to sneak
a single airplane, ship, or submarine into the region east of Taiwan to have a good chance of sinking
a ship”1007, thus deterring the US from entering a war to protects its allies. Similarly, Russia has
demonstrated operational counterspace capabilities in regional conflicts in Chechnya1008 as well as
Ukraine and Syria1009. 
The risk of space war decreased during the Second Space Age because states still maximised
space security to a high degree, and because technological maturity and high costs are still
important factors. China's ASAT test in 2007 can not be labelled space security maximisation, but
after the US response in 2008, the US approach in space actually shifted to become less
confrontational and slight more accepting to a multipolar balance of space power in the
international system.10101011 Even at the peak of the unipolar moment in space, with space weapons
like “Rod from Gods” on the drawing board, the US never placed weapons permanently in orbit.
Instead of using its ASAT weapons when it suddenly became an underdog, Russia cooperated with
the US, though much out of necessity. The Columbia accident in 2003, showed that even the state
with the most space power – in this case the US – was struggling to develop safe and functioning
space capabilities. 
However, a number of factor predicts a dangerous future in international space politics. The
true nature of new space capabilities continued to be blurred due to its dual-use. According to the
Pentagon, roughly 95 percent of space technologies can be considered dual use.1012 As Mutschler
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has argued, space security cooperation must produce balanced gains to stand a chance for
success1013, but as Hansel has pointed out, the US, China and Russia have opposing interests on
space arms control. 1014 The incentives for striking first in space, which according to Glaser and
Kaufmann1015 is an important factor in explaining the likelihood of war in the international system,
is made worse by limitations in space situational awareness (SSA)1016. Perhaps more importantly,
the US and China – the two most powerful states on Earth – have little to no cooperation in space,
leaving slim chances for successful, substantial space cooperation based on balanced, relative
gains.1017 Ultimately, as Bahney and Pearl have recently concluded in Foreign Affairs, “[e]ven if it
were possible to convince Moscow and Beijing of the benefits of comprehensive space arms
control, existing technology makes it extremely difficult to verify compliance with the necessary
treaty provisions—and without comprehensive and reliable verification, treaties are toothless”1018.
The goal of the third neorealist analysis was to test if a bipolar balance of space power in
the international system has decreased the risk of space war, and explain why a space war never
occurred in the Second Space Age. Space, just like Earth, experienced a unipolar moment beginning
in the early 1990s. After the virtual space power collapse of the USSR, the US reigned supreme
above the Kármán line. The US grew stronger due to the large military space investments in the
1980s. In the short run, the unipolar balance of space power decreased the risk of space war because
no other state risked attack, but in the long run, the US was a large threat to less powerful states in
space. China and Russia counterbalanced through large investments in military space capabilities,
new treaty proposals and new alliances. Consequently, the balance of space power became more
multipolar and the risk of miscalculation and space war increased. In sum, the first neorealist
hypothesis, as formulated, is wrong. A bipolar balance of space power was not the reason why a
space war did not occur in the Second Space Age. Both DN and ON are right, however, in
recognising that unipolar systems are safe, but quickly erode because other states counterbalance in
the international system. The conclusion is that a US unipolarity of space power and its underlying
components in the international system, together with high cost, technological immaturity and
possible space security maximisation, has decreased the risk of space war in the Second Space Age,
but a shift towards a more multipolar space power balance, with increased complexity and
competition for regional hegemony on Earth, has increased the risk.
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3.4 The Fourth Neorealist Analysis: Space Power Transition between the Second
and Third Space Age 
The fourth subchapter of Chapter III is a neorealist analysis of international space politics in the
ongoing transition between the Second and Third Space Age. The analysis, based on PTT and HST,
is meant to test the second neorealist hypothesis, that a preponderance of space power in the
international system has decreased the risk of space war in the ongoing transition between the
Second and Third Space Age. 
 China is undoubtedly rising in space. A high internal, industrial growth rate has given China
a rapidly growing industrial base for advanced space capabilities.1019 The resulting increase in space
power is shifting the balance of space power in the international system (See Figure 2, Figure 4, and
Figure 5). In the ongoing transition to the Third Space Age, China has started harvesting the fruits
of its long-term industrial growth strategy, which touches on a broad range of capabilities related to
space capabilities.1020 Already in the transition between the First and Second Space Age, when
China gradually opened to the West,  space capabilities and western concepts of military space was
transferred back to Beijing, mainly through the global commercial market.1021 What separates China
from the USSR is the speed of its rise in space and total lack of cooperation with the US (See Figure
5).1022. China has achieved many of the same “firsts” as the US and USSR, but in a shorter period of
time due to its latecomers advantage.1023 Costs are lower in China, which makes it cheaper for China
to challenge the US dominated international order.1024 
China has benefited from its own backwardness in space capabilities. Unlike the pioneering
efforts of the US and the USSR, China benefited greatly from of previous achievements in space.1025
In everything from energy sources to electronics, China has been able to copy or buy existing
capabilities. China has learned from US warfare1026, and copied and bought operational Russian
space capabilities.1027 Space scientists and engineers are younger in China.1028 All these trends are
fuelled by the fact that China, as a late starter, close the space power gap to other states by “leap-
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frogging”. As Johnson-Freese has noted, “[w]hat industrialization was to development in the 1960s,
knowledge is in the new millennium”1029.
The risk of space war seems to have increased because China is at least a partly dissatisfied
challenger that wants to change the international space order dominated by the US. China has tested
conventional ASATs while trying to win support for treaties banning space-based ASATs a central
parts of its alternative order.1030 Simultaneously, China has begun distributing wealth, space security
and material space power through various projects and institutions.1031 For example, China helps
collect, coordinate and share SSA-data through APSCO.1032 Gilpin1033 would probably argue that
China has demonstrated its military space capabilities in order to climb the ladders in the
international hierarchy of space powers. China has also cooperated closely with the EU on large
projects like Galileo1034, reached out to Brazil1035, established APSCO1036, distributed receiving
stations1037, and generally expanded its cooperative network of space fearing states.1038 Often, the
new space partners like Nigeria and Venezuela have provided China with resources which could
fuel the industrial growth driving the space power shift in the international system.1039 
The risk of space war seems to have increased because the US is trying to keep China from
becoming the dominant state. As the space power of the Chinese challenger grew, the US has tried
to protect its own international order in space by using some of the strategies described by
Organski1040 and Gilpin1041, mainly engaging in half-measures to delay industrialisation. The current
US-Chinese confrontation in space started growing already in the 1980s1042, when the US grew wary
of the role space capabilities transfers in international business.1043 In the following decade, the
combination of the SDI project1044, the Chinese repression of students at Tienanmen Square1045, the
Loral-Hughes incident and the following Cox Commission Report1046 lead to an ice cold
relationship between the US and China. The US began to execute strict export controls on space-
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related dual-use technology1047 and still upholds the specifically targeted Wolf Amendment blocking
commerce and cooperation with China.1048 The US has blocked Beijing’s effort to join the ISS.1049
Furthermore, the US has not accepted any of the proposed space weapons bans drafted by Russia or
China, mainly because space weapons based on Earth are not included in the proposals, but
continue to research and develop everything from space planes to  duals ABM systems despite
protests from other states.1050 
The risk of space war has probably not peaked yet in the ongoing transition between the
Second and Third Space Age. China’s decision to display its emerging counter-space capabilities
can be viewed as the result of long-standing opposition towards the existing international space
order.1051 The direct-ascent ASAT test in 2007 marked a turning point in international space politics
because it was the first reciprocal ASAT tests since the 1980s. Obviously, a third challenger had
entered the international boxing ring in space. At this point in time, China looks like a more potent
challenger to the US in the long run than the USSR. China's industry continue to grow and space
capabilities are rapidly becoming more advanced. The seems to be  a growing mismatch between
the hierarchy of space prestige and the actual distribution of space power. Unfortunately, the most
likely result is an increased risk of space war going into the future.  
If China's space power grows at speeds similar to those demonstrated in the last decades,
PTT and HST predicts that the risk of space war will keep increasing. China is still acting within the
capitalistic international order in space dominated by the US, but what will happen in the next
decade? Will it become cheaper for China to change the system? To which degree does China want
to change the system? If China's net gains from system change increase, and the costs of
maintaining the system increase for the US, the challenge could perhaps spread from the within the
UN to other institutions. The failure of the USSR to challenge the US teaches us a valuable lesson.
The underlying components of space power will ultimately determine whether China can become
the dominant state in international space politics. “Show-off” space capabilities can easily generate
short term prestige, but they do not guarantee survival in the long run. PTT and HST predicts that
the US stands in danger of entering a phase of space power maturation. Will the US open the door
for space cooperation as China becomes more powerful? If not, does that mean a space war will
occur as two new superpower approach parity in space power? If so, who will attack first? The
rising challenger who can finally throw a real punch? Or the dominant space power losing its grip?
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Regardless, Russia – together with a wide array of other states – will become the joker in an
increasingly dangerous relationship between the US and China. Will Russia continue to side with
China if it builds am alternative, international space order? Or stay sides with the US international
order it has criticised and worked to change? 
The goal of the fourth neorealist analysis was to test if a preponderance of space power in
the international system has decreased the risk of space war, and explain why a space war has not
yet occurred in the ongoing transition between the Second and Third Space Age. The US is still the
dominant state in space, but China is a rising, at least partly dissatisfied challenger. Furthermore,
China seems to have more space power potential than the USSR. The risk of space war so far was at
its highest around 2007 and 2008, when both the US and Chinese tested ASATs on their own
satellites for the first time in several decades, but will probably peak later in the space power
transition between the Second and Third Space Age. China is currently using its growing space
power to challenge the US order in space, and the cost of system change might be decreasing. At
the same time, the US, whose space power might be maturing, is trying to stop China from
becoming the dominant state in international space politics. If China keeps growing, the most
dangerous moment in the Space Age is yet to come. In sum, the second neorealist hypothesis is
correct, but might not stay correct as the transition from the Second and Third Space Age unfolds.
The conclusion is that a US preponderance of space power and its underlying components in the
international system has decreased the risk of space in the transition between the Second and Third
Space Age, but the risk of space war is increasing because China is a rapidly rising and at least
partly dissatisfied challenger both in space and on Earth.
3.5 The Third Partial Conclusion: Towards a Dangerous Future in Space
The fifth subchapter of Chapter III presents concluding remarks and reflections based on the
findings of the thesis so far. Historical evidence on both the First and Second Space Age has been
analysed using Waltz´s defensive neorealism (DN) and Mearsheimer´s offensive neorealism (ON)
in combination. The transition between the First and Second Space Age, and between the Second
and Third has been analysed using Organski´s power transition theory (PTT) and Gilpin´s
hegemonic stability theory (HST). As a synthesis of these four analyses, the third partial conclusion
argues that the distribution of space power in the international system has been prone to peace so far
in both the first and Second Space Age. Going into the third space age, however, the risk of space
war is increasing according to all four neorealist theories. 
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Anarchy and uneven growth rates have both influenced international space politics
throughout the Space Age. Under anarchy, the threat of US nuclear weapons made the USSR – the
communist challenger – develop more advanced rockets. However, the USSR would never had the
ability to develop so advanced space capabilities without the rapid transitional growth and benefits
of backwardness it was experiencing. In similar fashion, space weapons were developed due to a
security dilemma in which nuclear ASATs were followed by conventional ones, but the security
dilemma occurred in the first place because the USSR had grown into a superpower – in spite of
losing millions of people and large cities in WWII. Insecurity stayed high even when the US was
the sole superpower in space and no other state dared to attack it. Now, China is the challenger
rising up from rapid growth, approaching both power and space power parity, creating new security
dilemmas. A multitude of states is following behind, creating increased risk of miscalculation and
number of potential conflicts in international space politics. With all this insecurity, why has there
never been a space war? 
Neorealist scholars agree that distribution of power in the international system is the key to
explain the likelihood of war. The two neorealist hypotheses on space war, formulated in the
introduction, are built on extrapolations from some of the most prominent among them. In a
neorealist analysis, the space power would be defined as material capabilities like SLVs, satellites,
spaceports, ASATs, ground stations and space stations. Space capabilities are most often dual-use,
blurring the lines between civilian and military, and offensive and defensive. 
The first neorealist hypothesis suggested that a bipolar balance of space power in the
international system has decreased the risk of space war. The hypothesis was tested in the first
neorealist analysis against the historical evidence of the First Space Age. Seen through the
theoretical lenses of DN and ON, the history of international space politics in that time period show
that a bipolar balance of space power between the US and USSR, together with deep linkages to
nuclear stability, high costs, technological immaturity and possible space security maximisation,
did decrease the risk of space war in the First Space Age. In other words, the first neorealist
hypothesis was is correct, but would be more precise if it took into account the last three additional
factors. 
The second neorealist hypothesis, on the other hand, suggested that a preponderance of
space power in the international system has decreased the risk of space war. The hypothesis was
tested in the second neorealist analysis against the historical evidence on the transition between the
First and Second Space Age. Through the theoretical lenses of PTT and HST, the history of
international space politics in the time period shows that a US preponderance in the underlying
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components of space power in the international system decreased the risk of space war in the
transition between the First and Second Space Age. In other words, the hypothesis was partly
correct.
The third neorealist tests the first neorealist hypothesis against evidence on the Second
Space Age. The conclusion is that a US unipolarity of space power and its underlying components
in the international system, together with high cost, technological immaturity and possible space
security maximisation, has decreased the risk of space war in the Second Space Age, but a shift
towards a more multipolar space power balance, with increased complexity and competition for
regional hegemony on Earth, has increased the risk. Thus, the first neorealist hypothesis is wrong
when applied to the Second Space Age, but DN and ON have recognised that unipolar systems are
safe, but unstable. 
The fourth neorealist analysis tests the second neorealist hypothesis against evidence on the
transition between the Second and Third Space Age. The conclusion is that a US preponderance of
space power and its underlying components in the international system has decreased the risk of
space in the transition between the Second and Third Space Age, but the risk of space war is
increasing because China is a rapidly rising and at least partly dissatisfied challenger both in
space and on Earth. To conclude, the second neorealist hypothesis is correct, but might not stay
correct as the transition from the Second and Third Space Age unfolds. 
Four neorealist theories, divided in two opposing camps on the question of space war,
collectively conclude that the space power distribution in the First and Second Age has been
fundamentally prone to peace in space. The First Space age had a bipolar balance of space power,
but the USSR never truly reached parity with the US in the underlying components of space power
in the transition to the Second Space Age. For a decade or two, the US experienced a unipolar
moment in space. However, more and more states are realising their space power potential and
beginning to balance back in space. Most powerful among them is China, which is growing fast
both in space and on Earth. In combination, DN, ON, PTT and HST conclude that the international
system was prone to peace in space, and that the future in space is dangerous. They disagree,
however, on why space has stayed secure and stable, and exactly why the future is dangerous. 
In order to draw conclusions from four partly diverging theories, we must use an eclectic
approach. Analytical eclecticism seeks pragmatism, problems with wide scope and selective
recombination of analytical components from explanatory theories embedded in competing research
traditions. Yes, the four neorealist theories produce different explanations on why space war never
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occurred, but that is not only a negative thing. By using theories with many similarities and some
differences, the analysis becomes more rich in the face of complex, messy, real-world problems. 
The four neorealist theories all conclude that the world is approaching a dangerous moment
in international space politics. The US is still the most powerful state in space, but China is a
growing challenger. The US and China do not have – and never have had – any substantial
cooperation in space. They are at different stages technologically, making it harder to perform
symbolic “handshakes in space” like the US and USSR did in 1975. Meanwhile space is getting
crowded, more multipolar, has more potential conflicts and higher risk of miscalculation. States are
using space capabilities to challenge the US to regain regional hegemony. Thus, an eclectic
neorealism concludes that the Third Space Age is likely to be the most dangerous moment in the
history of international space politics. 
A future space war will most likely be part of a great power conflict on Earth. The thesis has
showed that international space politics can not be treated as totally exogenous to international
politics. Space power is deeply interlinked with power. In international politics, space capabilities
can be seen as a form of latent power. Space power insufficient to control the outcome of terrestrial
conflicts, but can be a force-enhancer to essential ground troops. Thus, in international space
politics, “Earth power” is latent to space power. States need certain material capabilities on Earth to
launch satellites into orbit. The satellites then increase states' space power and give them useful
information for military operations on the ground. In other words, states need “Earth power” to
make space power, but space power give them more “Earth power” in return.  The causes of space
war are also deeply interlinked with causes of great power war. A state cannot just use space
weapons to shoot down another state's satellite without expecting a reaction on Earth. Similarly, a
state cannot go to war with a country on Earth and expect that space weapons to be left out of the
fighting. Through surveillance and data collection, space capabilities have become part of the very
structure of international security and stability. Thus, an attack on space capabilities would be a
destabilising, provocative and therefore risky move. 
Some factors can still ease concerns. States due seem more inclined to maximise space
security than space power. High cost and technological immaturity puts a constant limit on space
activities. China is still mostly challenging the US within the existing international order. However,
anarchy can sometimes force states to maximise space security by building space weapons because
the risk of space war is actually high. The cost of space capabilities has fallen drastically, while the
technology has rapidly improving. China is challenging the US more directly in its own backyard in
South-East Asia, and eventually might reach parity with the US both in space power and its
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underlying components. 
The third partial conclusion argues that the distribution of the space power has been
fundamentally prone to peace so far in the Space Age. Anarchy and uneven growth rates have both
influenced international space politics, but a space war has still never broken out. Chapter III
contains four neorealist analyses that test different two neorealist hypothesis agains historical
evidence. When combined in an eclectic approach to international space politics, the four neorealist
theories concludes that a space war has not occurred in the Space Age because the space power
distribution in the international system has been bipolar and unipolar while no state has reached
parity with the US in the underlying components of space power.
*****
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CONCLUSION
“The advent of spaceflight produced a fundamental historical disjuncture, 
only dimly perceived at first, between industrial modernity, 
and the post-modernity of the information age. (…)
The space age is the age of global politics.”
– Michael Sheehan, International Politics of Space.1052 
This master thesis in International Relations (IR) has attempted to answer a simple question. Why
have the most powerful states on Earth never fought a war in space? The neorealist answer is that
the distribution of space power in the international system has so far been prone to peace in space,
but also that the distribution is gradually becoming more dangerous. A history of international space
politics between 1957 and 2018 has been analysed using a theoretical framework built on four
different neorealist theories. If defined widely enough, neorealism can include at least defensive
neorealism (DN), offensive neorealism (ON), power transition theory (PTT) and hegemonic
stability theory (HST). The four theories have much in common, but are divided on the question of
war. Two neorealist hypotheses, one for each “camp”, have been formulated and tested against
historical evidence. The conclusion is that the distribution of space power has been bipolar in the
First Space Age and unipolar in the Second Space, but in the underlying components of space
power, neither the USSR/Russia or China have ever reached up to the US. 
The risk of space war has been significant from the early Space Age into the present. Space
is not and has never been a sanctuary from military conflict. The security dilemma has caused
insecurity higher than 100 kilometres above the surface of the Earth – and so have uneven growth
rates. Space – the “final frontier” – was conquered using military technology from WWII. After a
modified ICBM carried Sputnik into space, the US and USSR quickly started developing space
weapons to defend their satellites through deterrence. The risk of space war peaked in the early
1960s, when the US and USSR developed and tested the first anti-satellite weapons in a highly
volatile international system. First, nuclear anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) became an extension of
the Cold War nuclear arms race. However, they quickly revealed a destructive potential so large
that the superpowers banned their use by treaty. After nuclear ASATs were banned, conventional
ASATs took centre stage. Meanwhile, satellites proved to be highly valuable for spying and military
force-enhancement, but they also became more vulnerable targets. In the 1980s, as the Cold War
1052 Sheehan. The International Politics of Space, p. 3. 
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was approaching its unforeseen end, large military space investments on both sides, but especially
in the US, created yet another peak in the risk of space war. After the USSR collapsed, US
unilateralism in space became a threat to less powerful states. In the last decades, China has
challenged the US by investing newfound wealth, partly from its commercial space sector, in a wide
range of military space capabilities, including operational ASATs with demonstrated destructive
potential. The research question remains: why have the US, the USSR/Russia and China not overtly
destroyed each others space assets through offensive action between 1957 and 2018? 
In short, this thesis provides three answers. First, a neorealist analytical framework – the
“toolkit” of the thesis – has proved that it can capture the essence of international space politics.
The initial case for using a widely defined neorealism, encompassing defensive neorealism (DN),
offensive neorealism (ON), power transition theory (PTT) and hegemonic stability theory (HST),
was made already in the introduction. International space politics appeared to be a game played by
the great powers on Earth, in which advanced, material, military capabilities is the main currency of
authority. However, liberal and constructivist perspectives were also included at an early stage to
expose the reader to other interpretations and provide justification for each step taken. The
supporting argument was strengthened in Chapter I. A crash course on international space politics
showed that there is no clear boundary between Earth and space. The most important space
activities are conducted by the most powerful states states either on Earth itself or in the orbits
surrounding it. A literature review showed that all major IR paradigms have proved useful, but
continue to clash in the study of international space politics. It revealed that neorealism can explain
core dynamics in international space politics, but also revealed clear gaps in the existing IR
literature on international space politics. Ultimately, a final case was made for basing the study on a
widely defined neorealism. Just as international politics is the realm of IR, competition, conflict and
war is the natural domain of realism. The discipline's dominant theoretical body, neorealism,
produced clear and contrasting hypotheses with multiple shared assumptions, but essential
differences. The first neorealist hypothesis, based on DN and ON, was that a bipolar balance of
space power in the international system has decreased the risk of space war. The second neorealist
hypothesis, based on PTT and HST, was that a preponderance of space power in the international
system has decreased the risk of space war. 
Second, a descriptive history of international space politics between 1957 and 2018 has
revealed that international space politic is highly interconnected with international politics. The
striking similarities between the history of international politics in space and on Earth implies that
the causes of space war are closely related to the causes of war. The Space Age began as the Cold
War superpower rivalry, born in the after math of WWII, carried over into space. Only two states,
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the US and USSR, were initially able to compete. The historically weaker USSR was a first mover
in space because it felt threatened, but the US quickly levelled the playing field. After the terror
balance between two opposing international orders in space was codified in a new space regime in
the spirit of détente, the risk of space war decreased. Gradually, the US overtook the USSR as the
most powerful state in space. When the USSR collapsed, the US was the only space superpower
left. Meanwhile, China had begun benefiting properly from long term investments in space
capabilities dating back to the 1980s. Today, the US is still the most powerful state in space, but
China's space power is growing rapidly. The familiar narrative strengthened the choice of IR theory,
since neorealist theories were designed to study the history of international politics on Earth. If
international politics in space and on Earth is deeply interlinked, the IR has a higher chance of being
able to capture the object's essence. There is a high risk of space capabilities being used together
with nuclear weapons and other military capabilities in a potential great power war. A conflict on
Earth could escalate into space, or a space war could lead to war on Earth. Regardless, history
shows that the causes of space war and great power conflict are related. 
Third, a neorealist analysis of the history of international space politics has concluded that
the distribution of space power among the US, the USSR/Russia and China has been prone to peace
so far in the Space Age. The eclectic analysis has combined four different neorealist theories with a
historical methodology to produce a complex causal explanation. Together they conclude that a
space war has not occurred between 1957 and 2018 because the space power distribution in the
international system has been bipolar and unipolar while no state has reached parity with the US in
the underlying components of space power. The conclusion is the result of four neorealist analyses
testing two neorealist hypotheses against historical evidence from the First and Second Space Age.
In the First Space Age, a bipolar balance of space power – deeply interlinked with the bipolar
balance of nuclear power – between the US and USSR decreased the risk of space war by creating a
game that was easy to read and codify in the international space regime. In the transition between
the First and Second Space Age, a US preponderance in the underlying components of space power
decreased the risk of space war by making it to costly for the USSR to challenge the status quo –
even though it initially was the most powerful state in space. In the Second Space Age and the
ongoing transition into the Third Space Age, a US unipolarity of space power and its underlying
components has decreased the risk of space war because no other state could afford to risk an attack
in space. In addition, high cost and technological immaturity deacreased the risk of space war by
placing a constant limit on space activities. States seem more inclined to maximise space security
than space power. Ultimately, China still seems to be challenging the US within the existing
international order – at least partly. 
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The neorealist analysis further warns against a dangerous future in space. All four neorealist
theories predict a more insecure distributions of space power and an increasing risk of space war in
the Third Space Age. China is rapidly catching up with the US both in space power and the
underlying components – and so are other powerful states. In other words, the distribution of space
power in the international system is becoming more multipolar, and a rising challenger is
approaching parity with the dominant one. Thus, according to both camps of neorealism, the world
is entering a period with a higher risk for space war. The gradual shift to multipolarity has already
increased the risk of space war during the Second Space Age. As the USSR collapsed, a US
preponderance of space power increased insecurity in space for less powerful states in the
international system. China and Russia therefore balanced against the US in space to be able to
defend themselves through deterrence. Moreover, the quest for regional hegemony on Earth has
increased the risk of space war. The risk of space war has increased because China is a partly
dissatisfied challenger that wants to change or replace parts of the international space order
dominated by the US. The risk has also increased because the US is trying to keep China from
becoming the dominant state. If China's space power grows at speeds similar to those demonstrated
in the last decades, the risk of space war will most likely increase in the future. 
Finally, this thesis can hopefully inspire further research on international space politics. If
this turns out to be a stepping stone for other students or scholars, there is still a wide gap to fill in
the IR literature. Even neorealism, a prominent school within the dominant realist paradigm, has
rarely been applied to the object. In that respect, this thesis is somewhat of an experiment. As it
turns out, international space politics is not exogenous to international politics. Neorealism can be
used to capture its essence. And the history of international politics in space and on Earth is largely
the same. Nonetheless, the neorealist conclusion – that the distribution of space power has been
prone to peace, but is growing more dangerous – makes competing theoretical perspectives more
important than ever. The distribution of space power might be unfavourable, but liberalism and
constructivism might produce more optimistic predictions on the likelihood of space war.
Alternative perspectives and conclusions on international space politics, perhaps based on the
descriptive history provided in this thesis, are highly needed to deal with humanity´s common
political future in space.
*****
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